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ABSTRACT 
The Methodology and Standards Development Unit of the Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE) commissioned Liverpool John Moores University (LJMU) to construct a laboratory 
facility to conduct a series of tests simulating the sudden failure of a tank such as is used 
industrially for the storage of hazardous liquids. Such failures are rare. However, history 
has shown that when they do occur a large proportion of the liquid is likely to escape over 
the surrounding bund wall or embankment, even if the force of the wave impact does not 
damage the retaining structures. This thesis introduces the background to the project, 
describes the new test facility, records the results of the investigation and shapes 
conclusions, which form partial fulfilment for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. The 
results will be of value to the HSE in the performance of its statutory duties, and may be of 
value to tank storage operators in their consideration of the extent and severity of 
foreseeable major accidents, in their risk assessments and in their consideration of 
reasonably practicable measures to reduce those risks. 
Tanks used for bulk storage of hazardous liquids are often completely surrounded by a wall 
or earth embankment with the aim of providing secondary containment for any spillage 
from the tank. If the walls of the bunded area have been designed, built and maintained in 
line with current standards then they will provide full containment of the likely spills. 
However, they will not contain the surge of liquid that would follow a catastrophic failure 
of the tank; even if the surge does not destroy the bund wall, the flood wave is likely to 
overtop it. Whilst catastrophic failure of bulk storage tanks is rare, the consequences for 
site personnel, any local community and the environment can be severe. Such accidents 
have occurred all around the world, such as in the USA, in Greece and in Lithuania, with 
colder climates being particularly at risk due to certain types of steel tanks becoming brittle 
with extended periods of exposure. 
The laboratory facility was built to perform simulations of catastrophic and partial failures 
of a storage tank, covering a comprehensive range of tank and bund arrangements and to 
measure both the dynamic pressures that are exerted on the bund wall and the quantity of 
liquid that overtops it. Charts and correlating functions were derived, allowing 
interpolation to other tank and bund arrangements at full scale. The resulting empirical 
equations allow operators and other interested parties to quickly and easily assess the 
potential impact of various failure scenarios in terms of overtopping and to determine if the 
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structural integrity of the bund itself is a factor in the possible complete loss of secondary 
containment. 
For overtopping, Equation 6.1: 
A exp[- B( 
h )] 
H 
With A and B taking values as recommended in Chapter 6 
For dynamic pressures, Equation 6.2: 
DynIStatb,,,, =C exp[- D( 
h )] 
H 
With C and D taking values as recommended in Chapter 6 
The major extent of this work far exceeds previous attempts to quantify the extent of the 
problems experienced when a bulk storage vessel fails both in the types of failure modelled 
and in the range of configurations considered. A total of 183 different tank and bund 
configurations with various failure modes were investigated, with each individual test 
repeated at least five times. The novelty of this work is in the determination of the 
dynamic pressures associated with the bund overtopping and in evaluating any 
relationships between them. 
Observations and measurements made during the testing programme determined the 
performance and integrity of bund walls to be in question given the force of the impounded 
wave in the event of a catastrophic failure of the primary containment. The findings 
clearly indicate that the vast majority of current installations are severely at risk in the 
event of catastrophic failures and various other forms of major leaks. The implications are 
that existing regulations and guidelines need to be re-evaluated to improve the assessment 
of potential risks and to recommend suitable mitigation measures in environmentally 
sensitive areas. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Preface 
Chemical storage of any kind gives rise to potential threats to the environment and poses 
health and safety issues, which require extensive consideration in terms of the management 
of design, manufacture, installation, operation, regular inspection and maintenance. There 
are numerous guidelines in existence to help give rise to standardised methods of work and 
to give recommendations on good practice, with slight variations depending upon the 
country of the installation. With regard to the UK the recent publication of the document 
Chemical storage tank systems - goodpractice CIRIA C598 (2003), aims to give guidance 
on design, manufacture, installation, operation, inspection and maintenance. The 
document is targeted at project promoters, designers, manufacturers, construction and 
maintenance engineers, construction project managers, site engineers and operatives as 
well as regulators (Cassie and Seale, 2003). 
The 1999 Environment Agency (EA) report Spotlight on business environmental 
performance highlights the risks due to bad practice and outlines details on the prosecution 
of more than 100 companies for water pollution offences during that year. Although some 
improvements have been made over the last few years, there is still an urgent need for 
further improvement in the management of all areas of chemical storage. 
Storage tanks are commonly surrounded by a catchment area in the form of a retaining 
wall, known as a bund, its function being to retain any spillages, which may occur. Bunds 
are a form of secondary containment sometimes used within plant buildings for reactors 
and other process vessels. It is normal to limit the number of tanks to 60,000 m3 total 
capacity with incompatible materials having separate bunds as outlined in the Technical 
Measures Document on secondary containment issued by the Health and Safety Executive 
(2000). 
Bunds are normally designed to hold 110 % of the volume of that of the largest tank, the 
excess height notionally to prevent stored liquid surging over the top of the bund in the 
event of a catastrophic failure of the primary containment. This allowance has proved to 
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be inadequate as, even with storage volume excess, large quantities of liquid can still 
overtop bunds as discussed by Thyer and Jagger (1997). This has been demonstrated by 
various researchers including Greenspan and Young (1978) and Greenspan and Johansson 
(1981), together with actual incidences of containment vessel failure e. g. at Ponca City in 
1924 and Floreffe in 1988. Within the last decade, several incidents have occurred in 
which tanks have failed catastrophically involving flammable vapours inside an 
atmospheric storage tank exploding. This resulted in the tank splitting along the side seam 
or being propelled upward from its base (shell to base failure). 
Welding operations are a common cause of catastrophic failure with vapours igniting 
outside the tank and flashback occurring into the tank itself. These incidents commonly 
result in serious injury or death to workers as well as environmental contamination as 
indicated by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (1997). Examples of the 
latter include: 
o Floreffe, January 1988 - failure of a4 million gallon tank of fuel oil at Ashland 
Oil released a wave of oil that surged through the bunded area damaging 
another tank, overtopping the bund and subsequently polluting major rivers 
(Plate 1.1). 
o Iowa, March 1997 - failure of aI million gallon tank of ammonium phosphate. 
o Michigan, July 1999 -a1 million gallon tank of ammonium polyphosphate 
ruptured and damaged three other tanks. 
o Ohio, August 2000 -aI million gallon tank of liquid fertilizer ruptured and 
damaged nearby tanks. The resulting wave of liquid broke through a concrete 
bund and hit five tractor-trailer rigs, pushing them into the Ohio River. 
o Ohio, August 2000 - later that month a 1.5 million gallon tank of ammonium 
phosphate ruptured at the same storage facility. It damaged three other tanks 
causing them to leak, with liquid overflowing the bund. A total of 450,000 
gallons of contaminated water was reclaimed from the sewers and the public 
drinking water system was feared contaminated, resulting in the widespread use 
of bottled water as reported by the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (2001). 
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Later work carried out by Rouzsky (1983 cited in Thyer et al, 2002), led to the conclusion 
that these pressures may only be as high as 3 times the hydrostatic pressure at the base. An 
examination of bunding arrangements at numerous sites gave strength reserve factors, 
which varied greatly (factors of safety ranging from 600 down as low as 2), the lowest 
factors applying to larger bunds, where some risk of total failure was identified (Thyer and 
MacMillan, 1998). Due to the fact that bunds are normally designed to withstand the 
pressure due to a static head of fluid, a more accurate assessment of the resulting dynamic 
pressures is therefore needed. This will allow a more accurate analysis for the 
determination of safety factors for bunding and permit the design of adequate mitigation in 
the case of existing facilities. 
The need for a more accurate assessment tool for the various bunding arrangements and the 
lack of available source data, particularly with respect to the possible magnitude of the 
dynamic pressures led to a detailed literature review. The literature clearly detailed a vast 
number of failures around the world, but the records of the quantities lost over the bund 
were poorly reported even though large quantities and huge surge waves were involved in 
almost every case. In terms of the research carried out in the area, the information was 
limited with the first seminal work on bund overtopping carried out in the late seventies 
(Greenspan and Young, 1978). Research data pertaining to the associated dynamic 
pressures was first presented by Cuperus (1980 cited in Thyer et al 2002) suggesting 
factors up to 6 times the static pressure at the base of the bund with later workers 
suggesting factors of between 2.5 and 3.5 (Trbojevic and Slater, 1989) and finally Rouzsky 
(1983) quoting a factor of 3. There are obvious discrepancies in the range of values 
quoted, mainly due to the different scenarios investigated, with limited range of 
configurations considered in each case. Such variation in the range of possible dynamic 
pressures exerted on the bunds was an area that clearly merited further, more detailed 
investigation, particularly in the area of possible bund capacity and the problems with large 
surface areas producing excessive evaporation. 
1.3 Research Aim 
The aim of this research is to investigate a substantial range of tank and bund 
configurations under various modes of failure to more accurately quantify the extent of the 
possible overtopping and the magnitudes of the dynamic pressures exerted on the bunds. 
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1.3.1 Objectives 
o To produce data from experimental investigations, for percentage of tank 
contents overtopping model bund walls together with dynamic pressure profiles 
on the bund walls themselves. 
o To perform a statistical analysis and derive charts or correlating functions for 
overtopping percentages and dynamic pressures in terms of dimensionless 
ratios of model bund and tank dimensions. 
o To compare results with previous work using the dimensionless ratios referred 
to above. 
o To apply findings to provide estimates of possible overtopping fractions and 
dynamic pressures in full size installations. 
o To recommend improvements in bund design to incorporate adequate dynamic 
pressure strength reserve factors. 
1.4 Organisation of the thesis 
This thesis is arranged in a manner that reflects the order of the investigation, 
experimentation and analysis of the data collected. 
Chapter 2 Covers the history of previous events and seeks to show that current 
thinking for the design of bund walls may not be suitable for all types of fluid release. 
Chapter 3 Explains the construction of a test rig suitable for the investigation of 
catastrophic failures of bulk storage tanks and details the instrumentation used to measure 
the pressure effects on the bunds and the level of overtopping. 
Chapter 4 Considers previous work and the correlations derived from the small-scale 
experimental results and provides an introduction to axisymmetric and asymmetric 
releases. 
Chapter 5 Gives a summary of the results for axisymmetric and asymmetric modes of 
failure. 
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Chapter 6 Details the analysis of the axisymmetric and asymmetric test results and 
poses equations derived for the prediction of overtopping fractions together with expected 
dynamic pressures. 
Chapter 7 Evaluates the performance of empirical formulae in relation to historical 
case studies including comparisons with associated wave impact research. 
Chapter 8 Discusses the implications for stakeholders given the levels of overtopping 
and the extent of the dynamic pressures found during this investigation. 
Chapter 9 Conclusions relating to the major implications for the bulk storage industry 
and the issues relating to regulators in the design of installations and land use planning 
together with recommendations for improved risk assessment and possible methods of 
mitigation. 
1.5 Summary 
The introduction clearly identifies the extent of the problem in the event of a failure of a 
bulk storage tank together with the extreme effects of such an incident. Statutory bodies 
responsible for safety at major facilities have stated a need for greater understanding in the 
areas of catastrophic and partial tank failures. The performance of secondary containment 
measures along with the possible extent of any losses is therefore central to any 
investigation and reliable data is paramount in any efforts to properly identify risk and 
implement effective mitigation. 
The literature review examines a history of events and looks at the causes of bulk storage 
tank failures together with any 'domino' effects. A number of cases are discussed in 
further detail and the scope of the problem is explored in terms of the economic, social and 
environmental impact. Statutory regulations are an important factor in loss prevention in 
the process industries and the major Directives and Regulations relating to the design, 
operation and management of such facilities are outlined together with recommendations 
for the assessment of risk and the implementation of reasonably practicable measures for 
control of such risks. Limitations of previous research in the field is highlighted by a 
number of investigations undertaken by the HSE and a definitive need for review is 
established with the aim of gathering further data to quantify the level of possible losses in 
the event of a bulk storage tank failure. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 History of events 
There have been a substantial number of failures in the primary containment leading to 
extensive loss of the fluids contained with varying levels of devastation. The modes of 
failure vary greatly as do the initial causes, however in the cases involving sudden 
catastrophic release, the bunds were found lacking in almost all instances. 
The following examples are indicative of such failures, with a variety of causes listed 
including natural disasters and accidental releases. Some of the examples given are 
covered in more detail in order to convey the extent of the problem and to establish the 
need for a better understanding of the failure mechanisms and the magnitudes of the 
possible losses. 
A selection of tank failures has been catalogued as an extract from a recent paper by Thyer 
et al (2005) with single tank failures illustrated in Table 2.1. In cases where a single tank 
failure has led to further tanks being damaged in a 'domino' effect, these have been listed 
separately in Table 2.2 (Thyer et al, 2005). 
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Table 2.1 Single tank failures (Thyer et al, 2005) 
Date Location Contents Inventory Cause Reference 
lost 
1919 Boston USA Molasses 12,300 tons Inadequate desiýn Wilkinson 1991 
December Ponca City, Oil 8500 tons Brittle fracture MHIDAS 
1924 Oklahoma Database record 
2977 
February Esso refinery, Water Approx Failed during Private 
1952 Fawley, UK 21,500 M3 hydrotest correspondence 
March 1952 Esso refinery, Water Approx Failed during Private 
Fawley, U 21,500 M3 hydrotest correspondence 
1957 Meraux, USA Petrol 2220 M3 Not known Wilkinson 1991 
January 1966 Feyzin, France Propane 12000 m' - Loss Prevention 
Bulletin 
1967 North Tees, Ethylene Not reported Over-pressurisation Wilkinson 1991 
UK 
1968 UK Water Not reported Failed during Private 
drotest correspondence 
1970 Norfolk, USA Petrol T700 M3 Tank collapsed . MHIDAS database 
following fire caused 
by light ing 
1970 USA Slop oil 2400 m' Internal explosion lChemE accident 
following lightning database 
strike 
January 1970 Varannes, Ethylene 70 tons Over-pressurisation MHIDAS database 
Quebec 
Canada 
December Netherlands Fuel oil 19,000 in' Brittle fracture Private 
1970 starting at corroded correspondence 
weld 
1971 Canada, USA? Crude oil Approx Brittle fracture Glossop 
9000 M3 
1972 USA Oil 66000 bbl Brittle fracture Wilkinson 1991 
July 1973 Potchefstroom Ammonia 38 tons Brittle fracture on Barnes, 1990 
,S Africa domed end 1976 Addyston, Methanol 2275 M3 Internal explosion Wilkinson 1991 
USA following lightning 
strike 
1976 USA Asphalt Not Glossop 
specified 
1977 Umm Said, Propane 37000 M3 Possibility of faulty Lees 1996 
Qatar weldin 
1980 El Dorado, Solvents Mechanical failure Wilkinson 1991 
Kansas, USA 
1981 Moose Jaw, Crude oil 15,900 M3 Defective welding Private 
USA correspondence 
1983 Canada? Crude oil Not known Brittle fracture Private 
correspondence 
1983 USA Sulphuric 1800 M-1 Glossop I 
acid 
I 
1986 Colon, Light crude 38000 M3 Not known MHIDAS database 
Panama oil 
1986 Australia C4 heavy T8_m_T_ Internal explosion Lees 1986 
ends 
1987 Lyon, France Multiple - Internal explosions Lees 1986 
failures due to fire in tank 
farm 
- Lubricating - Failure at lChemE accident 
oil shell/bottom database 
junction due to over- 
pressurisation 
- Fuel oil - Internal explosions IChemE accident 
due to fire in tank database 
farm 
' 1988 Brisbane, Petro] T4T6_0-m3 Mechanical failure Wilkinson 1991 
Australia 
1988 Floreffe, Diesel 14,630 M3 Lack of full Laskowski, and 
Pennsylvania, hydrotest for Voltaggio in 
USA reassembled tank or Bockholts and 
brittle fracture Heidebrink 1988 
1989 USA Oil 760 m3 Glossop 
1989 USA Phosphoric 500 mT- Glossop 
acid 
1989 Richmond, Petrol M3 3200 Earthquake MHIDAS database 
California, 
USA 
20 March Lithuania Ammonia 7000 tons Roll-over Anderson & 
1989 Lindley 1992 
1992 USA Water 1100 m, - Glossop 
1992 USA? Undisclosed Nil. (tank Ignition of USEPA 
flammable empty) flammable vapour in 
liquid tank by external 
welding 
1993 ElSegundo, Fuel oil 830 tons Not known MHIDAS database 
California, 
USA 
1993 Fawley, UK Bunker oil 20,000 tons Not known MHIDAS database 
1994 USA Petroleum- - Internal explosion USEPA 
based sludge 
1995 USA Asphalt 14.000 M3 Internal explosion Glossop 
- Flushing oil 77 tons Spigot flow over Safety News 
bund following 
overheating of tank 
17 July 2001 Delaware Petrol 1.1 million Welding sparks US Chemical 
USA sulphuric gallons ignited flammable Safety and Hazard 
acid mixture vapours inside badly Investigation 
corroded tank Board 
Oct 2004 Hamburg, Heating oil -5 _00ml-i7n7 Internal explosion as Internet news 
Germany 50,000 m3 demolition workers report. 
tank started demolishing 
the wrong tank 
Table 2.2 Catastrophic tank failure incidents resulting in damage to, 
or failure of, neighbouring tanks (Thyer et al, 2005) 
Date Location Contents Inventory lost Cause Reference 
Source tank Subsequent 
tanks 
1949 Perth Asphalt Not reported Not Overheating of Wilkinson 
Amboy, reported asphalt tank caused 1991. 
USA explosion engulfing 4 
adjacent tanks. One, 
containing naphtha 
rocketed. 
1970 USA Creosote Glossop 
1978 US Oil 72,000 m-' -3 tanks Failure of three tanks Glossop 
in earthquake 
1979 USA Internal explosion Glossop 
occurred in one tank 
lifting entire tank off 
foundations. 10 mins 
later a neighbouring 
tank exploded 
1990 Westem Crude oil Not 10,000 tons Internal explosion IChemE 
Siberia reported (4 tank following lightning accident 
contents? ) strike database 
1995 US Undisclosed Approx Approx Internal explosion USEPA* 
flammable liquid 500 in 
3 500 in 
3 during welding on 
tank exterior 
1997 Iowa, US Ammonium 4550 M3 9100 M3 Defective welding USEPA 
phosphate from 2 tanks 
solution 
1999 Michigan Ammonium 455Tm-T- Damage to three Defective welding USEPA** 
us phosphate other tanks, 
solution volume lost not 
reported 
2000 Ohio, US Liquid fertiliser 4550 in' 4500 m' Defective welding USEPA** 
from 4 tanks 
2000 Ohio US Ammonium 6825 m3 Approx 3400 M3 Defective welding USEPA** 
Phosphate from 3 tanks 
solution 
(. ) US EPA chemical safety alert, EPA 550-F-97-002b, May 199 7. 
(*. ) All of these incidents were listed in a USEPA chemical safety alert, EPA 550-F-01-001 January 2001, 
following a series of catastrophic lank failures. All the tanks were built either by the Carolyn Equipment 
Company ofFairfield Ohio, or Nationwide tanks Inc. ofHamilton Ohio. Both companies have since gone out 
of business. 
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2.2 Investigation of Causes 
The failure of above ground atmospheric storage tanks (Tables 2.1 and 2.2), of which a 
variety of similar types are in use around the world, can be liable to failure in the same 
way. Types include open top tanks with or without floating roofs and closed-top tanks 
either with or without floating roofs. Within the European Union (EU) the specification 
for the design of such tanks is covered by BS EN 14015: 2004. 
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) commissioned a study to 
investigate the common sources of failure and stated that a significant factor in tank farm 
accidents is human error. The study covering the ten-year period (1990 - 2000) 
highlighted that the number of accidents at long-term storage facilities had remained 
relatively constant. Of the 312 accidents at tank farms examined in this period it was 
found that operator error accounted for 22 %. Additionally, 55 % were attributable to tank 
failure, 10 % to valve failure, 4% to pump failure and 3% to bolted fitting failure. Human 
error also accounted for 100 % of accidents that resulted in fatalities, 88 % involving stock 
loss and 87 % of property damage, with the root cause attributed to overfilling/over- 
pressurisation (United States Environmental Protection Agency, 2000). 
The failure of bulk storage tanks can be attributed to a number of causes including human 
error, poor maintenance, vapour ignition, differential settlement, earthquake, lightning 
strike, hurricane, flood damage and over-pressurisation. Such incidents have highlighted 
the need for the proper assessment of potential risks and the requirement for suitable 
methods of mitigation. 
2.3 Natural disasters 
The fact that most major facilities are exposed to the elements and that many countries 
experience severe climatic extremes and or geological phenomena makes for increased risk 
of failure at some point in time. Such natural disasters are not always predicable and 
suitable methods of construction may not always mitigate the most extreme of possible 
effects. 
There have been numerous storage facilities around the world damaged by earthquakes 
including major incidents in Alaska USA 1964, Chile in 1960, and two in Japan, Niigata in 
1964 and Tokachi in 2003. The incident in 1964 at Niigata resulted in the loss of 
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containment of several tanks due to damage sustained during the earthquake, which added 
to the ensuing inferno and continued to bum for 13 days. This incident highlighted several 
problems including that of floating roofs becoming dislodged and jamming, with the 
resulting fire being attributed to sparks from the damaged roof being shaken violently. 
More importantly, this was the first time that the phenomena of liquefaction had been 
observed, raising concerns over the integrity of storage tank foundations at similar coastal 
locations (Akatashi and Kobayashi, 2006). 
It is estimated that lightning accounts for 61 % of all accidents in storage and processing 
activities, where natural events are identified as the root cause of the incidents. In North 
America, 16 out of 20 accidents involving petroleum products storage tanks were as a 
result of lightning strikes. Persson and L6nnormark (2004) in a review of fires in the 
petroleum industry claim there have been 150 tank fires in a 52-year period as a result of 
lightning. Some of the more recent incidents include Brisbane, Australia 4 th June 2003, 
where a floating roof crude tank was struck by lightning. Nigeria, 20 th July 2002,180000 
bbl (one blue barrel is equal to 42 US gallons) were lost when fire fighters failed to gain 
control of a rim fire caused by a lightning strike. Poland 5 th May 2002, a 10,000 ml tank 
was destroyed as a result of being struck by lightning, this was compounded by the failure 
of the semi-fixed fire fighting system. Kansas, USA 21't August 2001, five tanks were 
destroyed in one incident after fire spread from a tank which had been struck by lightning. 
2.3.1 Louisiana, USA, 3 rd September 2005 
Numerous refineries closed down production prior to Hurricane Katrina striking, however 
in the wake of the hurricane several refineries reported spills, the worst being at the 
Meraux Refinery operated by Murphy Oil. A crude oil storage tank holding 65,000 bbI 
was damaged during the storm and an estimated 25,110 bbI of oil was released. The 
surrounding dyke was damaged and large quantities of oil escaped into the local 
environment. The cause of the damage to the dyke is uncertain; it was either as a direct 
result of the storm or due to the force of material escaping from a tank. At least one tank 
was lifted and moved 10 metres away from its foundations by the immense power of the 
floodwaters (Murphy Oil Corporation, 2006), (MSN News, 2006). 
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2.4 Accidental releases 
There are numerous causes for accidental releases to occur, most of them involving some 
form of human error or tank failure. Filling and emptying operations are particular sources 
for potential releases with structural failures mostly being traced back to poor construction 
or maintenance issues. In most instances, catastrophic failures can be attributed to material 
defects or extreme cold conditions leading to brittle fracture of the steel shell. A number 
of examples of such failures are listed below: 
2.4.1 Naples, Italy, 21st December 1985 
During a filling operation, fuel overflowed through the roof of a floating roof tank for 
almost an hour and a half. An estimated 700 tonnes of fuel escaped into the secondary 
containment. The pool of liquid covered the bund area of the tank and the adjacent 
pumping area, which was connected through a drain duct. The spill was followed by a 
vapour cloud, which rapidly formed and ignited, the source of the ignition being a pumping 
station. The explosion resulted in the injury of five personnel, and the destruction of the 
facility. Twenty-four tanks were destroyed in the fire, together with the failure of 
numerous pipelines, which contributed to the fire, and the loss of the main fire-fighting 
control centre. The fire lasted for seven days (Clark et al, 2001). 
2.4.2 Floreffe, Pennsylvania, USA, 2 nd January 1988 
The Department of Environmental Protection (1988) reported a large aboveground fuel 
storage tank that suddenly failed as its shell rent completely from base to roof. The failure 
came completely without warning as the tank released a huge wave of Diesel fuel (3.5 to 
3.9 million US gallons), which surged across the bunded area with the wave crest easily 
washing over the secondary containment systems in the form of earthen dykes (Plate 2.1). 
The intended design of the dykes was originally meant to deal with gradual releases with 
such an event never envisaged, leaving them unable to cope and totally inadequate. 
Figures on the amount of fuel escaping from the site vary with typical figures quoted as 
750,000 US gallons leaving the storage terminal, owned and operated by Ashland Oil Inc. 
The pathways included underground wastewater systems operated by the nearby Elrama 
power generating station, which fed directly into the Monongahela River via a storm water 
discharge pipe. 
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Estimates of the amount of un-recovered material vary, however data suggests that over 
511,000 gallons remain in the river systems. The effects of the release included the deaths 
of 11,000 fish and 2,000 birds with miles of contaminated shoreline reported. The short- 
term effects were merely the start of the problem with the log-term chronic effects on the 
environment persisting for many months. As well as the environmental impact, the socio- 
economic effects were just as widespread with businesses unable to operate properly and 
locals having their normal every day lives disrupted. 
The investigation into the events leading up to the catastrophic failure and subsequent 
contamination found a flaw in the recently reconstructed 4,000,000-gallon bulk storage 
tank. The problem originated near the top edge of a steel plate in the fist level and with 
such low winter temperatures, the steel was prone to act in a brittle manner making it 
susceptible to the stresses imposed due to filling. The flaw was found to exist prior to the 
reassembly of the tank and had gone undetected for many years of previous operation. 
The catastrophic failure should have been avoidable, as the existence of the flaw was 
detectable and the brittle nature of the steel during prolonged periods of cold weather was 
easily predicable. The errors in failing to detect the flaw and in the poor consideration of 
the material properties were considered serious deviations from good practice and 
compliance with the current codes. Further criticism was aimed at some of the company 
employees and contractors, where a pattern of bad practice and negligence in the 
reconstruction of the tank had been uncovered. 
The reconstruction process did not conform to the industry standard practice or in some 
cases to the terms of the contract, however these discrepancies were not directly attributed 
to the ultimate failure of the tank. The neglect by Ashland, which led to the collapse 
caused extensive environmental and economic damage and exposed workers to 
unnecessary bodily harm, with one employee recorded as taking fluid level measurements 
from the roof only minutes prior to the event. 
The lack of suitable statutory and regulatory programmes meant that the accident was 
unlikely to have been prevented, as there was no emphasis on the design and construction 
practices relating to such activities. The occurrence of sudden and extensive failures of 
bulk storage vessels is more frequent than commonly envisaged and legislation for 
construction and maintenance programmes is essential together with the apportioning of 
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financial responsibility for emergency response and recovery of associated costs 
(Department of Environmental Protection, 1988). 
2.4.3 Lithuania, 20th March 1989 
A large bulk storage vessel containing refrigerated liquid ammonia failed catastrophically 
without warning. The resulting sudden escape of the contents forced the tank to move 
sideways impacting and demolishing the concrete bund wall compromising the secondary 
containment and releasing 7000 tonnes of material, which ignited spreading fire across the 
site. The storage of 35,000 tonnes of fertiliser in a nearby warehouse added to the problem 
as the fire engulfed the facility. The combination with the solid material produced acid 
fumes from the burning mass for several days with the fume cloud visible form up to 45 
km away. In terms of deaths, there were seven immediate fatalities with 57 gas related 
injuries reported on site due to the pools of ammonia that formed on the ground, however 
no deaths were reported off site. 
The Azotas site was a large complex and employed many people from the local area with 
the main town of Jonova approximately 12 km from the facility having a population of 
about 40,000. At the time of the accident 3500 employees were on the site, which was 
with a restricted military zone. The tank was sited approximately 600 m from the main 
plant with rail tankers filled some 50 m from the storage tank. A control and operations 
room positioned nearby was completely destroyed along with all of the operations data. 
The adjacent fertiliser plant transported product via conveyor belts to storage facilities with 
15,000 and 20,000 tonnes of capacity with a further storage warehouse holding 20,000 
tonnes of ammonium nitrate. 
The tank itself had a diameter of 30 in and was about 20 in high, standing on a concrete 
plinth supported by columns. The base of the tank was fixed to the concrete base using 36 
steel anchor straps welded to box section on the vertical shell, passing through the concrete 
and secured with welded steel cross plates. Carbon steel was used in the manufacture of 
the tank with a wall thickness of 200 mm at the top and 35 mm at the base. Thermal 
insulation was provided by 700 mm of perlite covered by a steel jacket. The condition of 
the perlite was not known with regard to moisture content at the time of installation and no 
record of base insulation could be found. The tank was of Japanese design and was 
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installed in 1979 surrounded by a 14 m high reinforced concrete bund with a 100 % 
capacity. 
The incident was accompanied by a loud 'whooshing' noise as the shell of the tank was 
pushed through the bund by the force of the rapidly escaping liquid ammonia. It appeared 
that the tank had split open along one side extending to the base, breaking all of the 
holding straps. The extent of the damage was so great that the depth of the liquid ammonia 
around the fertiliser plant was up to 70 mm deep in some areas and evaporation soon 
allowed the build up of a large vapour cloud. The vapour was subsequently ignited by a 
nearby flare-stack and quickly advanced to include the nearby fertiliser storage areas. 
The military responded in minutes and began to spray water, which only increased the 
evaporation rate fuelling the intensity of the fire. The toxic gas alarm sounded for several 
minutes after the release, yet the fire fighters were poorly equipped with no heat resistant 
suits or adequate air supplies. After about 12 hours all of the ammonia had evaporated, 
however the fertiliser continued to bum for many days, releasing vast quantities of nitrous 
fumes. Most of the deaths were attributed to inhalation of ammonia gas with victims 
concentrated in the storage area. 
The root cause of the incident was later attributed to warm ammonia being delivered to the 
bottom of the tank due to an operational error. This led to the formation of an unstable 
layer at the base of the tank which later rose to surface causing violent evaporation to 
occur, which the pressure relief system was unable to cope with. The result was the 
sudden uplifting of the tank base and breaking of the straps along with the base to wall 
welds allowing the rapid release of the liquid ammonia (Anderson and Lindley, 1992). 
2.4.4 Pennsylvania, USA, 16 th October 1995 
Five workers were killed when two tanks exploded at the Pennzoil Product Company 
Refinery. A welding operation was in progress on a service stairway sited between the two 
waste liquid storage tanks. One tank failed along its bottom seam, the shell being 
propelled vertically away from the base as a result of rapid over-pressurisation caused by 
ignition of combustible vapour. The tank contents were instantly released, igniting the 
contents of the second tank, this also exploded, releasing its entire contents. There was no 
secondary containment surrounding these tanks and the surge of burning liquid rapidly 
spread across the entire site, damaging another thirteen storage tanks. The contents of 
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another five other tanks were ignited, resulting in the loss of 95,000 gallons of solvent and 
fuel oil ( United States Environmental Protection Agency, 1998). 
2.4.5 Delaware, USA, 17 th July 2001 
One worker was killed and eight injured, when a large sulphuric acid tank exploded. The 
explosion was the result of sparks from hot work on a catwalk above one of several tanks 
on the site, entering a tank through corrosion holes. Due to the subsequent ignition of 
flammable vapours, the tank shell was propelled away from its base resulting in a 
significant volume of sulphuric acid being released into the environment. An estimated 
660,000 gallons of acid was released, with extensive environmental damage including a 
large quantity of the escaping material entering the Delaware River killing thousands of 
fish and other wildlife. The operator, Motiva, part of the Premcor refining group were 
ordered to pay costs of $58 million, this included a sum of $36 million to the widow and 
family of the employee killed in the accident. An additional $24 million was also deemed 
payable in fines for various environmental violations (US Chemical Safety & Hazard 
Investigation Board, 2002). 
2.4.6 Antwerp, Belgium, 25th October 2004 
A storage tank failed catastrophically releasing its entire content of 37,000 e of crude oil. 
It is estimated that only 3 in' escaped the secondary containment during this incident, this 
was a result of a combination of factors. The height of the containment dyke itself was in 
excess of 4 m. and this combined with the unusual nature of the incident limited the extent 
of the losses. The mode of failure is best described, as a jetting release and it was this 
directionality, which possibly prevented further losses. One month prior to the incident a 
leak was detected in a neighbouring tank, which was consequently drained to allow for 
maintenance. Of seven tanks within the dyke at the time of the failure only three where in 
operation, the release being preceded by a low-level alarm indicator, which identified a 
change in content level. The incident began as a minor release rapidly changing to a major 
failure, with total loss of containment occurring within fifteen minutes of the alarm 
sounding. The release from the base was powerful enough to cause displacement and 
resulted in the tilting of the tank due to erosion of the foundation. 
Primarily, the cause was traced to the construction process with similar problems later 
identified with the remaining tanks on the site. The tanks had been erected on a base of 
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sand with an outer annulus of compacted crushed rock acting as the foundation. This 
overlaid a layer of sand and soft clay with the tank bases designed to incorporate a 'dome- 
up' to allow run of any water. Upon initial fill, due to the soft ground conditions, all of the 
tanks experienced subsidence, which resulted in deformation of the bases. This allowed 
the formation of a 'gutter', which trapped and concentrated moisture away from the sump 
pumps. In the tank that failed this 'gutter' was some 35 m in length and 0.2 m in width and 
resulted in severe corrosion culminating in the breach of the primary containment (Federal 
Public Service - Employment, Labour and Social dialogue, 2006). 
2.4.7 Buncerield, Hertfordshire, UK, 11th December 2005 
The events at the Buncefield fuel depot in Hertfordshire saw what was possibly the largest 
explosion in Europe since the Second World War, as reported by BBC News (2005). The 
incident, which happened at around 0600 GMT on Sunday I Ith December caused injuries 
to 43 people, two seriously and left a scene of devastation necessitating the closure of part 
of the MI and MIO motorways. The surrounding area was evacuated leaving some 2,000 
people displaced from their homes with thick clouds of smoke spreading to the south of the 
site. 
The Buncefield site is operated by the Total Oil Company and is a major depot for the 
distribution of fuel, storing oil, petrol and kerosene. A total of 20 tanks were involved in 
the incident, each reported to hold three million gallons of fuel. There is a question as to 
the operational safety of the depot in terms of its size relative to operating capacity and the 
investigation will look at risk assessments made by Total and the British Pipeline Agency 
(BPA) (Buncefield Adeyfield Community Forum, 2006). 
A tank overfilled at an estimated rate of 550 in' per hour for several hours overflowed into 
the bund generating vast quantities of vapour. This was a result of instrumentation failure, 
as high-level gauges failed to show that the tank was full. This was the second major 
catastrophe in less than 10 months, where vessels had been over-pressurised due to faulty 
instrumentation. In the first case the explosion and subsequent damage occurred at the BP 
America Refinery, Texas, where a distillation tower was over-pressurised during a start up 
operation and resulted in the loss of 15 lives with a further 170 injured (US Chemical 
Safety & Hazard Investigation Board, 2006). The devastation at Buncefield has been 
estimated at in excess of E10,000,000 in stored materials alone, in addition to the 
destruction of the site itself and the effect on surrounding businesses. The nearby 
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industrial estate housed some 630 businesses with at least 20 of these losing their premises, 
affecting the livelihood of some 500 people (Buncefield Major Incident Investigation 
Board, 2006). 
The environmental issues related to the disaster do not appear to have long-term 
implications with regard to water pollution as the heavily contaminated firewater was 
contained on site. In terms of air quality, the smoke released was classified as an irritant, 
rather than being toxic and monitoring of both air and ground level contamination was 
used to inform on any public health issues (Environment Agency, 2005). 
2.4.8 Mississippi, USA, 5th June 2006 
Three contractors were killed and one was seriously injured in an explosion and fire at an 
oilfield. The contractors were stood on a gantry situated above four oil production tanks, 
preparing to weld piping, when it is assumed that a welding tool ignited flammable 
vapours from one of the tanks (US Chemical Safety & Hazard Investigation Board, 2006). 
2.5 Current requirements 
Two of the instruments on the control of major accident hazards involving dangerous 
substances are outlined below. The first is Council Directive 96/82/EC, which is known as 
the Seveso II Directive (1996) and applies to all activities within the European 
Communities. The second is the Control of Major Accident Hazards or COMAH 
Regulations (1999), which applies within the UK. Both instruments aim to ensure 
adequate control and build on the lessons learned from previous incidents, however such 
controls are limited to what is termed 'reasonably practicable'. 
2.5.1 Seveso 11 Directive (1996) 
The main issues relating to the bulk storage of hazardous materials include the following: 
oA requirement to demonstrate that all possible steps have been taken to prevent 
major accidents including the preparation of contingency plans and response 
measures. The provision of a competent authority with information in the form of a 
safety report containing details of the establishments, the substances, the 
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installation and storage facilities, possible major accidents and the management 
systems in place to prevent/reduce risks of major incidents. 
0 To reduce the risk of domino effects so as not to increase the probability of major 
accidents by careful consideration to ensure establishments are not sited too closely 
and to provide the exchange of appropriate information. 
0 To Promote access to information on the environment with public access to safety 
reports and other information sufficient to allow correct actions to be taken. 
0 In the case installations where dangerous substances are present in significantly 
large quantities, it is necessary to institute internal and external emergency plans. 
This includes the establishment of systems to ensue monitoring and revisions as 
required to ensure proper implementation in the event of a major incident. 
0 With regard to internal emergency plans, staff must be properly consulted and with 
external plans the public suitably informed and consulted. 
0 For residential areas, areas of substantial public use and areas of natural/special 
interest it is necessary for land use and/or other policies to take account of the long- 
term need to maintain a suitable distance between these areas and establishments 
presenting major hazards. In the case of existing establishments to take account of 
additional/special technical measures so that the risk is not increased. 
0 To ensure adequate response measures are taken in the event of a major incident, 
whereas the operator immediately informs the competent authorities and provides 
sufficient information for the impact assessment to take place. 
0 The provision of information exchange to prevent future accidents of a similar 
nature with Member States communicating details of major accidents to the 
Commission to allow suitable analysis and dissemination of preventative measures. 
2.5.2 COMAH Regulations (1999) 
HSE has a statutory duty alongside the Environment Agencies as the Competent Authority 
under Statutory Instrument No. 743 - The Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) 
Regulations (1999). As a part of this duty HSE must assess predictive aspects of COMAH 
safety reports. A failing of some such reports is the belief of their authors that because 
bunds satisfy current standards they do provide full secondary containment for all 
foreseeable failure modes; it follows that the estimates of the extent and severity of 
accidents in the reports may be seriously optimistic. It was foreseen that data from this 
project would greatly strengthen the technical basis of HSE's assessments. Moreover, data 
from the project would provide tank storage operators with a means of assessing the 
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current performance of their bunds, of assessing the extent and severity of accidents, and of 
considering the reasonable practicability of measures to reduce the risks. 
COMAH regulations apply mainly to the chemical industry, but also to some storage 
activities, explosives and nuclear sites, and other industries where threshold quantities of 
dangerous substances identified in the Regulations are kept or used. Their main aim is to 
prevent and mitigate the effects of those major accidents involving dangerous substances, 
such as chlorine, liquefied petroleum gas, explosives and arsenic pentoxide which can 
cause serious damage/harm to people and/or the environment. The COMAH Regulations 
treat risks to the environment as seriously as those to people. 
An ammendment to the COMAH regulations came into force on the 30'h June 2005 
realting to the notification of activities encompassed by the regulations including 
exploration, extraction, processing and storage of hazardous materials. 
The bunds or earth banks that commonly surround tanks used for storing hazardous liquids 
are often designed with a capacity equal to 110 % of the capacity of the largest storage 
tank within the bund, the excess height being claimed in part to prevent liquid surging over 
the top of the bund following sudden failure of a tank. In reality, whilst a 110 % capacity 
bund will contain the release for less extreme modes of failure, it is unlikely to do so for 
more extreme modes. A series of experiments reported in HSE Contract Research Report 
405/2002, in which the contents of a model storage tank were released gently into a 110 % 
bund over a period of 30 seconds, showed that the bund was overtopped in almost every 
case. More severe modes of release would clearly give more in terms of overtopping 
(Cronin and Evans, 2002). 
2.6 Previous work 
In the UK, the HSE has undertaken a number of experimental studies of bund overtopping, 
principally in its Health and Safety Laboratory (HSL) in Buxton. In 1997 an HSL report 
examined the totality of the work, alongside known work performed outside HSE, and 
concluded that whilst much had been done the work was generally piecemeal and was in 
some cases not well recorded; in consequence it did not form the coherent and 
comprehensive picture that HSE required (Thyer and Jagger, 1997). 
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An outcome of the 1997 review was focused on a particular set of overtopping experiments 
undertaken by Greenspan and Johansson at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) 
in 1981. Greenspan and Johansson performed some fifty- laboratory simulations of a 
catastrophic failure of a storage tank located centrally within a circular surrounding bund 
Greenspan and Johansson (1981). Their work has since formed the basis of derived 
overtopping correlations. However, their model tank had a diameter of only about 8 
inches, leading to a suspicion that their results would be influenced by frictional effects to 
an extent that made them not applicable to full-scale tanks. A requirement of the test 
facility was that it should be sufficiently large that there should be no concern over scaling 
to full size (Thyer et al, 2002). 
Trbojevic and Slater (1989) investigated the potential failure of the secondary containment 
given the sudden release of fluid and determined a real possibility of structural failure of 
the bund itself. Existing work on modelling has been split between (small scale) 
laboratory experimentation and pure mathematical and modelling with efforts made to 
combine the two made by Greenspan and Young (1978), Michels et al (1988) and Thyer 
and MacMillan (1998). 
Based on these considerations the new facility was to have: 
oA suitably large scale to reduce friction and losses associated with smaller 
models. 
oA tank and bund quadrant representing a quarter of an axisymmetrical release. 
oA system to lift the tank very rapidly leaving a column of unsupported liquid 
able to slumP freely under gravity. 
oA set of dynamic pressure transducers fixed to the bund wall at various heights 
to record the dynamic pressures acting on the bund due to the liquid impact. 
o Systems for measuring the quantity of overtopped liquid. 
To meet these requirements it was decided that the tank bursts would be modeled using a 
single quadrant of space in the comer of a square spill table with sides 2 rn long. The 
effects of any friction against the smooth acrylic sheets that would form the sides of the 
spill table were to be regarded as negligible for the geometry applied in the analysis of the 
results, when considering a complete tank and bund arrangement. The quadrant-tank 
would have a radius of 300 mm. 
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The recent publication of the results based on the above work led to a number of 
recommendations for ftirther investigation (Atherton, 2005). These recommendations are 
directed towards the mitigation of current storage facilities to reduce the risk of fluid 
escape and the subsequent contamination of the environment. 
2.7 Need for review 
There is clear historical evidence that the current design criteria fails to address the 
problems associated with the sudden release of the tank contents following a catastrophic 
failure. The bund arrangements for most installations will fail to contain such a release in 
some cases the design of the bund itself may be liable to complete structural failure leading 
to the total loss of secondary containment. 
Given the substantial number of failures in the primary containment leading to extensive 
loss of the fluids, the need for further investigation into the performance and design of 
secondary containment was identified by current researchers. The modes of failure vary 
greatly as do the initial causes, however in the cases involving sudden catastrophic release, 
the bunds were found lacking in almost all instances. The overtopping of bunding is 
commonplace with the rapid escape of fluid from storage tanks. There is a particular need 
for hazard awareness in the area of defective welds, which have been identified as the 
cause of many failures. In terms of hazard identification there is a need to evaluate storage 
tanks for potential catastrophic failure with regard to the following (United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, 2001): 
o Manufacturer's details and records of the levels for quality of workmanship and 
testing. 
o Evidence for weakened or defective areas of weld. 
o Indications of corrosion around the base and those areas in direct contact with 
the ground. 
o Levels of exposure to heavy rainfall or high wind loading. 
o Age and general condition of the tank. 
o Close proximity to other bulk storage tanks, particularly those containing 
hazardous materials. 
Hazard reduction/prevention is directly related to proper design and construction, with 
regular inspection and maintenance allowing early detection and repair of potentially 
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dangerous defects. Guidance on the scheduling of inspections can differ. API 653 (2001) 
recommends a full external inspection of tanks every five years, while NACE International 
suggest every two years (US Chemical Safety & Hazard Investigation Board, 2002). Such 
guidance and suggested 'good practice' rely on voluntary action rather than direct 
regulatory requirement. However, inadequate inspection is one of the root causes of a 
catastrophic tank failure, for example in Antwerp (Belgium) 2004. Examination of the 
failed tank and remaining tanks within the same containment area indicated that poor 
foundations had resulted in all of the tanks incurring damage to the bases. Large creases 
had been formed in their bases acting as channels that retained excess water, resulting in 
localised post-construction corrosion remaining undetected until failure. 
In the UK, the HSE has considerable interest in predicting the consequence of releases of 
hazardous liquids from storage tanks, as indicated by Thyer, Hirst and Jagger (2002). HSE 
is a statutory body responsible for safety, and works alongside the various Environment 
Agencies. Regulation is mainly achieved via the implementation of the COMAH 
Regulations (1999) and the Seveso 11 Directive (1996). Under the UK regulations there is 
a need to perfonn suitable risk assessments and outline practicable measures to control the 
escape of materials from site. This requires the prediction of losses under various possible 
scenarios and leads to the requirement for realistic data on the performance of the 
secondary containment. The determination of common variables incorporated into an 
experimental database will facilitate the development of computer-based models as 
descried by Thyer and MacMillan (1998). 
2.8 Summary 
The history of events and the major incidents covered are only a few examples, which aim 
to highlight the extent of the problem the bulk storage industry faces with the containment 
of large volumes of mostly hazardous materials. Regulations can only go so far in 
providing a 'perceived' level of safety if the information upon which any assessment is 
based is reliable and covers all foreseeable modes of failure. A review of such work by the 
HSE has raised serious doubts over the validity of COMAH safety reports with misguided 
assumptions being made as to the performance of secondary containment at major 
installations. As a result of this work, a need for review was established and 
recommendations were made for possible further investigation of the problem based on 
information gathered from previous research and site assessments. 
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A suitable methodology has to be identified for a detailed investigation to be carried out 
and a review of the current literature is limited in terms of both the scope of the variables 
covered and the extent to which the data is recorded. A number of different approaches to 
the construction of a realistic test rig have been considered and the restrictions of various 
methods explored in some detail. The design of the test rig for this investigation is 
discussed as part of the methodology together with its functional requirements and 
performance in terms of repeatability. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Methodology 
3.1 Model Testing 
The failure mode in the event of tank rupture is highly complex and involves the 
interaction between fracture propagation and the flow of a fluid with a free surface. The 
assumption is made that the cracks will propagate at a much higher velocity than that of the 
fluid motion, and that they propagate at the same time in the vertical and in the 
circumferential directions. Thus, the tank looses its integrity instantaneously and hence is 
considered to have been removed as far as any structural containment is concerned 
(Trbojevic and Slater, 1989). Hypothetically, this leaves a cylindrical column of liquid 
collapsing under gravity or an axisymmetric mode of failure. An alternative mode of 
failure has been considered based upon evidence that the crack will propagate much faster 
in the vertical than the circumferential direction, hence giving rise to a vertical gaping 
aperture with the liquid flowing directionally through the gap created. This would 
represent an asymmetric failure mode and could lead to a localised increase in the 
hydrodynamic loading on the bund. It is however, considered that a mixture of the two 
modes of failure is more likely to occur. 
3.2 Axisymmetric releases 
A water table was constructed together with a working model of a tank quadrant to 
simulate a catastrophic tank failure. The scale of the model used was 1: 30 allowing a large 
enough model to overcome problems of excessive frictional effects, which could be 
detrimental to the results in terms of underestimating the level of overtopping. The type of 
tank failure modelled was to simulate a quadrant (90') of cylindrical column of liquid 
collapsing under gravity within the secondary containment and can be considered to 
represent an axisymmetric mode of failure once transposed to 3600 geometry as indicated 
in Fig. 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1 Typical axisymmetric release with the fluid collapsing under 
the action of gravity after the instantaneous removal of the tank 
The tank quadrant was removed by accelerating it upwards using a power spring/cord at an 
initial rate of 250 MS-2 based upon a 440 mm extension with a stored force of 800 N 
accelerating a mass of 3.2 kg, allowing water to rapidly escape (Plate 3.1). Using the 
average force in the power spring of 560 N at half the extension over the total distance 
travelled a mean upwards velocity of 12.41 ms-1 is obtained using Newton's Laws of 
Motion. The velocity of the gate was measured using a magnetic pick-up connected to an 
oscilloscope, giving a peak to peak time of 8xI 0-5 sec for a screw pitch of I mm, leading to 
a mean upwards velocity of 12.5 ms-, giving a standing head of fluid. The initial fluid 
height in the tank and the wave height at the bund were recorded by capacitance probes. 
Plate 3. / Test rig with power spring1cord attached* 
* Plate source: I-IMU 
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A series of model bund walls of various heights and placements, incorporating dynamic 
pressure sensors were fixed to the spill table with a second capacitance probe used to 
record the overtopping wave height. An investigation into the repeatability of the tank 
bursts and levels of overtopping was carried out to determine a suitable operating 
procedure for obtaining consistent data. The overtopping fraction and volume of fluid 
retained in the bund were determined using mass balances after collecting the fluid through 
drainage points. The data collected was input into a Personal Data Assistant (PDA) and 
transferred to a 'note book' computer via an infrared link. 
Raw data was collected via a National Instruments SCXI data logger used in conjunction 
with Labview virtual instrumentation software. The graphical programme written as part 
of this research enabled 'real time' visual data to be displayed on a computer screen as well 
as written to file for further processing in other software packages. Statistical analysis of 
the data was undertaken and dimensionless ratios were used to construct charts and 
correlating functions for the determination of overtopping percentages. The data from the 
dynamic pressure sensors was used to calculate the dynamic pressure profiles on the bund 
walls themselves and compare them to the hydrostatic profiles used for current design 
purposes. 
3.3 Characteristics of the test programme 
During the conceptual phase of development of the new test facility HSE undertook a 
survey of the storage tanks and bunding arrangements at sites where it may be required to 
give land-use advice or to assess operator's safety reports. With the results of this survey 
in mind the test programme was designed to embrace: - 
Radius of model tank, R: 
Height of water in tank, H: 
Separation distance, L: 
Angle of bund, 0: 
Height of bund wall, h: 
Radius of bund wall, r: 
single radius of 300 mm. 
three ratios of (R/H): 0.5,1.0 and 2.5. 
varies with radius of bund wall, r below. 
vertical bunds only (0 = 90'). 
to cover (h/H) ranges from 0.05 to 0.4 and 1.0 to 1.2. 
to cover the range of bunded volumes from 110 % to 
200 % of the volume of water in the tank. 
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The nomenclature used for describing a 'circular' bund configuration is shown in Fig. 3.2 
below: 
R 
hj 
Figure 3.2 Tank and bund nomenclature for circular geometry 
For the bunds with 'rectangular' geometries (Fig. 3.3) the key question to be addressed is 
whether a non-circular bund is systematically better or worse than a circular bund of the 
same area and height. The basis for testing was to use the I 10 % bund capacity results 
from the circular configurations and identify the bund arrangement that gave the closest to 
50 % overtopping for each tank type. 
The tests were then to be repeated with the bund plan changed from circular to square, 
keeping the bund capacity at 110 %. Using symmetry in the quadrant of space there are 
two possibilities, one where the bund forms a 45' diagonal and one the bund consists of 
two equal walls parallel to the walls of the rig. Assuming no edge effects in the rig, then 
the two geometries should give similar values in overtopping. A rectangular bund with 
lengthlbreadth =2 was the final arrangement to be considered, again using the criteria as in 
the case of the square bund. In the case of the square and rectangular bunds small radii, r, 
= 12 inm were used at the comers for fabrication purposes and to better introduce the 
threaded needle connectors of the dynamic pressure transducers. 
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Figure 3.3 Tank and bund nomenclature for 'rectangular' geometries in plan 
In the case of the triangular bunds the dynamic pressure transducers were placed at mid- 
span, with the square and rectangular bunds having the sensors located at the comers. 
The total number of configurations investigated for the 'circular' bund geometry was 84 
and for the 'rectangular' geometry 9 bund configurations were considered (Table 3.1) with 
each configuration tested a minimum of 5 times for repeatability purposes. 
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Table 3.1 HSE axisymmetric test matrix 
CIRCULAR BUND CONFIGURATIONS 
(3 values of R/H, 7 values of h/H and 4 values of VtotfVtank) 
All dimensions in mm 
Tests have R= 300 mm and maximum r< 2000 mm; vertical bund only 
A. Tall Tank 
R 300 H 600 RIH 0.5 
Radius of bund (in mm)for different values of h (in mm) and VtotlVtank 
h1H h VtotlVtank 
1.1 1.2 1.5 2 
0.05 30 1407 1470 1643 1897 
0.1 60 995 1039 1162 1342 
0.2 120 704 735 822 949 
0.3 180 574 600 671 775 
0.4 240 497 520 581 671 
VIoMankfor different values of h and r (in mm) 
h1H hr 
315 330 360 390 
1 600 1.10 1.21 1.44 1.69 
1.2 720 1.32 1.45 1.73 2.03 
B. "Middle" Tank 
R 300 11 300 RIH 
Radius of bund (in mm) for different values of h (in mm) and VtotlVtank 
WH h VtotlVtank 
1.1 1.2 1.5 2 
0.05 15 1407 1470 1643 1897 
0.1 30 995 1039 1162 1342 
0.2 60 704 735 822 949 
0.3 90 574 600 671 775 
0.4 120 497 520 581 671 
ViollPtankfor different values of h and r (in mm) 
h1H hr 
315 330 360 390 
1 300 1.10 1.21 1.44 1.69 
1.2 360 1.32 1.45 1.73 2.03 
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C. Squat Tank 
R 300 H 120 RIH Z5 
Radius of bund (in mm) for different values of h (in mm) and Vlotlvtank 
WH h VtotMank 
1.1 L2 1.5 2 
0.05 6 1407 1470 1643 1897 
0.1 12 995 1039 1162 1342 
0.2 24 704 735 822 949 
0.3 36 574 600 671 775 
0.4 48 497 520 581 671 
VtotlVtankfor different values of h and r (in mm) 
1111H hr 
315 330 360 390 
1 120 1.10 1.21 1.44 1.69 
1.2 144 1.32 1.45 1.73 2.03 
TOTAL NUMBER OF TESTS REQUIRED = 84 (PLUS REPEATABILITY CHECKS) 
RECTANGULAR BUND CONFIGURATIONS 
All dimensions in mm 
Tests have R= 300 mm and vertical bund only 
A. Tall Tank 
R 300 H 600 h 120 
Wall No Geomelry type y r, z d 
I Triangular (tri) 882 Na 582 624 
2 Square (squ) 624 12 324 582 
3 Rectangular (rect) 441 12 141 686 
B. "Middle" Tank 
R 300 H 300 h 60 
Wall No Geometry type Y r, z d 
4 Triangular (tri) 882 Na 582 624 
5 Square(squ) 624 12 324 582 
6 Rectangular (rect) 441 12 141 686 
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C Squat Tank 
R 300 H 120 h 12 
Wall No Geometry type Y r, d 
7 Triangular (tri) 1247 Na 947 882 
8 Square (squ) 882 12 582 947 
9 Rectangular (rect) 624 12 324 1095 
TOTAL NUMBER OF TESTS REQUIRED =9 (PLUS REPEATABILITY CHECKS) 
3.4 Method of construction 
The model tank wall, support frame, bearing rails and fittings for the swinging 
compression latching bar mechanism were all constructed from stainless steel, with the 
swinging arms made from lightweight aluminium. tube. The power spring, effectively a 
giant rubber band was supplied by a manufacturer specialising in multi strand elastomeric 
material capable of delivering a high load to extension relationship with good repeatability 
and sustained durability. 
The main tank and spill table (Plate 3.2) were manufactured using mild steel for the 
structural frame, with marine ply for the base of the spill table and two of the sides. The 
other two remaining sides were produced using laminated safety glass to enable video 
footage to be filmed through the main tank. One of the ply sides and one of the glass sides 
were then lined with Perspex to allow setscrews to be used for the bund wall fixings. The 
model bund walls were produced from polycarbonate to allow for the degree of bending 
required to form the smaller radii and to resist the impact loading produced by the rapidly 
released fluid. 
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Plate 3.2 Test rig with spill table and lank quadrantfitted* 
3.5 Design considerations 
The final design details were chosen for speed and ease of construction with as much as 
possible of the work performed in-house. Where equipment and tooling limitations 
existed, as in the manufacture of the tank quadrant and the frame incorporating the linear 
bearing rails, work was subcontracted to local specialist engineering companies. The 
resulting test rig design could thus be easily maintained in house with parts likely to be 
subject to wear and tear reproduced and installed relatively quickly, keeping any project 
delays to a minimum. 
A number of design considerations led to the development of a basic model concept with 
three different methods of powering and triggering the rapid removal of the tank quadrant. 
Firstly a double acting arrangement of elastomeric power springs was considered using a 
twin catch release mechanism operated by a cam arrangement. This also incorporated a 
spring loaded latching system to prevent the tank quadrant from returning back down the 
bearing runners at high speed. Secondly, the same power spring arrangement was 
designed to be used in conjunction with a dual catching mechanism operated by a lever 
system. In the second case the non-return catching system was to be constructed using a 
'butterfly' type spring opening mechanism designed to latch through a hole in the tank 
quadrant-loading beam. 
* Plate source: LIMU 
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The final design, which was the one eventually constructed, used only a single power 
spring to accelerate the tank quadrant and a 'bungee' cord (Plate 3.3) to decelerate it before 
contracting a pair of safety compression spring buffers. The single power spring was 
extended using a mechanical bed winch once the tank quadrant had been locked and 
securely held in place by a swinging compression-latching bar. The 'firing' mechanism 
was designed to operate via a bicycle hand brake lever pulling down a spring-loaded 
stainless steel release pin running through a plain bronze bearing. The movement of the 
release pin allowed the swinging arm to move back, thus jumping off the roller bearing 
retaining bar on the tank quadrant, hence leading to the required rapid release of the 
contained liquid. 
Plate 3.3 Tank quadrant with bungee cord, dynamic pressure transducers and wave probes * 
The resulting design gave rise to the required rapid removal of the tank quadrant and the 
standing head of liquid, as required for an axisymmetric mode of failure. Video footage 
was taken to show the tank side removal in an upward direction and to see the liquid 
released fall under gravity (Plate 3.4). 
Plale source: LJMU 
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Plate 3.4 Tank quadrant released with instantaneous standing head offluidjalling under gravity* 
3.6 Asymmetric releases 
Completion of the work for HSE has seen a change in focus to enable researchers to 
investigate alternative modes of failure, such as directional releases, which could be 
considered to be the more common mode of failure likely to be encountered. These 
failures represent situations such as low - level flange or pipe failure or the loss of integrity 
of a small section of the tank wall. Research suggests that this mode of failure can 
typically result in considerable loss of containtnent, together with the possibility of 
incurring failure to the bund or earthen dyke resulting from the prolonged and concentrated 
effects of ajet of fluid as indicated in Fig. 3.4. 
* Plate source: LJMU 
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Figure 3.4 Typical asymmetric release with the fluid jet impacting 
the bund from a partial failure of the tank 
The alternative mode of failure has been considered based upon evidence that the crack 
will propagate much faster in the vertical than the circumferential direction, hence giving 
rise to a vertical section of the tank being removed and the liquid flowing directionally 
through the gap created. This would represent an asymmetric failure mode and could lead 
to a localised increase in the dynamic loading on the bund. It is, however, considered that 
a mixture of the two modes of failure is more likely to occur as assumed by Trbojevic and 
Slater (1989). 
While considerations are made for 'spigot flow' (Bames, 1990) and the possibility of 
jetting failures in the design of bunds, most studies have examined sudden releases. This 
work has considered the effects of partial failures, which might be experienced through the 
loss of integrity of a flange or small section of the tank wall, as suggested in initial work by 
Greenspan & Johansson (198 1). 
To examine this mode of failure, modifications were required to the test facility. This was 
achieved by forming a second tank wall, which sat directly in front of the removable wall 
described above (axisymmetric releases). This contained guides, into which a series of 
interchangeable plates were inserted (Plate 3.5). A number of plates containing holes were 
used to represent flange failures and a moveable plate was positioned to represent the 
effect of removing a section of tank wall. The additional wall sat less than 0.2 mm in front 
of the original wall, allowing the original wall to be removed at the same velocities as with 
the axisymmetric releases. The test regime involved considering the 110 % bund capacity 
using three-tank radius to height ratios (R/H), three circular orifices, and three rectangular 
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(slot) openings (Plate 3.6). A total of 90 asymmetric test configurations were investigated 
with each configuration tested 5 times for repeatability checks to be carried out (Table 3.2). 
Plate 3.5 Tank quadrant with second tank wall installedfor asymmetric releases* 
:: 
Plate 3.6 Tank quadrant with asymmetric orifice release* 
* Plate source: LIMU 
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3.7 Dynamic pressure transducers 
The objectives required the determination of the dynamic pressure profiles on each of the 
bunds under test and in order to facilitate these, five piezotronic type pressure transducers 
were incorporated at predetermined percentage heights for each bund (Table 5.1 and Table 
5.7). Kistler type 21IB5 pressure transducers were selected powered by a type 5134A 
power supply/coupler and are illustrated below (Plate 3.7). These were specifically chosen 
because of their small size and high signal output, allowing them to be installed in the 
smaller height model bunds and respond effectively over the range of pressures expected. 
An additional aspect of these transducers is their ability to compensate for the acceleration 
produced by the physical movement of the model bund due to the impacting wave. 
Model 21 IB5 piezotron pressure transducers are miniature, acceleration compensated 
instruments, which produce a high level, low impedance signal that is the voltage analogue 
of dynamic pressure input. Resolution is in the order of one part per 20,000 of full-scale 
range, in other words plus or minus 34.5 Pa for a0 to 100 psi transducer. These 
transducers incorporate sensing elements of crystalline quartz and contain a solid-state 
impedance converter with sensitivity expressed in millivolts per unit of pressure. 
The acceleration compensation is required as the mass of the diaphragm and sensing 
element produces an inherent acceleration sensitivity, which is eliminated by the 
embodiment of a quartz accelerometer whose output polarity is opposite to that of the 
pressure-sensing element. Thus, the accelerometer output nominally cancels or nulls what 
would otherwise be a component of the sensing element output attributed to the 
acceleration (Kistler Universal Pressure Transducer Manual, 2000). 
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Plate 3.7 Bund with dynamic pressure transducers installed* 
3.8 Wave monitor 
The wave monitoring equipment was supplied by Churchill Controls and comprises two 
probes and a wave monitor module. One probe was placed inside the tank quadrant to 
record the level as the tank emptied, the other being positioned adjacent to the inner face of 
the bund wall to monitor the wave height at the bund (Plate 3.3). This technology is well 
proven in the field of wave research and provides an output voltage that is directly 
proportional to the wave height, although regular calibration checks are required due to 
temperature changes in the fluid under investigation. 
The system works on the principle of measuring the current flowing in a probe, which 
consists of a pair of stainless steel wires. The probe is energised with a high frequency 
square wave voltage to avoid polarisation effects at the wire surface. The wires dip into 
the water and the current that flows between them is proportional to the depth of 
immersion. The current is sensed by an electronic circuit, which provides an output 
voltage proportional to the instantaneous depth of immersion, or wave height, which can 
be used as input to a high-speed data logger (Churchill Controls Wave Monitor Manual, 
1977). 
Plate source: LJMU 
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3.9 Electronic platform scales 
The mass of the fluid overtopping the bund and the mass of the fluid retained by the bund 
were measured using Adam Equipment RFC/L series platform scales, one for each side of 
the bund. The capacity of each scale is 100 kg with readability of 10 g, the output received 
over the RS-232 interface. The balance data was then logged using A&D software and 
saved to file for later use in an Excel spreadsheet. 
3.10 Magnetic pick-up 
The speed of operation of the tank quadrant was determined using a fixed magnetic pick- 
up and a length of mild steel threaded studding of known pitch moving along with the tank 
quadrant. The device responds to the movement of ferrous parts past the pole-piece on the 
end of the unit. The passive nature of the device requires no external power and yields an 
output voltage in response to variations in a self induced magnetic field caused by 
proximity to moving ferrous metal parts. The output from this device was input into an 
oscilloscope and the time based used to determine the time between successive peaks on 
the 1 min pitch threaded studding. 
3.11 Data logging 
The data logger used for data collection from the pressure transducers and the wave 
monitoring probes was a National Instruments SCXI 1000 chassis with an SCXI 1200,12- 
bit analogue to digital (A to D) converter with SCXI 1121 amplifier modules and SCX1 
1321 terminal blocks. The data logger was then in turn connected to a computer and 
controlled through the use of Labview virtual instrumentation software, which is user 
programmable via a graphical programming language. 
The resolution of the signals from the dynamic pressure transducers and the wave 
monitoring probes depends upon the gain used on the SCXI 1121 amplifier modules. For a 
chosen amplifier gain of 10 the resolution is 29 Pa/bit, for a gain of 100 this changes to 2.9 
Pa/bit and for a gain of 200 this becomes 1.45 Pa/bit. A gain of I was used throughout for 
wave monitoring probes, with the probe length changing from 950 mm with a resolution of 
0.29 mm/bit to 475 mm with a resolution of 0.145 mm/bit, depending upon the height of 
bund under test (Appendix 1, Table 1.1 and Appendix 4, Table 4.1). 
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The graphical programme (Figure 3.5) was written as part of this research enabled 'real 
time' visual data to be displayed on a computer screen as well as written to file for further 
processing in other software packages. Statistical analysis of the data was undertaken in 
Excel and dimensionless ratios were used to construct charts and correlating functions for 
the determination of empirical formulae for the prediction of the overtopping fractions and 
the dynamic/static pressure ratios. The empirical formulae were derived using the curve 
fitting techniques available in Excel with the level of fit determined using the square of the 
correlation coefficient or Rý. The derivation of the empirical formulae is more fully 
covered in chapter 5, section 5.6 with the performance investigated in chapter 7. The data 
from the dynamic pressure sensors was used to calculate the dynamic pressure profiles on 
the bund walls themselves and compare them to the hydrostatic profiles used for current 
design purposes. 
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3.12 Video 
Video footage was recorded for each of the bund configurations under test; the footage was 
then transferred to computer using video editing software. The video recordings were then 
used to monitor the movement of the tank quadrant and the subsequent motion of the fluid 
under the action of gravity as it approached and overtopped the bund. 
3.13 Trials 
A number of trials were undertaken to check the repeatability of the test rig operation and 
ensure each test run could be repeated giving a reasonable spread of data for each 
configuration. One of the bund configurations was chosen for the trials and the experiment 
was repeated 30 times to analyse the spread of data in terms of the mass of the fluid 
overtopping the bund and the mass of the fluid retained within the bund (Table 3.3). 
Checks were also made with respect to the maximum dynamic pressure measured upon 
impact with the bund. By calculating the mean values and plotting the spread of the 
retained and overtopping data it was decided that the results gave rise to a normal 
distribution with very little spread (Charts 3.1 and 3.2). This is clearly indicated by the 
sample standard deviation. Hence it was decided to limit the test runs to five per 
configuration, as most of the results were close to the mean. Variation in the level of fill 
for the tank quadrant was also monitored with measured values giving volumes falling 
below the theoretical values (calculated from tank dimensions) by approximately 3% in the 
worst case. 
The main component where variation in operational repeatability was most likely was the 
power spring. The high number of operations made it susceptible to wear and tear and its 
performance was checked on a regular basis. Two methods were employed for this: 
o For quick checks, a load cell could be incorporated into the system to check the 
load extension characteristics. 
o For calibration purposes, a dead loading rig was used to plot the load extension 
curve for the power spring and comparisons made to previous tests. The 
performance of the power spring was most satisfactory, even though some 
minor damage to the outer sheath became visible with repeated operations. 
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Table 3.3 Repeatability checks for axisymmetric overtopping 
Date 1310112004 Pipe & valve adjustment (Ag) 0.40 
Test configuration id BI (h120) 
Series id Temp Mass retained Mass overtopping Overtopping 
rc) (kg) (kg) (Ratio) 
1 14.4 15.58 5.83 0.28 
2 14.0 15.62 5.94 0.28 
3 13.9 15.63 5.73 0.27 
4 13.7 15.41 5.79 0.28 
5 13.9 15.66 5.59 0.27 
6 14.0 15.58 5.75 0.27 
7 13.9 15.61 5.74 0.27 
8 13.7 15.79 5.60 0.27 
9 13.4 15.69 5.69 0.27 
10 13.4 15.63 5.61 0.27 
11 18.2 15.56 5.62 0.27 
12 17.5 15.49 5.91 0.28 
13 17.4 15.65 5.67 0.27 
14 17.1 15.53 5.86 0.28 
15 16.9 15.67 5.85 0.28 
16 16.7 15.83 5.71 0.27 
17 16.8 15.56 5.92 0.28 
18 16.9 15.5 5.8 0.28 
19 16.9 15.45 5.93 0.28 
20 16.8 15.68 5.69 0.27 
21 17.8 15.69 5.56 0.27 
22 17.7 15.67 5.68 0.27 
23 17.5 15.47 5.78 0.28 
24 17.4 15.44 5.84 0.28 
25 17.4 15.52 5.8 0.28 
26 16.9 15.46 5.85 0.28 
27 18.2 15.59 5.58 0.27 
28 17.9 15.55 5.73 0.27 
29 17.6 15.64 5.68 0.27 
30 17.5 15.47 5.82 0.28 
Mean 16.18 15.59 5.75 0.27 
Sample S. D. 1.73948 0.10242 0.11102 0.00475 
Max overtopping 0.28 
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Chart 3.1 Frequency distribution of trial data for fluid retained in the bund 
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Chart 3.2 Frequency distribution of trial data for fluid overtopping the bund 
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3.14 Summary 
A suitable test facility has been constructed based on the detailed review of the limited 
literature available using additional information provided by the HSE as to the range of 
variables to be expected at UK facilities. The methodology has established a repeatable 
means of generating reliable data for the investigation of both catastrophic partial and tank 
failures over a wide range of tank and bund configurations. This will allow the main aim 
of the research to be realised in so far as it will allow an accurate quantification of the 
extent of the possible overtopping and the magnitudes of the dynamic pressures exerted on 
the bunds. The objectives to establish methods of predicting the levels of overtopping and 
the magnitude of the dynamic pressures on the bunds should therefore be possible. 
Comparison with seminal works will be used to support the methodology and give 
confidence in the results generated from the experimental test rig. A number of key 
publications have been chosen due to the type of measurements taken or the availability of 
suitable equations for the estimation of overtopping fractions and/or the celerity of 
escaping waves. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Comparative Seminal Works 
4.1 Introduction 
The following pieces of seminal work were chosen from the literature review due to the 
rigorous nature of their various methodologies and the fact that the data is reasonably 
recorded as to allow suitable comparison of the results produced from this investigation. 
There are certain limitations to the scope of the work in any one case, which is why such a 
range of work will be used for the purposes of testing any empirical formulae developed 
from the research. In some cases the work described is not directly associated with the 
failure of bulk storage tanks, yet it is possible to make certain assumptions in order to 
apply the findings. 
4.2 Henderson (1966) and Featherstone (1988) 
The basic design of the primary storage tanks is based on the hoop stress with the tank 
contents causing the shell of the vessel to be in constant tension. In the case of a failure, 
the integrity of the tank can be severely compromised and the ability to withstand the 
tensile forces vastly reduced. It is generally accepted that the failure will involve cracks 
rapidly propagating vertically up the shell, causing unwrapping at the base and allowing 
the contents to be spilled either in a directional asymmetric failure or in the case of a 
complete collapse, releasing fluid in all directions as an axisYMmetric failure. 
In the case of the axisymmetric failure mode, a comparison can be made with the classic 
dam-break failure scenario. This assumes that the failure will be the same throughout the 
360' geometry of the tank and is considered as if the tank had suddenly been removed, 
leaving a free standing column of liquid, which then starts to fall under the action of 
gravity. 
The fluid held against the dam wall is similar in nature to the fluid held by the tank shell 
with the failure allowing the flow to move horizontally away from the original position of 
the tank. The velocity of the flow post failure of the vessel is a major factor in the level of 
energy developed by the surge prior to impact with the bund. Henderson (1966) stated that 
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the 'Pivot' point at the intersection of the line of the dam and the parabolic curve if the 
liquid profile remains constant is at 4/9 times the original head of liquid behind the dam, as 
measured from the base. This is provided that the top surface remains at the same level at 
the top of the parabolic curve. 
From Featherstone (1988) the velocity of the flow at the position of the dam wall can be 
approximated to: 
112 
3 
g112 H (4.1) 
The reality of this concept will not produce a true parabolic curve and the downstream 
wave profile will not comply to a featheredge, as the frictional effects with the ground 
interface will produce a bore (Fig. 4.1). 
C/L 
Bore profile 
/I VI 1 4/9 H 
Vi = 2/3 g 
1/2 H 1/2 
Figure 4.1 Dam-break scenario 
4.3 Greenspan and Young (1978) 
H 
The consequences of the sudden release of a large volume of fluid within a relatively short 
period of time were investigated by Greenspan and Young (1978). They realised that very 
little was actually known about the problem of fluid impact against and over a barrier and 
attempted to investigate the problem both theoretically and experimentally. The aim was 
to establish the overflow fraction of the original fluid volume that escapes on impact using 
non-linear shallow-water equations, which were originally applied to 'dam-break' 
problems. 
vi 
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They found that upon collision of the fluid with the vertical face of the barrier, liquid 
accumulates rapidly to a great height, forming a shock wave, which moves back towards 
the tank. Fluid starts to pile up behind the shock and rapidly begins to overtop the barrier 
with reflected waves interacting with the propagating shock. The numerical analysis was 
carried out using a two dimensional approach, which once revolved about the vertical axis 
equates to the normal three dimensional geometry relating to a cylindrical storage tank 
surrounded by a concentric circular bund. 
For the analysis the wall of the tank is considered to have disappeared at time zero with the 
resulting flow directed towards the bund. The impact with the bund and the resulting 
overtopping is only discussed in terms of vertical bunds with the spillage determined using 
accurate qualitative and quantitative descriptions of the events using a series of parameters 
as employed in the non-linear shallow water theory. This theory uses depth-averaged 
versions of the conservation laws involving mass and momentum with dependant variables 
being free-surface height and the mean horizontal velocity. Other assumptions made relate 
to the running surface being smooth and level with viscosity, turbulence and frictional 
ground effects ignored with escaping liquid no longer influencing the main body within the 
bund. 
The basic description is typically described as the tank wall being removed, the liquid 
rushing to meet the bund and the rarefaction wave moving into the tank. Eventually the 
leading edge of the liquid is considered to move at constant dimensionless speed with a 
rarefaction wave moving in the opposite direction and reflecting off the rear wall. The 
impact with the bund causes a rapid accumulation of liquid, capable of reaching extreme 
height with the subsequent formation of a strong shock wave moving back towards the 
tank. Liquid continues to accumulate at the bund behind the shock wave with fluid flow 
eventually overtopping the bund and/or reflected waves interacting with the shock wave. 
The free surface behind the bore is almost uniform at any instant in time and this forms the 
basis of the analytical approach, allowing for the evaluation of the motion even when the 
bund is too high to allow overtopping. The complexity of the problem required the use of 
a computer to carry out the numerical analysis based on linear interpolations to define 
points between nodes based on small increments in time using central differences. 
Experiments were carried out using a sliding wall in a Plexiglas tank (9 x9x. 48 inch) with 
the slide positioned 9 inches from one end of the tank forming a reservoir and a spillage 
channel with dykes placed at various positions along the channel with inclinations of 901, 
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60' and 30'. The reservoir was filled to a fluid height of less than 8 inches and the rapid 
removal of the sliding wall used to generate the surge. The motion of the wave was 
recorded on videotape and examined using slow motion playback. As the flow builds 
behind the vertical wall, some of the fluid is thrown to great height as a plume, which 
subsequently collapses into the main body of the fluid that accumulates behind the shock 
and then flows over the barrier. 
The problem of the reflected waves led to the investigation of overtopping due to initial 
impact only. This was achieved by replacing the siding wall before the reflected wave 
could escape the tank thus preventing additional overtopping due to successive impacts. 
The total amount overtopping the barrier due to reflected waves was found to be a 
maximum of an additional 5% with 'sloshing' being an important factor for a high barrier 
close to the tank. 
The main finding indicated that the overtopping was dependant mainly on h/11, the ratio of 
the height of the barrier to the height of the fluid released from the tank with little 
dependence on L/R, the ratio of tank wall/barrier separation and the distance from the back 
of the tank to the sliding wall. This was found to be true for all combinations of barrier 
and tank heights in the range 0.33 :5 L/R: 5 4. The overtopping fraction increases as the 
bund/dyke is sited further from the tank, with the height of the bund decreasing to maintain 
the storage capacity. This is true within certain limits, as frictional effects would limit 
overtopping with increasingly large values of L/H, however this is not generally the case in 
practice. The other obvious effect is the angle of the dyke with any decrease from the 
vertical allowing a greater percentage of spillage, due to the greater forward momentum 
being maintained over the dyke. 
With regard to the performance of the mathematical model based on the shallow water 
equations, the physical model generated measured fluid heights adjacent to the bund in the 
order of approximately 15 % greater than the theoretical predictions. The flight of fluid 
droplets was also an issue with the theory unable to account for the droplet formation. It 
was determined that the height of the fluid plume exceeded the initial height of fluid in the 
tank with the flight of particles from the leading edge of the surge reaching three times the 
height of the tank fill level. 
When transcribing the results to circular tank/barrier configurations it was found that the 
volume of overtopping was of the same order of magnitude as in the unidirectional releases 
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originally investigated. It was estimated that up to 25 % of the volume stored would be 
lost in the event of a sudden failure for a bunded area corresponding to a volume equal to 
that of the initial tank capacity. 
4.4 Greenspan and Johansson (1981) 
In their 1981 publication, the manner in which the wave overtops the barrier depends upon 
the shape of the dyke or bund. The fluid may vault an inclined embankment or accumulate 
rapidly behind a vertical bund and then overtop. The experimental apparatus consisted of 
an aluminium. cylinder 7.5 inches in diameter and II inches in height surrounded by a 
circular barrier constructed from Plexiglas and clay. The barriers were Placed at 5,7,9 or 
II inches from the centre with dyke inclinations of 30', 60' or 90" measured from the 
horizontal. The tests were axisymmetric in nature with an instantaneous release of fluid 
from the storage tank, whereby a stationary column of fluid was allowed to fall and spread 
under the action of gravity. This was achieved using compressed air to operate a piston, 
which rapidly lifted the containment vessel. The overtopping fraction was determined by 
measuring the height of the fluid retained within the barrier using a needle depth gauge. 
Video recordings were taken and viewed in slow motion playback to observe the falling 
column of fluid and the subsequent overtopping of the barrier. A source of error was 
identified as the sudden impulsive motion of the containment vessel, which produced drag 
on the outer surface of the fluid column. This effect on the final level of overtopping was 
considered minimal due to the relatively small volume of fluid involved. The overtopping 
due to 'sloshing' was considered not to be significant with most of the fluid escaping in the 
first impact of the wave with the barrier. 
Partial tank ruptures were also modelled using an inner wall with various rectangular holes 
(I to 3 inches high) over a 30* arc length. The influence of the barrier shape was further 
investigated using the two-dimensional tank as described in the earlier experiments. 
The Greenspan and Johansson (1981) experiments, led to a conclusion that simple 
formulae to estimate the overtopping fraction could probably be based on dimensionless 
combinations of parameters: 
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h, R, 
(4.2) 
HHH 
with h/H as the main variable and r/H, R/H and the angle of inclination of the bund, 0, as 
subsidiary parameters. 
Comparisons between axisymmetric configurations and the channel experiments indicated 
that in both cases the level of overtopping Q, was mainly dependant upon h/H, the ratio of 
the height of the barrier, h to the height of the original fluid column, H. In all cases the 
overtopping of the barrier was substantial with reduced levels of overtopping occurring 
with increased distance of the barrier from the tank. Reducing the angle of the barrier also 
led to increased values of overtopping. The level of agreement between the cylindrical and 
channel experiments was generally good with some variation at increased separation 
distances. This meant that the simplified experimental channel results could be used to 
gain meaningful overtopping fractions that could be applied to axisymmetric releases. 
The directional releases indicated that spillages from small holes were comparable to full 
column releases, especially in the case of the inclined dykes. It was therefore 
demonstrated that the two-dimensional channel releases were sufficient to model the 
effects of a catastrophic failure of a containment vessel. The investigation was then 
centred on various designs of barrier with the aim of reducing the overtopping fraction. 
Designs included reversed tops on the inclined dykes, where the escaping fluid is thrown 
back to interfere with the approaching flow. The reduction in forward momentum resulted 
in lower levels of overtopping and this led to the use of fluid 'trip' control devices to 
further reduce the forward momentum. Other methods included the use of forward facing 
angled bunds, which proved effective, but would be difficult to construct in terms of any 
full-scale mitigation. 
The mitigation methods used reduced the overtopping fraction in the range of 25 to 35 % 
of the values originally obtained while maintaining the equal tank storage to containment 
volumes. In terms of a real life solution the mitigation would most probably take the form 
of an additional deflector fixed to the top of the original bund. When this proposal was 
investigated the deflector along with the increased capacity of the bund led to a much 
reduced overtopping fraction in the order of a factor of ten. Such methods of mitigation 
should therefore be considered for further investigation, both in terms of optimisation and 
reasonably practicable installation. 
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4.5 Michels et al (1988) 
One of the most important factors in the design of a bulk storage facility must be its "total 
and immediate containment capability. " This means that even a large spill can be dealt 
with and limited to enclosed predetermined area, normally achieved via the construction of 
a suitable bund/dyke. Experience has indicated that the tank needs to be encompassed by a 
surround at least as high as the tank itself to achieve protection from catastrophic tank 
failure. The determining influence for level of overtopping is related to the rate of release 
rather than the volume of release, with the possibility of earthen dykes being simply 
washed away. 
A combined theoretical and physical modelling programme was established to investigate 
the problem with the starting point being that once failed, the storage tank is largely 
irrelevant to the subsequent flow, due relative mass of the tank walls compared to that of 
the liquid contents, typically around 1%. Hence, the assessment of a freestanding column 
of liquid falling under the action of gravity was used in the analysis. 
Typically, Reynolds number, &: 
R. = 
pg112 H 312 
>> (4.3) 
A 
with the Weber number, W.: 
p2 (4.4) 
- >> I 
CY 
where, p= density of liquid, g= viscosity, a= surface tension &g= acceleration due to 
gravity 
Theoretically, the viscous and surface tension effects are negligible compared to the 
inertial and gravitational forces. This leads to the equations of motion being modified 
from the Navier-Stokes equations immediately after the tank failure to Euler's equations. 
If the vertical acceleration in the liquid is neglected together with the immediate failure, 
then the equations further simplify to the shallow water equations. These are hyperbolic 
partial differential equations with dependent variables being the horizontal liquid velocity 
and the local height of the fluid. The solution is again obtained via the use of a computer 
based on discrete changes in radial position and time. 
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The flow near the bund/dyke is of importance due to the surging liquid being slowed down 
by contact with the bund and the rise in fluid level. The increase in level can be sufficient 
to cause overtopping of the bund, which is assumed to take place with a horizontal velocity 
equivalent to that of long waves of small amplitude based on the localised depth. There is 
also consideration of reflected waves travelling back towards the original tank position and 
the formation of a hydraulic jump allows analysis using conservation of momentum. 
Hence the velocity near the leading edge of the moving liquid is given by: 
2g 112 H 112 (4.5) 
The physical model comprised a horizontal water table made from plate glass, illuminated 
from below in order to allow viewing through the flow. A vertical open-ended cylinder 
was used to contain the liquid under test with a mechanism for providing a rapid vertical 
lift. The resulting flow was photographed and the progress of the wave monitored as the 
flow travelled over a series of photodiodes placed at known positions along the water table 
in order to determine the velocities. Experimentally, from the physical modelling for the 
velocity near the leading edge of the liquid, it was found that: 
1.4g 112 H 112 (4.6) 
The overtopping fraction was also determined, with the percentage overtopping expressed 
versus h/11 and r/R. The importance of scale is highlighted due to the fact that Reynolds 
number, & varies with H3/2 (Equation 4.3) and that the Weber number, We varies with H2 
(Equation 4.4). Thus, if the height of liquid stored in the tank is too small, it possible to 
get values such that R, and We are not very much greater than I and it is recommended that 
H is at least 0.1 m, which determines the lower limit on the length scale for any 
investigation. The difference between Equations 4.5 and 4.6 is due to the neglect of 
viscous and surface tension effects as assumed in the mathematical model. 
4.6 Trbojevic and Slater (1989) 
There is considerable interest in the loading that would occur on the bund/dyke given the 
sudden failure of the bulk storage tank. In the event of a failure, the consequences of large 
volumes of fuel being released and the possibility of fire, explosion and the ultimate 
widespread pollution means that the probability of failure is required to be very low. The 
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problem currently facing designers is that existing facilities may not provide the necessary 
levels of protection, especially with land use planning issues and the locality of densely 
populated areas. 
Due to the complexity of the problems associated with tank failures there are various views 
as to the modes of credible failure. A widely accepted possibility is the rapid propagation 
of cracks in the primary containment (storage tank), leading to large dynamic loading on 
the secondary containment (bund). Reliable and sensible estimates of these dynamic 
pressures are needed to evaluate existing bunds as well as to aid the design of new 
facilities. The use of complex numerical methods needs to be considered to obtain a better 
understanding of the overall system behaviour both to evaluate existing levels of risk and 
to reduce such risks in new designs. 
There are many arguments as to the speed of crack propagation in bulk storage tanks and a 
worst-case option is often adopted, where the vertical propagation is considered along with 
crack propagation around the base of the tank. During any sudden release, the tank will 
move due to the escaping liquid and cases have been recorded, where the tank has been 
forced backwards from its base in reaction to the instantaneous release and rapid forward 
motion of the liquid. Even with such complexity, a suitable mathematical model can offer 
considerable flexibility provided a reasonable representation of the physical problem could 
be achieved. This would undoubtedly require validation using physical scale modelling to 
confirm the necessary performance and suitability across a range of usual parameters. 
The highly complex nature of the interaction between the fracture propagation and the 
rapid fluid flow under free-surface conditions has to be simplifled for the analysis and it is 
assumed that the tank loses integrity instantaneously with cracks propagating much faster 
than the motion of the escaping fluid. This gives rise to the collapsing cylindrical column 
as previously discussed, with liquid rapidly directed towards the bund in an axisymmetric 
mode of failure. It is this failure mode that is modelled mathematically using a finite 
difference programme based on Eulerian theory and run on a computer. The volume of 
fluid (VOF) technique is employed at the boundaries with the computational grid fixed 
allowing flow through the mesh in discrete intervals of time. This offers certain 
advantages over the integration of the Navier-Stokes equations as the VOF method allows 
for discontinuities (droplet formation) and large deformations of the free surface during 
release and overtopping. 
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Results from the modelling indicated dynamic pressures at the bunds to be between 2.5 and 
3.5 times the normal static head with local conditions more than four times that normally 
experienced. Velocities were also determined and for a tank of 30 rn diameter with a 10.5 
rn head of fluid it was shown that the velocity reached a value of up to 14.6 ms" after a 
time of 2 seconds, just prior to impacting the bund/dyke. It was estimated that 
approximately 30 % of the initial contents of the tank overtopped the secondary 
containment, assuming no physical damage to the bund/dyke was sustained due to the 
dynamic loading. 
The overall conclusions indicated good levels of fit with existing small-scale models and 
highlighted the need for careful consideration of the dynamic pressures in the design of 
secondary containment. The speed of determination of results and the usefulness in 
assessment of mitigation was discussed given the limitations of scale using physical 
modelling. 
4.7 Clark et al (2001) 
For a cylindrical tank surrounded by a concentric circular bund, the following relationship 
is suggested for the height of the bund wall required to provide 100 % containment, this of 
course assumes that bund overtopping or spigot flow Oetting) does not occur: 
h> 
(R L)" 
or h2 as r=(R+L) (4.7) 
Tbus, for I 10% containment: 
h 2! (R + L)2 
or h r2 
(4.8) 
Similarly, for a rectangular bund with dimensions x and y 100 % capacity is given by: 
> 
(nR2H) (4.9) 
XY 
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Thus, for 110 % containment: 
h> 
(lJnR 2H) (4.10) 
XY 
Bunds should be capable of limiting the contamination of the soil and groundwater along 
with preventing running pool fires by providing adequate containment and at the same 
time, minimising vapour production due to evaporation. The main contributors to 
evaporation are vapour pressure, the exposed surface area of the spill, the velocity of the 
passing wind and the ambient temperature of the contact materials including the air 
interface. Hence, effective bund design should limit the exposed surface area in an effort 
to minimise evaporation and the generation of excessive amounts of vapour. The method 
of construction of the bund itself is also of importance in terms of the material properties, 
such as thermal insulation, which can be used to inhibit vapour production due to heat 
transfer characteristics. 
It is essential that the effectiveness of any secondary containment system be properly 
considered in terms of the possible scenarios that may render its design ineffective. A 
number of possibilities exist where problems may arise including overtopping, rainwater 
build-up, spigot orjetting failure, accidental drainage and bund collapse due to excessive 
dynamic loading. 
Overtopping due to sudden failures of the primary containment (tank) should be taken 
seriously with the severity of such an event depending on factors such as the bund 
capacity, the structural integrity of the design and the severity of the release dynamics due 
to the catastrophic failure mode. Both mathematical and physical modelling techniques 
have indicated that, for vertical bunding arrangements, the volume overtopping the bund 
depends principally on the parameter h/H. 
Clark (2001) put forward the following relationship to predict the overtopping fraction, Qc: 
Qc = exp 
ml [- 
P(H 
where p=3.89,2.43 or 2.28 when 0= 90% 60* or 30% 
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Generally, it was found that the overtopping fraction Qc and the relationship with h/H held 
true over the range 0.33: 5 (r - R) / R: 5 4, with an intercept at h/H =0 when Q=I 
It is clear that the angle of inclination of the bund/dyke has a definite effect on the 
overtopping fraction with a positive slope angle, the surge retains more of its horizontal 
momentum both pre and post impact. This allows a greater spread of fluid than that 
typically observed for a vertical bund wall with a 30' slope giving values of overtopping 
approximately twice that expected for the equivalent vertical bund. A negative angle of 
slope can be beneficial, with a backward facing wall giving significant reductions in 
overtopping fraction. In situations where the shock wave is reflected back from the bund 
wall post impact, returning to the storage vessel and then continues to reverberate, 
additional overtopping can occur. In such cases it has been shown that these effects 
typically contribute only 5% of the fluid lost over the bund. 
The proper management of bunded areas is essential and careful planning is needed in the 
removal of water build-up from precipitation. This normally involves drain down valves 
and surface water may need to go through separation procedures depending on the 
presence of any previous minor spillages and the nature of the liquid involved. If this 
process is not properly managed then a major spill could easily result in the capacity of the 
secondary containment being exceeded or seriously limit the capability of dealing with fire 
fighting water or chemical agents. There is also the possibility of a spill being accidentally 
released due to failure in the drainage management system with control valves being left 
open. 
Spigot flow or 'jetting' is a possible mode of partial failure and the bund can largely be 
bypassed by such an event if not properly designed to cope. It is possible to perform 
relatively simple calculations to determine if such a scenario is credible for a give tank and 
bund configuration. The various factors involved are based on the minimum distance from 
a credible position of release, the operating pressure of the containment vessel and the head 
of the liquid in the tank. 
For atmospheric conditions, spigot flow is prevented using the relationship: 
L+h>H or Lý! H-h 
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In the case of pressurised liquids, the formation of a high-speed jet is probable and due to 
the horizontal orientation of such storage vessels it is not normally possible to prevent fluid 
escaping unless high collar bunds are employed. Due to the pressurised nature of such 
tanks, a partial breach of containment could propagate resulting in an explosion and a total - 
loss of containment. 
A more serious scenario is the possibility of a total bund collapse due to excessive dynamic 
loading conditions or the impact of tank debris following the catastrophic failure of the 
bulk storage tank. Other possibilities include thermal shock in the case of cryogenic 
liquids, earthquake and differential settlement due to poor foundation design or impact 
damage from moving vehicles, 
4.8 Thyer et al (2002) 
A number of experimental studies are discussed including the work of Greenspan and 
Young (1978) and Greenspan and Johansson (1981). Two studies carried out at the Health 
and Safety Laboratory using hydraulically lifted storage tanks in water channels are 
described with the results indicating good agreement with that of Greenspan and Young 
(1978). 
The simple approach above was improved upon using three-dimensional models of both 
small and large scale. The large-scale tests employed either a 'petal' opening arrangement 
or a 'split-skin' approach with the tank opening along a vertical split in one face. The size 
of the test area for the experiments was aI Om square concrete pad using a square bund and 
central circular tank. This arrangement allowed the comer effects to be investigated with 
interfering wave fronts giving rise to localised increased overtopping. The fluid flow was 
monitored using video cameras with the overtopping fraction determined from 
measurements of liquid collected in a series of trays laid out behind the bund. 
The smaller-scale testing was carried out using a similar 'split-skin' tank arrangement with 
water released onto a smooth table with overtopping determined by collecting the overflow 
into a number of trays located behind the model bund with quantification via measuring 
cylinder. A rather crude attempt was made at determining the wave height employing 
strips of tissue paper suspended directly behind the bunds. The combined results of these 
tests were analysed in terms of the overtopping as a function of the parameter h/H with 
varied r/H and r/R. 
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Work by Cronin and Evans (2002) was described, where water was released through a 25 
mm high circumferential slot at the base of a 'quadrant' tank with a diameter of 3.5 m and 
a fill height of approximately 2m and allowed to flow over a concrete base surrounded by 
various bund configurations. On average, the release time was 30 seconds with the flow of 
the fluid monitored and the overtopping estimated. 
Some comparison of the various data sets is possible as the overtopping fraction, Q was 
normally expressed in terms of varying h/H, as a function of r/H however there are 
limitations as the parameter r/R was also varied. Where the differences in r/R are minor it 
is possible to obtain comparisons with some level of confidence. 
In the case of predictive models, a number of researchers have attempted to quantify the 
bund overtopping for various configurations this included Clark et al (2001), where an 
equation was fitted to the data complied by Greenspan and Johansson (1981). 
Independently, Hirst in Thyer et al (2002) derived formulae fitted to the same test data to 
predict the overtopping fraction, QH: 
Qff =A+Bln 
(h)+C 
ln( r) 
ýH) H 
where A=0.044, B= -0.264 &C= -0.116 for 0= 90* 
A=0.287, B= -0.229 &C= -0.191 for 0= 60* 
A=0.155, B= -0.360 &C= -0.069 for 0= 30* 
The proposed equation permits estimates of the bund retention capabilities; this may be 
limited in terms of performance when transposed to larger scale facilities due to the small 
scale of the models used. It is suggested that scaling issues relating to surface roughness in 
the models may cause the equation to under estimate the overtopping fraction when 
applied to full scale. 
In conclusion, there are limitations as to the range of available data sets and a definitive 
investigation is still required using medium scale laboratory models in order to validate 
any computer based mathematical models. Both the Clark and Hirst equations gave good 
fits to the data of Greenspan and Johansson on which they were based. However, as the 
test data did not include high collar bunds, neither Clark nor Hirst claimed that their 
functions could be used for such cases. Moreover, the Greenspan and Johansson tests were 
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performed at very small scale so may systematically underestimate the overtopping 
fraction due to the spill surfaces not being suitably smooth enough. The performance of 
both Equations 4.11 and 4.13 are tested in this research against the newly obtained test 
data. Failure to perform well would indicate a systematic difference between the small- 
scale test data and the new larger scale data. 
4.9 Pettitt and Waite (2003) 
A series of experiments were carried out to determine the effects of placing a vertical 
section of wall on top of an existing sloping dyke with the aim of providing suitable 
mitigation of overtopping. Observations made on the performance of sea wall defences 
indicated considerable reduction in overtopping could be achieved by deflecting high 
velocity waves and associated splash back into the sea. This influenced the decision in 
providing a horizontal 'lip' at the inside face on the top of the sloping dyke with the aim of 
investigating its performance in terms of reduced overtopping. A series of experiments 
were undertaken using physical modelling at a scale of 1: 30 based on a bund capacity of 
170% of the maximum tank capacity used during testing. 
The release of fluid was achieved using a sliding plate behind a polypropylene block with a 
series of profiled apertures cut into the block, a second much larger opening in another 
block sandwiched the sliding plate allowing a suitable seal to be formed. Hence, the 
investigation was focused on asymmetric releases associated with the spigot failure mode. 
The fluid used was water with a specific gravity of I rather than the typical specific gravity 
of 0.83 for a hydrocarbon fuel. 
Various combinations of sloping dyke profiles; apertures, separation distances and fluid 
heads were investigated with a video camera used to record the escaping fluid motion. 
Release quantities were calculated from the tank geometry with overtopping fractions 
determined by weighing the contents of a series of catch trays. The results indicated that 
the tanks typically emptied in 10 to 20 seconds depending on the fill height and aperture 
size with the virtual elimination of overtopping when employing the deflector plate 
modification. Comparison with other data for the sloping dykes highlighted discrepancies, 
probably due to the geometry of the comparison test regime, which was based on releases 
in a channel rather than similar spigot flow. 
In terms of the civil engineering issues, the possibility of bund failure was considered due 
to the nature of the dynamic loading upon impact by the rapidly approaching surge. Any 
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retrofitted deflector would therefore have to be suitably designed with these pressures 
carefully considered. 
4.10 Kleefsman et al (2004) 
Confidence in computational fluid dynamics (CFD) modelling is building as improved 
methods are developed with increasing computer speed and memory capacity enabling 
millions of calculations to take place in shorter periods of time with high mesh densities 
giving a high degree of resolution to free surface flow simulations. A common theme is 
the use Navier-Stokes equations with improvement in the VOF method used for the 
displacement of the free surface. A dam break scenario is used for simulation purposes 
with experimental results used for validation purposes. 
The area of interest lies in the physical modelling of breaking dam flows over the deck of a 
cargo ship. A large tank of 3.22 in x 1.00 in x 1.00 in was used with 0.55 m head of water 
retained behind a release door, which when release allowed water to rapidly flow along the 
tank. At a known position along the tank, a model container was position to represent full 
size container sited on the deck of a large ship. The instrumentation employed allowed 
collection of wave profile data and more importantly the dynamic pressures generated on 
the front face and top of the model container. Four pressure sensors were fitted to the 
front face and four to the top surface with the wave velocity determined using a horizontal 
wave probe located near the sidewall of the tank. Although velocities are not directly 
quoted in the paper, it is possible to elicit data from the scale drawings and plates using the 
impact times to estimate the celerity of the wave. 
For the wave impacts on the model containers, the dynamic pressure are shown graphically 
against time for two of the sensors on the front face and two on the upper surface. The 
front face dynamic pressures indicate instantaneous peak values of 11400 Pa close to the 
base (Chart 4.1) and 6500 Pa in the region of the upper third (Chart 4.2), however these 
values quickly fall to post peak values of 4000 and 3900 Pa respectively. 
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The final conclusion relates to the overall validation of the improved VOF method with the 
global agreement of results between mathematical and physical models. One of the main 
uses of the results relating to this work will be in comparison of the velocity and dynamic 
pressure values with those recorded on bunds of similar geometry with similar 
dimensionless ratios in terms of h/H at suitable separation distances, L. 
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4.11 Ivings and Webber (2007) 
Ivings and Webber (2007) further extended the work on CFD modelling with the 
development of a bespoke method of assessing the hazards arising from liquid spills from 
bulk storage tanks eliciting data produce by Atherton (2005). The CFD model again made 
use of the solution of shallow water equations with the ability to account for the interaction 
of the flow with sloping ground and bund/dykes. In terms of risk assessment, one of the 
major requirements is the determination of the quantity of fluid that might conceivably 
overtop the secondary containment or bund/dyke. This specific requirement led to the 
development of a 'sub model' to analyse the three-dimensional nature of the problem 
within the two-dimensional model. The methodology employed the solution of the 
shallow water equations with an adaptive element incorporating two shock-capturing 
numerical techniques known as the weighted average flux (WAF) and the random choice 
methods (RCM). 
In real terms tank and bund configurations are complex, requiring much more complex 
algorithms with various levels of input information required, depending on the level of 
complexity. The time and extreme effort required to input data and model the scenarios to 
the desired level of output are demanding and for practicality an acceptable approach has 
to be deterinined, allowing as suitable degree of confidence in the results to be achieved. 
Hence the development of 'SPLOT', allowing necessary degrees of complexity with 
reduced functionality in comparison to full three-dimensional CFD modelling software. 
The shallow water equations are unable to account for three-dimensional behaviour of the 
fluid bund interface and subsequent overtopping. To describe the physical behaviour, the 
model was based on certain assumptions including representing the bund as a thin wall 
between computational cells with the flow subdivided vertically at the top of the bund, 
solving the resulting shallow water equations in two layers. The lower layer is considered 
to interact with the bund as a solid wall with the upper layer free to travel over the bund. 
The bottom layer is updated using a reflective boundary condition in the cells immediately 
adjacent to the bund and the upper layer is analysed using a modified liquid height (liquid 
height - bund height), The overall solution is a recombination of the separate solutions to 
give the depth-averaged flow variables in that cell, which leads to a reasonable solution to 
the problem without having to take account of the complexity of the three-dimensional 
flow. 
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In a typical test run, a single tank of radius 8 rn is filled to a height of 10 m giving a 
volume of just over 2000 in 3 with a rectangular bund 24 in x 44 mx2 in with a volume of 
2100 in 3. The results in terms of general observation show that overtopping takes place at 
the nearest section of wall to the release through a 25 % area of the tank. The impact 
generates splashing to a considerable height and overtopping is significant before the 
volume of fluid released ever becomes an issue in terms of the bund capacity. Thus, the 
bund capacity is not a determining factor in the magnitude of the overtopping fraction. 
The application of the model has been validated using more exacting numerical methods as 
well as experimental work including the overtopping results obtained by Atherton (2005). 
In conclusion, the model is sufficiently accurate to predict overtopping in the event of a 
sudden release due to the catastrophic failure of the primary storage vessel and as such, is 
able to adequately assess the risks associated with this type of potential hazard. 
4.12 Summary 
A number of previous researchers have attempted to address some of the problems 
highlighted using a range of different approaches including dam-break analogies, channel 
releases, small-scale cylinder models and CFD techniques. In each case it has been 
difficult to make exact comparisons between the results due to the different ranges in the 
parameters used in each of the investigations. There is one overall commonality between 
all works considered, in so far as the conclusions lead to an undeniable shortcoming of the 
vast majority of bund walls. This is particularly evident in the case of bunds providing 
proper containment for the more extreme modes of failure. For the purposes of validation 
of the results from this research, the work described in this chapter will provide sufficient 
information for the performance of any empirical formulae to be evaluated. This is 
possible, as over the range of work considered there are a number of suitable cases that are 
relatively similar dimensionally to those investigated. 
The summary of results aims to confirm the extent of the problem of bund wall 
overtopping and dynamic pressures over a wide range of possible tank and bund 
configurations for both catastrophic (axisymmetric) and partial (asymmetric) releases. The 
results are presented in both table and chart format, making use of non-dimensional 
parameters to illustrate the magnitudes of both overtopping and dynamic pressures. 
Comparisons between types of failure and the effects of aperture size and shape are also 
presented for consideration. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Summary of Results 
5.1 Data processing 
The data collected from each test run were imported into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet for 
statistical analysis. For each configuration examined the maximum, minimum, mean and 
sample standard deviation for the masses overtopping the bund and retained by the bund in 
each of the five test runs were calculated to check the spread of the data about the mean. 
The spread was found to be small, usually within 1% of the mean. The maximum value of 
the overtopping fraction, Q, over the five test runs was taken forward as the overtopping 
fraction for the configuration. 
Dynamic pressures and fluid heights were plotted against time to allow comparison of 
results and permit the evaluation of values such as the average speed of the approaching 
wave. The dynamic pressure profiles were plotted and the maximum dynamic pressure at 
the base was estimated using linear extrapolation of the signals from the two sensors 
nearest to the base. The majority of tests had these sensors at 10 % of the bund height, but 
the physical size of the sensors meant that for bund heights of 36 min and below greater 
heights had to be used to accommodate the sensor body adjacent to the base. The 
extrapolation is therefore less reliable for the lower bunds (and indeed is not available for 
the 6 mm bund as only one sensor could be used in that case). The sensor positions are 
recorded in Tables 5.1and 5.7. The extrapolated pressure could then be compared to the 
wave height measured at the bund in the vicinity of the transducers. 
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Table 5.1 Dynamic pressure sensor positions for axisymmetric tests 
Bund height Sensorpositions Sensorposition 
(MM) (% from base) (mmfrom base) 
6 75 4.5 
12 40 4.8 
50 6 
60 7.2 
70 8.4 
80 9.6 
15 30 4.5 
50 7.5 
70 10.5 
80 12 
90 13.5 
24 20 4.8 
30 7.2 
50 12 
70 16.8 
90 21.6 
30 20 6 
30 9 
50 15 
70 21 
90 27 
36 20 7.2 
30 10.8 
50 18 
70 25.2 
90 32.4 
48 10 4.8 
30 14.4 
50 24 
70 33.6 
90 43.2 
60 10 6 
30 18 
50 30 
70 42 
90 54 
90 10 9 
30 27 
50 45 
70 63 
90 81 
72 
Bund height Sensorpositions Sensorposition 
(MM) (Olo from base) (mmfrom base) 
120 10 12 
30 36 
50 60 
70 84 
90 108 
144 10 14.4 
30 43.2 
so 72 
70 100.8 
90 129.6 
180 10 18 
30 54 
50 90 
70 126 
90 162 
240 10 24 
30 72 
so 120 
70 168 
90 216 
300 10 30 
30 90 
50 150 
70 210 
90 270 
360 10 36 
30 108 
50 180 
70 252 
90 324 
600 10 60 
30 180 
50 300 
70 420 
90 540 
720 10 72 
30 216 
so 360 
70 504 
90 648 
Example results for the axisymmetric 'circular' configurations are given in Tables 5.2 and 
5.3 with full results given in Appendix 2. For each of the 84 configurations studied the 
appendix shows a table of measured variables in each of the five test runs and their 
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statistical analysis, followed by a table showing extrapolation of the worst-case dynamic 
pressures and their analysis alongside wave heights. 
Table 5.2 Series results for configuration identity B2 (h240) 
Configuration series Mb.. d MI_k Imp Jtlb.. d correction Vb.. d VW. Al Overtopping 
identity identity (kg) (Ag) (IQ (kg) (in i) (in -, ) ftaction 
B2(h240) A 33.38 8.63 18.4 0.4 0.13192 0.03452 0.2074 
B 33.62 8.55 15.6 0.13288 0.03420 0.2047 
c 33.55 8.68 14.3 0.13260 0.03472 0.2075 
D 33.20 8.95 14.6 0.13120 0.03580 0.2144 
E 33.48 8.86 14.0 0.13232 0.03544 0.2113 
Mav 33.62 8,95 18.4 0.13288 0,03580 0,2144 
Min 33.20 8.55 14.0 0.13120 0.03420 0.2047 
Mean 33.45 8.73 15.4 0.13218 0.03494 0.2090 
Sample sd 0.16365 0.16592 1.7922 0.00065458 0.00066369 0.0037835 
Heightfrombase Series dynamic pressures (Pa) Mav dynamic pressure 
M. ) ABCDE (Pa) 
10 3779 3808 3750 3808 3808 3808 
30 2922 2840 2977 2867 2895 
50 1350 1292 1206 1292 1264 
70 403 317 317 288 317 
90 137 -82 -82 137 -82 
Table 5.3 Worst-case dynamic pressures for configuration identity B2 (h240) 
Configuration Test Series Tank radius, R Tankfluid depth, H Band radius, r Band height, h 
Identity Identity (M-) (MM) (-in) (MM) 
B2(h240) B 300 600 520 240 
Estimated dynamic Estimated Wave Equivalent wave Max integral Equivalent Integral 
basepressure Intercept height intercept pressure wave height wave pressure 
(PO) (mm) (Pa) (MM) (Pa) 
4292 288 2830 552 5418 
Heightfrom 
base 
NO 
static 
pressure 
(Pa) 
Dynamic 
pressure 
(Pa) 
Local 
difference 
(Pa) 
Local 
dynaMICIStalle 
ratio 
0 2354 4292 1937 1.82 
10 2119 3808 1689 1.80 
30 1648 2840 1192 1.72 
50 1177 1292 115 1.10 
70 706 317 -390 0.45 
90 235 -82 -317 -0.35 
100 0 
Release time Impact time Time taken Impact Velocity 
(sec) (sec) (sec) OWS) 
0.184 0.301 0.117 3.76 
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Example Charts 5.1 and 5.2 indicate variation of dynamic pressures and fluid depths 
against time, and best-fit curves to the pressure data with variation in percentage bund 
height with. Complete chart sets are given in Appendix 2. 
Chart 5.1 Plot of dynamic pressures and wave heights for 
configuration identity B2 (h240) 
Plot of pressure & fluid depth against time 
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Chart 5.2 Plot of static and dynamic pressures for 
configuration identity B2 (h240) 
Plot of pressure against % height 
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Tables 5.5 and 5.6 indicate example results for the axisymmetric 'rectangular' 
configurations with full results for each of the nine test configurations shown in Appendix 
3. 
Table 5.5 Series results for configuration identity Wall 3 (rect) 
Configuration 
identity 
series 
identity 
Mb.. d 
(kg) 
MOM, 
(kg) 
lemp, Mb.. d correction 
(00 
Vb.. d 
(- 3) 
VSIk 
(in 3) 
Overtopping 
ftaction 
Wall 3 (rect) A 22.23 19.71 20.6 0.4 0.08732 0.07884 0.4745 
B 22.14 19.95 20.1 0.08696 0.07980 0.4785 
C 22.51 19.63 19.7 0.08844 0,07852 0.4703 
D 22.22 19.92 19.3 0.08728 0.07968 0.4772 
E 22.42 19.88 19.2 0.08808 0.07952 0.4745 
mar 22.51 19.95 20.6 0.08844 0.07980 0.4785 
Min 22.14 19.63 19.2 0.08696 0.07852 0.4703 
Mean 22.30 19.82 19.8 0.08762 0.07927 0.4750 
Sample sd 0.15437 0.14025 0.5805 0.00061748 0.00056100 0.0031706 
Heightfrombase Series dynamic pressures (Pa) Mav dynamic pressure 
NO ABCDE (pa) 
10 3953 3663 3837 3866 3517 3953 
30 3523 3441 3741 3414 3496 
50 3274 3504 3274 3360 3274 
70 2793 2764 2994 2649 2677 
90 2377 1885 2049 1830 1666 
Table 5.6 Worst-case dynamic pressures for configuration identity Wall 3 (rect) 
Conflguration 
Identify 
Test Series 
Identify 
Tank radius, R 
(-M) 
Tankfluid depth, B Multiple ofkngth, y 
(-M) NO 
Bunddiagonald 
(-m) 
Bundheighth 
(-M) 
Wall 3 (rect) A 300 600 441 686 120 
Estimated dynamic 
hosepressure 
(Pa) 
Estimated Wave 
Intercept height 
(M-) 
Equivalent wave 
intercepipressure 
(Pa) 
Mav integral 
wave height 
(MM) 
Equivalent integral 
wavepressure 
(PO) 
4168 122 1197 128 1259 
Heightfrom Static Dynamic Local Local 
base pressure pressure difference dynamiclstalic 
NO (Pa) (PA) (Pa) ratio 
0 1177 4168 2991 3.54 
10 1059 3953 2894 3.73 
30 824 3523 2699 4.28 
50 589 3274 2685 5.56 
70 353 2793 2439 7.91 
90 118 2377 2259 20.19 
100 0 
Release time 
(sec) 
Impact time 
(sec) 
Time taken 
(sec) 
I-pact Velocity 
(MAS) 
0.742 1.094 0.352 2.19 
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Example Charts 5.3 and 5.4 indicate variation of dynamic pressures and fluid depths 
against time, and best-fit curves to the pressure data with variation in percentage bund 
height with for 'rectangular' bunding arrangements. Complete chart sets are given in 
Appendix 3. 
Chart 5.3 Plot of dynamic pressures and wave heights for 
configuration identity Wall 3 (rect) 
Plot of pressure & fluid depth against time 
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Chart 5.4 Plot of static and dynamic pressures for 
configuration identity Wall 3 (rect) 
Plot of pressure against % height 
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Table 5.7 Dynamic pressure sensor positions for asymmetric tests 
Bund height Sensorpositions Sensorposition 
(11o from base) (mm from base) 
6 75 4.5 
12 40 4.8 
50 6 
60 7.2 
70 8.4 
80 9.6 
15 30 4.5 
50 7.5 
70 10.5 
80 12 
90 13.5 
24 20 4.8 
30 7.2 
50 12 
70 16.8 
90 21.6 
30 20 6 
30 9 
50 is 
70 21 
90 27 
36 20 7.2 
30 10.8 
50 18 
70 25.2 
90 32.4 
48 10 4.8 
30 14.4 
50 24 
70 33.6 
90 43.2 
60 10 6 
30 18 
50 30 
70 42 
90 54 
90 10 9 
30 27 
50 45 
70 63 
90 81 
120 10 12 
30 36 
50 60 
70 84 
90 108 
180 10 18 
30 54 
50 90 
70 126 
90 162 
240 10 24 
30 72 
50 120 
70 168 
90 216 
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Tables 5.8 and 5.9 indicate example results for the asymmetric 'circular' configurations 
with full results for each of the nine test configurations shown in Appendix 5. 
Table 5.8 Series results for configuration identity BI JS3 (h48) 
Configuration 
identity 
series 
identity 
Mb.. d 
(kg) 
M,,,, /, 
ft) 
temp Mb.. d correction 
rQ (kg) 
VA.. d 
(m 3) 
V". b 
(in i) 
Overtopping 
fraction 
BIJS3(h48) A 7.11 1.08 21.6 0.0 0.02844 0.00432 0.1319 
B 7.11 1.10 21.8 0.02844 0.00440 0.1340 
C 7.18 1.07 21.9 0.02872 0.00428 0.1297 
D 7.09 1.07 22.0 0.02836 0.00428 0.1311 
E 7.13 1.07 22.0 0.02852 0.00428 0.1305 
Max 7.18 1.10 22.0 0.02872 0.00440 0.1340 
Min 7.09 1.07 21.6 0.02836 0.00428 0.1297 
Mean 7.12 1.08 21.9 0.02850 0.00431 0.1314 
Sample sd 0.03435 0.01304 0.1673 0.00013740 0.0000521 5 0.0016349 
Heightfrombase 
NO 
Series dynamic pressures (Pa) 
ABCD 
Mar dynamic pressure 
E (Pa) 
10 748 730 657 641 668 748 
30 677 591 594 613 707 
50 531 514 538 573 430 
70 367 363 384 417 439 
90 232 191 200 194 240 
Table 5.9 Worst-case dynamic pressures for configuration identity BI JS3 (h48) 
Configuration 
identity 
Test Series 
identity 
Tank radius, R 
(mm) 
Tankfluld depth, H 
(mm) 
Bund radius, r Bund height, h 
(- m) (-in) 
BIJS3(h48) A 300 120 497 48 
Estimated dynamic Orifice diameter Slot width Slot height Area ofjet 
basepressure (MM) (MM) (MM) (. in 2) 
(Pa) 
784 157.08 36.00 5654.88 
Heightfrom Static Dynamic Local Local 
base pressure pressure difference dynamiclstatic 
(0/6) (Pa) (Pa) (Pa) ratio 
0 471 784 313 1.67 
10 424 748 325 1.77 
30 330 677 348 2.05 
50 235 531 296 2.26 
70 141 367 226 2.60 
90 47 232 185 4.93 
100 0 
Release time 
(sec) 
Impact time 
(sec) 
Time taken 
(sec) 
Impact Velocity 
OWS) 
0.818 0.979 0.161 2.45 
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Example Charts 5.5 and 5.6 indicate variation of dynamic pressures and fluid depths 
against time, and best-fit curves to the pressure data with variation in percentage bund 
height with for asymmetric 'circular' bunding arrangements. Complete chart sets are given 
in Appendix 5. 
Chart 5.5 Plot of dynamic pressures and tank contents for 
configuration identity B US3 (h48) 
Plot of pressure & fluid depth against time 
Boo 
700 
600 
500 
400 
LD 
5D 300 
IL 
200 
100 
0 
-100 
Chart 5.6 Plot of static and dynamic pressures for 
configuration identity BI JS3 (h48) 
Plot of pressure against % height 
900 
Boo 
700 
600 
9500 
400 
IL 
300 
200 
100 
0 
140 
120 
100 
BO 
50 
40 
20 
Y-0.0007X'3-01.1? 23ý4x2-0.4992x+7i77.6i2 0 
n 9989 mg 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 
Height (%) 
--e- Static pressure * Dynamic pressure -Poly. (Dynamic pressure) 
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Time (see) 
10% from bass * 30% from base a 50% from base x 70% from base - 90% from base - Tank depth 
5.2 Axisymmetric overtopping 
Along with the total overtopping for axisymmetric 'circular' configurations, a comparison 
between the total overtopping and the overtopping due to the first wave impact was also 
considered and an experimental procedure developed to investigate the relationship. By 
repeating the same tests, only this time suddenly opening the tank drain before any 
reflected wave could overtop the bund, a series of first wave overtopping results were 
obtained. The values were compared and it was found that a reduced overtopping fraction 
resulted, indicating that 94 to 95 % of the total overtopping takes place with the impact of 
the first wave (Table 5.4). A short summary of all axisymmetric results both 'circular and 
4 rectangular' can be found in Table 5.10. 
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5.3 Asymmetric overtopping 
Due to the physical nature of the impinging jet of fluid in the case of an asymmetric 
directional release or 'spigot/jetting' failure, the resulting overtopping can be very different 
than that for an axisymmetric release. For experimental purposes the apertures used for the 
partial failures were split into two types, namely 'orifice' and 'slot' as detailed in Table 
3.2. These apertures were further sub divided into different surface areas of release of 
0.125,0.250 and 0.500 % of tank surface area for orifice releases and 0.500,1.500 and 
2.500 % for slot releases. The bund capacity investigated was limited to 110 %, due the 
increased number of variations of aperture under evaluation. In terms of fluid height, the 
same ratios of R/H (0.5.1.0 and 2.5) or 'squat', 'middle' and 'tall' were used to determine 
the effects of the partial releases. A short summary of all asymmetric results can be found 
in Table 5.11. 
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5.4 Axisymmetric dynamic pressures 
An estimate of the maximum dynamic pressure at the base of the bund was obtained by 
extrapolating the pressure profiles, and comparisons were then made with the pressures 
that would apply if the bund were just full of static water. For the non high-collar bunds, it 
was found that the actual pressure experienced in the event of a catastrophic failure was 
higher than that normally employed for design purposes. For high-collar bunds the 
dynamic pressures were lower than the static pressure. 
Further comparisons between the fluid levels and the maximum dynamic pressures led to 
the investigation of the crossover points (that is, the moment in time when the fluid level in 
the tank and that at the bund are equal) and the instantaneous pressure heads corresponding 
to the positions of local maxima. The wave-monitoring probe was repositioned to be as 
close as possible to the dynamic pressure transducers in order to obtain more accurate 
correlations. 
As work progressed it was consistently apparent that the maximum wave height did not 
correspond to the timings or magnitudes of the maximum dynamic pressures. Video 
footage allowed an upward and forward momentum to be identified along with the 
formation of a separation layer, which having a higher energy level, starts to rapidly rise 
upwards and forwards to leave the main body of fluid (Plate 5.1). 
F 
* Plale source: LJMU 
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Plate 5.1 Wave breaking over model bundshowing separation laj, er* 
High-speed camera footage was used to further confirm the behaviour of the fluid at the 
point of contact with the bund. The same characteristics were observed with the separation 
layer further forming droplets, which separate and fly through the air. It is therefore 
concluded that the full wave height, including the separation layer does not fully contribute 
to the maximum dynamic pressure at the base of the bund wall due to the vertical 
component of the upward moving fluid as it separates from the main fluid body. 
The ratios of maximum dynamic pressures to hydrostatic pressure obtained in this work are 
mostly in keeping with the results reported by Trbojevic and Slater (1989), where a ratio of 
2.5 is quoted for a typical liquefied fuel gas and a ratio of 3.5 for Diesel fuel. Atherton 
(2005) has, however, shown much higher values in some cases, generally for the lower 
bunds. The values for lower bunds may have been exaggerated by the need to extrapolate 
data from sensors whose placement was not ideal, and it has to be noted that the dynamic 
pressures obtained in nominally identical tests showed a substantial variability (h = 12 mm 
- DynlStatba,, = 16.45 for a squat tank 110% bund and Dyn1Statb,, e = 6.64 for a squat tank 
120% bund). Other workers have stated higher values than did Trbojevic and Slater 
(1989), for example Cuperus (1980) quoted a ratio of six, but the basis of the Cuperus data 
is unknown. The ratios obtained in this research are shown in the "Short summary of 
axisymmetric results" Table 5.10 in the columns headed "DYnIStatbase"- 
Impact velocities, as shown in example Table 5.3 (fully in Appendix 2) for circular bunds 
and in example Table 5.6 (fully in Appendix 3) for rectangular bunds are calculated from 
Newton's Laws of Motion considering the fluid to be accelerated uniformly from rest over 
a known distance in known time. There are inherent inaccuracies in the calculation of 
velocities, as the horizontal acceleration is not uniform as the standing head of fluid falls 
and spreads over the bunded area and friction acts to slow the motion, especially over the 
larger distances travelled. The transit times are also shown and these are more reliable as 
they are inferred directly from the recorded data. A range of video stills (Plate set 5.2) are 
shown with the fluid (water dyed blue) tracked across the flow table from initial release to 
impact with the bund and eventual overtopping. 
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1. Firing mechanism released 2. Free standing water 
3. Initial impact with bund 4. Fluid clears bund 
5. Fluidgains height 6 Separation layerforms 
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7. Separate components visible 
9. Height in excess offill level 
11. Separation layer clears bund 
8. Fluid moveý5 up &forward 
10. Fluid starts tofall 
12. First wave overtopping 
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13. Overtopping continues 14. Reflected wavefi)rming 
15. Reflected wave gains height 16. Reflected wave returns 
Plate set 5.2 Videoftames showing wave tracking and bund impactfor axisymmetric releases* 
Plate source: LIMU 
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5.5 Asymmetric dynamic pressures 
It has been suspected for some time that a concentrated jet of fluid acting on the bund 
would cause high levels of dynamic loading in excess of those generated by a catastrophic 
failure (Plate 5.3). The results in the short summary Table 5.11 indicate that this in not 
universally true and the dynamic pressure at the base of the bund depends on a number of 
factors including the size and shape of the aperture, the tank to bund separation distance 
and the height of the bund. The effect of the separation distance, L may appear obvious, as 
with an increasing value of L, the jet tends to impact the floor of the bund and spreads out 
prior to impact with the bund wall. An example impact velocity is indicated in Table 5.9 
and more detailed information can be found for individual configurations in Appendix 5. 
, 0, 
Plate 5.3 Asymmetric orifice release withjet impacting model hund wall* 
A range of video stills (Plate set 5.4) are shown with the fluid tracked from initial release 
to sustained impact with the bund and continual overtopping. 
Plate source: LJMU 
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1. Initial release 
3. Spreading starts 
2. Impact with bund 
--Iro7lr 1 
, 4(- N 
4. Spreading continues 
5. Upward& forward motion 6 Droplets start tofall 
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7. Overtopping starts 
9. Overtopping builds 
H. Wave height starts tofall 
8. Overtopping continues 
10. lmpact with spill table 
12. Wave height reducesfurther 
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Jed 40 
13. Overtopping stabilises 
Ilk 
15. Overtopping continues 
17. Overtopping continues 
14. Overtopl Ping continues 
16. Overtopping continues 
18. Overtopping continues 
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19. Overtopping continues 
2 1. Overtopping starts to diminish 
23. Overtopping ends 
20. Overtopping continues 
4 
22. Overtopping subsides 
24. Bundstarts tofill 
Plate set 5.4 Videoftames showing wave tracking and bund impactfor asymmetric releases* 
Plate source: LJMU 
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In the Summary of Results Tables 5.12 to 5.23 below the column headed 'Q' shows the 
measured overtopping fractions, those headed Qf, Qc, and QH show the overtopping 
fractions predicted using the equations of Atherton, Clark (2001) and Hirst in Thyer et al 
(2002) respectively. 
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5.6 Interpretation of graphical results for axisymmetric releases 
The Charts 5.7 to 5.12 indicate both the quantity overtopping the bunds and the magnitudes 
of the dynamic pressures in terms of non-dimensional parameters for bund capacities 
ranging from 110 % to 200 %. The curves are derived from the best fit to the experimental 
data using the standard curve-fitting techniques available in Excel and the equations of the 
curve are shown along with the degree of fit, as indicated by R2, the correlation coefficient 
squared. The degree of fit is deemed perfect R2 = 1, with deviations of fit determined by 
values of R2 < 1. 
The dimensionless ratios used in the charts allow the equations to be used at any scale to 
predict both the amount of overtopping and the magnitude of the ratio of the dynamic to 
static pressures experienced due to an axisymmetric failure of a bulk storage tank. It can 
be seen for the results that the degree of fit for both overtopping and dynamic pressures is 
less good for squat tanks with bunds of larger capacity (200 %). The middle and tall tank 
configurations are fairly consistent with regard the degree of fit, however there are a 
couple of anomalous results in the pressure data at smaller ratios of h/H. 
Generally, the greater the tank height, the greater the overtopping and the pressure ratio 
obtained due the increase in potential energy. In terms of bund capacity, smaller capacity 
bunds tend to have increased pressure ratios, although there are slight variations with 
specific configurations of tank and bund. 
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5.7 Interpretation of graphical results for asymmetric releases 
The Charts 5.13 to 5.22 indicate both the quantity overtopping the bunds and the 
magnitudes of the dynamic pressures in terms of non-dimensional parameters for a bund 
capacity of 110 %. Again, the curves are derived from the best fit to the experimental data 
using the standard curve-fitting techniques available in Excel and the equations of the 
curve are shown along with the degree of fit, as indicated by R2. 
The dimensionless ratios used in the charts allow the equations to be used at any scale to 
predict both the amount of overtopping and the magnitude of the ratio of the dynamic to 
static pressures experienced due to an asymmetric failure of a bulk storage tank. The 
overtopping for squat tank orifice releases are all in the order of less than 2% with the slot 
releases predicted form the equations indicated on the chart. The smallest slot used has 
the poorest degree of fit, mainly due to the apparent anomalous result for the smallest ratio 
of h/H. There are no predictions made for the dynamic pressure ratios in the cases of 
asymmetric releases for squat tanks. 
For the overtopping related to middle tanks, the orifice releases all show a poor degree of 
fit and this can be attributed to effect of the eddy currents observed for certain 
configurations of tank and bund, particularly with the smallest orifice. The dynamic 
pressures also show a large degree of scatter and an empirical formula is only proposed for 
largest orifice. In the case of the slot releases for the middle tanks, the overtopping is 
reproducible with a good degree of fit, as are the pressure ratios, however there are some 
anomalous pressure results at the smaller values of h/H. 
In the case of the overtopping for the tall tanks, the orifice releases are reproduced to a 
reasonable standard with a good degree of fit. The pressure ratios are less well reproduced 
for the orifice releases, again this is due to the results obtained for the lower values of h/H. 
The slot releases give good overtopping results across the range of apertures with a good 
degree of fit in all cases, however the pressure ratios are less well represented and have a 
lesser degree of fit. As in other cases, the degree of fit is compromised by the results 
obtained at lower values of h/H. 
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In general terms, the overtopping and pressure ratios increase along with the tank height 
and increase in potential energy, although there are some anomalies for both orifice and 
slot releases, possibly as a result of eddy currents produced due to the quadrant 
arrangement of the test rig. These anomalies were investigated to confirm the observations 
made during testing using a full 360' plastic barrel and bund arrangement constructed to 
the same scale as the test rig, but with a very basic rubber bung release allowing fluid to 
flow through the orifice. The data form these tests can be found in Tables 7.1. and 7.2 
along with a more detailed discussion of the results in section 7.5. 
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5.8 Interpretation of comparative graphical results for dynamic pressure profiles 
and overtopping 
Table 5.24 and Chart 5.23 indicate the relationships between the various types of release in 
terms of the pressure profiles along the percentage height of the bund walls for asymmetric 
release areas of 0.5 % compared to the full axisymmetric release. For squat tank releases, 
the axisymmetric pressure profile is consistently above the normal static pressure designed 
for with overtopping of 23.9 %. The orifice release exhibits pressures above the static 
values only up to 30 % of the bund height and as such, the overtopping is only 1.8 %. In 
the cases of the slot release, the pressure profile is consistently below the static values and 
has the lowest overtopping of 1.1 %. 
Generally, it appears that the greater the deviation of the dynamic pressure profiles above 
the static pressure profiles, the greater the overtopping, particularly if the deviation occurs 
near the top of the bund. These charts are examples taken from a more extensive range to 
be found in Appendix 6. 
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5.9 Interpretation of comparative graphical results for overtopping In terms of 
area of removal 
Tables 5.25 and 5.26 together with Charts 5.24 and 5.25 indicate the relationships between 
the axisymmetric and asymmetric test results in term of the overtopping fraction and the 
ratio of h/H. In the case of orifice releases, the overtopping fractions are considerably 
lower (nominally less than 20 %) than those obtained for the full axisymmetric releases (28 
to 62 %). It can be seen that the smaller the area of removal, the smaller the values of 
overtopping with respect to h/H. 
For slot releases, the same observation is made and in all cases the overtopping fractions 
are lower than those obtained for the full axisymmetric releases (28 to 62 %), however the 
differences are not as great as those in the case of the orifice releases. The smaller area of 
removal again gives the smaller values of overtopping with the largest area giving a range 
of 22 to 42 %. 
Generally, the smaller the area of release the smaller the overtopping fraction, however the 
shape of the aperture is of importance. The charts discussed are only examples taken from 
a fuller range to be found in Appendix 7. 
5.10 Summary 
The tables and charts in the summary of results indicate the extent of both overtopping and 
dynamic pressures that can occur post failure of a bulk storage tank. Upon inspection this 
presents the possibility of estimating the magnitude of such events using suitable 
correlations and equations. 
For the range of variables investigated, the analysis of results proposes suitable empirical 
equations for the prediction of overtopping fractions and dynamic to static pressure ratios 
for the purposes of risk assessment. The equations and constants indicated for the various 
scenarios are valid over the ranges stated and exclude the ranges for high-collar bunds. 
This is due the fact that high-collar bunds pose much less of a problem in temns of both 
overtopping and dynamic pressures and are much less common than lower forms of 
bunding. This is directly related to the cost of the installation of high-collar bunds, which 
can be excessive and difficult to justify using current statistically based risk assessments. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Analysis of Results 
6.1 Introduction 
The main aim of this investigation was to simulate various modes of failure over a wide 
range of tank and bund configurations and to determine the extent of the losses in terms of 
possible overtopping of the bunds and to quantify the magnitudes of the dynamic pressures 
exerted on the bunds. From the vast amount of data collected, empirical equations were 
derived based on dimensionless parameters, using curve-fitting techniques available within 
the Excel spreadsheet package. Tables 6.1 to 6.6 indicate the constants to be used for the 
various data sets based on mode of failure, tank type and bund capacity. 
6.2 Correlations and equations for the prediction of overtopping fractions for 
axisymmetric failures 
The test configurations sub-divided the tanks into three categories (squat, middle and tall). 
These groups are based on the ratios of tank radius to tank height giving the ratios of 2.5, 
1.0 and 0.5 respectively. The equation produced (6-1) then requires the use of two 
constants (Table 6.1) to allow the prediction of losses. The constants allow for variations 
not only in tank configuration but also bund capacity. The equation is valid for the three- 
tank radius to tank height ratios of 2.5,1, and 0.5 and for bund capacities ranging from I 10 
to 200 %. 
The equation 
Q=Aexp[-B(h (6.1) V) 
with A and B taking the values shown below (Table 6.1), is recommended to estimate the 
overtopping fraction. The equation is of the same form as that suggested by Clark et al 
(2001). The range of validity is 0.66 5 (r - R) / R: 5 5.32. It should be noted that high- 
collar bunds are excluded from the range of validity, as the overtopping fraction is 
negligible, usually less than 5 %, the bulk of which can normally be recovered from site. 
Omitting the high-collar bunds improves the quality of fit for the smaller bunds at greater 
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radii, where frictional forces start to affect the result, as evidenced by the reduction in 
impact velocities. 
Table 6.1 Constants used in Equation 6.1 for prediction of losses 
for axisymmetric failures 
Tank type Bund capacity 
NO 
A B 
Squat 110 0.5789 2.0818 
120 0.5193 1.9671 
150 0.3978 2.0051 
200 0.1824 0.4972 
Middle 110 0.7588 2.3529 
120 0.7306 2.3834 
150 0.6359 2.4451 
200 0.4814 2.1866 
Tall 110 0.8873 3.1682 
120 0.8942 3.4692 
150 0.8244 3.4712 
200 0.7369 3.5240 
6.3 Correlations and equations for the prediction of dynamic pressures for 
axisymmetric failures 
Using the same test configurations as described in Section 6.2 the dynamic pressures at the 
base of the bund can be determined from the ratio of the dynamic pressures to static 
pressure, DYnlStat base3 which are evaluated from an equation of the same form as that used 
for calculation of the overtopping fractions. 
The constants listed in Table 6.2 are used to predict the magnitude of the ratio DynlStat base 
encountered with axisymmetric releases again using Equation 6.2. The configurations are 
again represented over various bund capacities with the three ratios of tank radius to tank 
height, R/H represented as 'squat', 'middle' and 'tall'. 
DynlStat ba,, = C exp[- D( 
h )] 
(6.2) H 
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Table 6.2 Constants used in Equation 6.2 for prediction of 
dynamic pressures for axisymmetric failures 
Tank type Bund capacity C 
r1o) 
Squat 110 28.9250 
120 8.0669 
150 10.9630 
200 5.4911 
D 
8.3704 
4.2599 
5.1350 
3.0111 
Middle 110 9.4121 4.5712 
120 8.4295 4.6397 
150 6.7030 4.3532 
200 7.4184 5.1410 
Tall 110 9.8056 4.8587 
120 7.4835 4.3025 
150 8.2102 5.0004 
200 7.5531 5.2278 
6.4 Correlations and equations for the prediction of overtopping fractions for 
asymmetric orifice failures 
For asymmetric releases, the same ratios of R/H were employed, however only bund 
capacities of 110 % were investigated due to the additional complication of three orifice 
diameters being introduced with a range of validity of 0.66: 5 (r - R) /R<3.69. In cases 
where no empirical formula is proposed for the overtopping fraction, the constants in Table 
6.3 are listed as 'Na'. 
Table 6.3 Constants used in Equation 6.1 for prediction of losses 
for asymmetric orifice failures 
Tank type Bund capacity Orifice dia AB 
M. ) (MM) 
Squat 110 18.97 Na Na 
26.83 Na Na 
37.95 Na Na 
Middle 110 30.00 0.0665 0,1256 
42.43 0.0839 0.7674 
60.00 0.1509 0.2018 
Tall 110 42.43 0.3144 4,7386 
60.00 0.3740 4.5316 
84.85 0.4017 3.6271 
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6.5 Correlations and equations for the prediction of dynamic pressures for 
asymmetric orifice failures 
Table 6.4 indicates the values of the constants C and D for the determination of the ratio 
DynlStat bam for the orifice releases. Again, where no empirical equation is proposed the 
values of C and D are listed as 'Na'. 
Table 6.4 Constants used in Equation 6.2 for prediction of 
dynamic pressures for asymmetric orifice failures 
Tanktype Bundcapaeity Orifice dia CD 
(0/. ) (MM) 
Squat 110 18.97 Na Na 
26.83 Na Na 
37.95 Na Na 
Middle 110 30.00 Na Na 
42.43 Na Na 
60.00 4.8340 2.8167 
Tall 110 42.43 8.1811 2.6902 
60.00 7.6295 2.4264 
84.85 5.0453 1.9413 
6.6 Correlations and equations for the prediction of overtopping fractions for 
asymmetric slot failures 
For the slot failures, values of A and B in Table 6.5 are listed throughout the configurations 
employed, making overtopping predictions possible in all the cases investigated for a range 
of 0.66: 5 (r - R) / R: 5 3.69. 
139 
Table 6.5 Constants used in Equation 6.1 for prediction of losses 
for asymmetric slot failures 
Tank type Bund capacity Slot height A B 
r/0) (MM) 
Squat 110 7.20 0.0547 4.2640 
Slot width 21.60 0.3496 3.5033 
157.08mm 36.00 0.3445 2.1237 
Middle 110 18.00 0.4350 6.1307 
Slot width 54.80 0.4778 2.3753 
157 08mm 90.00 0.4928 1.9141 
Tall 110 36.00 0.4260 3.6389 
Slot width 108.00 0.5509 2.6940 
157.08mm 180.00 0.6554 3.3391 
6.7 Correlations and equations for the prediction of dynamic pressures for 
asymmetric slot failures 
Table 6.6 gives values of C and D for the determination of DynlStat base for slot releases 
with the 'squat' tanks having no empirical formulae. 
Table 6.6 Constants used in Equation 6.2 for prediction of 
dynamic pressures for asymmetric slot failures 
Tank type Bund capacity Slot height C D 
(MM) 
Squat 110 7.20 Na Na 
Slot width 21.60 Na Na 
157.08mm 36.00 Na Na 
Middle 110 18.00 4.4082 3.0939 
Slot width 54.80 6.9382 3.4641 
157.08mm 90.00 7.2228 3.6725 
Tall 110 36.00 4.2077 2.7650 
Slot width 108.00 8.2802 3.9153 
157.08mm 180.00 8.3413 3.8197 
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6.8 Dimensional analysis 
The method of dimensional analysis is valid for comparison of the same phenomenon at 
different scales and speeds. Common forms of non-dimensional groups used in fluid 
mechanics are Reynolds number, the Froude number, the Mach number and the Webber 
number. The magnitude of the forces exerted on the escaping fluid depends on the mean 
velocity, on the size of the release (length or depth), on the fluid viscosity and density and 
on the gravitational acceleration. Gravity is important, as any changes in fluid level 
involve a gravity force tending to cause acceleration or a deceleration as the release 
progresses. It is important that the length in the model is taken at the same point as the full 
size prototype so that a suitable scale can be determined. 
The problem is therefore a function of Reynolds number and the Froude number. 
Reynolds number, R,: 
ul (6.3) 
P/P 
Froude number, F,: 
(6.4) 
(91) 112 
Where, u= velocity, I= length, p= viscosity, p= density of liquid &g= acceleration due 
to gravity 
The frictional forces cannot be reproduced using the same scale as the gravitational forces 
due to the problems with viscosity scales. The scale of the model test rig was chosen to 
allow the effects of friction to be ignored, thus leaving the gravitational forces to be 
correctly modelled (Francis, 1975). 
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This gives: 
U. up 
112 ý--/ (91'. ) gp IF 
The scaling law for velocities is therefore : 
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um 
(1. 
as g is a constant (6.5) 
UP lp 
) 
Where, um = velocity in model & up = velocity in prototype 
1. = model length & Ip = length in prototype 
6.9 Summary 
The empirical equations derived from the experimental data require validation and their 
performances are checked by initial comparison with the measured data they were 
developed to represent. As to the potential usefulness the equations, this can best be 
determined from their ability to reproduce results produced from a reliable source. The 
problem with this approach is that no definitive set of data has been previously established 
and comparisons with various sources are therefore required to determine the accuracy of 
any predictions made. The seminal works originally identified will therefore form the 
basis for comparison for the orders of magnitude for overtopping, wave celerity and 
dynamic pressures with the Ashland Oil spill (1988) used as a case study. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Performance of Empirical Formulae and Case Studies 
7.1 Historical approaches for modelling 
Various methodologies have been employed in an effort to suitably quantify the losses in 
the event of the failure of a bulk storage tank; these include the application of pure 
mathematics, physical modelling and more recently computational fluid dynamics (CFD). 
Each method has its merits, however an underlying fact remains that some form of 
validation is required to ensure a rigorous approach and to give a level of confidence in the 
resulting predictions. 
The recent and ever developing field of computer hardware and software has made CFD a 
more viable option for the analysis of free surface flow, which is complicated by the 
instability of the complex algorithms used in the computation together with the demands 
made on the processors. Today, such software is able to run simulations more efficiently 
on high speed dual-core processors or even able to share the work between several 
machines using parallel processing techniques. 
One of the main problems encountered with the use of commercially available generic 
CFD packages is the problem of accurately evaluating the overtopping fraction, given the 
mixing of the liquid with air during the initial release and subsequent bund impact. The 
volume fraction (liquid/air) contained within each cell has to be determined and the sum of 
the cells overtopping the bund calculated, based on an assessment of a suitable minimum 
value for the fraction of liquid in each cell. This causes inherent errors in the 
determination of the overtopping fraction, as the magnitude is dependent on the value used 
for the minimum volume fraction for the individual cells. Thus, the overtopping fraction is 
sensitive to changes in the cell volume fraction used as the trigger to be counted in the final 
summation of the cells moving out of the bund boundary. 
As far as modelling a wide range of data sets, there seems to be little evidence that CFD 
has been used to build suitable mathematical models for the purposes of loss prediction and 
risk assessment. The general use of such tools appears to be limited to individual cases 
and specific scenarios. Hence there is a need for complementary work in the field of 
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physical modelling and the development of empirical formulae to aid in the development 
of such packages. The work of Ivings and Webber (2007) in the development of 'SPLOT' 
using the data and empirical formulae produce by Atherton (2005) is one example where 
major advances are being made. The additional modelling work carried out in this 
research will further reinforce the material published by Atherton (2005), especially with 
regard to the determination of the dynamic pressures for both axisymmetric and 
asymmetric releases. 
7.2 Correlations and equations for the prediction of overtopping fractions and 
dynamic pressures 
The performance of the empirical equations for overtopping and dynamic pressures 
formulated from the collected data sets is investigated in the following sections. The 
equations have been developed using curve-fitting techniques and algorithms available in 
Excel and the degree of fit determined using R2 (where R is the correlation coefficient). 
They are evaluated against the measured values from which they were derived as well as 
the equations suggested by other researchers. The final assessment uses various 
experimental data sets; CFD model results and case studies in an attempt to further validate 
the work. 
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7.3 Interpretation of graphical results for the performance of the empirical 
equations for axisymmetric releases 
Chart 7.1 shows a plot of the calculated overtopping fraction against the measured 
overtopping fraction for axisymmetric middle tank releases and indicates a good level of fit 
with only minimal scatter. The empirical equation is therefore a reasonable representation 
of the overtopping fractions for the configurations considered. 
Chart 7.2 represents the predictions of overtopping fractions against h/H for axisymmetric 
releases and compares the new experimental results to the equations proposed by Clark 
(2001) and Hirst in Thyer (2002). It can be seen that both sets of equations show a 
reasonable approximation of the data, however there are significant differences at the 
smaller values of h/H. 
Chart 7.3 indicates the calculated pressure ratios against the measured pressure ratios for 
axisymmetric releases. The level of fit is again acceptable over most of the range, however 
there is an anomalous result at the higher range of the pressures considered, where the 
calculated result underestimates the measured value for the 110% bund capacity relating to 
one of the lower ratios of h/H. 
Generally, in the case of axisymmetric releases, the empirical equations for both the 
overtopping and the dynamic pressures perform relatively well in representing the results 
from which they were derived. As such they are suitable for use in predicting values 
within the ranges investigated. 
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7.4 Interpretation of graphical results for the performance of the empirical 
equations for asymmetric releases 
Chart 7.4 indicates a plot of calculated overtopping fractions against measured overtopping 
fractions for asymmetric orifice releases. It can be seen that the degree of fit is reasonable 
for most of the results, however there are a number of anomalies, where the calculated 
values underestimate the measured values. These tend to be associated with the generation 
of eddy currents at particular tank and bund configurations, leading to additional 
overtopping. These anomalies are to be investigated later in this chapter. 
Chart 7.5 illustrates the performance of the empirical equations for overtopping for 
asymmetric slot releases and shows the fit to be exceptionally good over the complete 
range of configurations considered. 
Chart 7.6 shows the performance of the empirical equation for the pressure ratios for 
asymmetric releases through a 60 mm diameter orifice. There are no equations proposed 
for the smaller orifice releases. The fit can be seen to be reasonable for an orifice of this 
size and therefore acceptable for the purpose of prediction within the range investigated. 
Chart 7.7 represents a plot of the calculated pressure ratios against the measured pressure 
ratios and again indicates a reasonable level of fit with a couple of anomalies, where the 
calculated values appear to both underestimate and overestimate the measured values, 
depending on the configuration considered. 
Generally, the empirical equations proposed for asymmetric releases, appear to reasonably 
represent the experimental data over most of the ranges investigated. 
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7.5 Interpretation of the results for 36011 asymmetric orifice releases 
Tables 7.1 and 7.2 illustrate the results from an additional investigation into the effect of 
the eddy currents observed in a number of the orifice releases in the quadrant of the test 
rig. The results show that the overtopping is in fact exaggerated by the generation of the 
eddy currents due to the quadrant arrangement used in the test rig. In the case of the 30 
mm diameter orifice, the additional overtopping due to the eddy currents is approximately 
2.6 times that measured in the 360 " test. For the 60 mm diameter orifice, the additional 
overtopping equates to approximately 2 times that measured in the 360 ' test. 
In both cases, the empirical formulae for the overtopping give a better approximation the 
360 1 test results and therefore give a reasonable indication of the actual overtopping, 
reducing the effects of the eddy currents that are generated as a result of the test rig 
geometry. 
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7.6 Comparison with Henderson (1966) dam-break theory 
Tank wall 
40 Bund z Tank H=0.48m 
h 0.13m 
L 0.60 mR0.30m I 
Figure 7.1 An axisymmetric release using Henderson (1966) dam-break theory 
Using Featherstone (1988) Equation 4.1: 
At x= OY= 
4H 
9 
V, 
29 112 H 112 
3 
V, =2x9.81 
112 
xO. 48 
112 
3 
V, = 1.45 ms-1 
Consider the pressure on the bund at impact using momentum (Francis 1975): 
F=pAV2 
2 
Dynamic pressure: 
Lyn =F= PV2 
2 
A 
Assuming VI = V2 
Lyn = 1000 x 1.452 
Eyn = 2102 Pa 
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Considering bund geometry: 
h 0.13 
= = 0.27 LI 0.48 
R 0.3 
= = 0.625 LI 0.48 
Volume released : 
V= nR2 rei H 
x 0.3 
2 
x0.48 
V=0.13572 m' rel 
Bund eapacity 
V ýIP = irr 
2h 
V, =7rx0.9'x0.13 le 
0.33081 M3 , ý"p 
Vp 
= 
0.33081 
= 2.43 7 or 243.7 V,. 
 
0.13572 
Using experimental test data: 
A 200 % bund capacity with R/H = O. S. 
Using the dynamic pressure Equation 6.2: 
DynlStat bae= Ce -D(hlff) 
EynlStat 7.5531 e -5,2278(a27) 
LynlStat 1.84 
Based on the hydrostatic head for the model bund 
Dynamic pressure = 1,84pgh 
Dynamic pressure = 1.84 x 1000 x 9.81 x 0.13 = 2346 Pa 
Comparing dynamic pressures: The values obtained from the theoretical and empirical 
formulae are similar in magnitude and generally compare well with a difference of 11.6 % 
based on the theoretical result. The dam-break theory assumes continuity using velocity at 
centreline of tank wall along with conservation of momentum, which is not the case, as tile 
released liquid will initially accelerate due to the failing head and then decelerate due to 
frictional effects. This will depend on the separation distance, L between the tank wall and 
the bund together with the roughness of the fluid/ground interface with the dynamic 
pressure at impact varying accordingly. 
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7.7 Comparison with Greenspan and Young (1978) experimental channel models 
for determination of overtopping fractions 
Example I 
Tank wall width = 228.6 mm 
Bund Tank H= 203.2 mm 
n. h= 81.3 mm 1 
.R= 
228.6 mm L= 914.4 mm 
Figure 7.2 The Greenspan and Young (1978) channel model 
From the data given, assuming h/H = 0.4 & L/R = 4.0 the chart for flow over a 
containment dyke, Fig. 10 from Greenspan and Young (1978) gives an overtopping 
fraction, Q=0.24 or 24 %. 
Considering bund geometry: 
h =0.4xH 
h=0.4x203.2 
h= 81.3 mm 
Hence, 
R= 228.6 
= 1.125 H 203.2 
Volumereleased: 
Vre, = 0.2286 x 0.2286 x 0.2032 
Vr, l = 0.01062 m3 
Bund capacity: 
Vc,, 
p = 
0.2286 x (0.9144 + 0.2286) x 0.0813 
V, = 0.02124 M3 "V 
Vcap 
= 
0.02124 
= 2.00 or 200 % V,,, 0.01062 
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Using experimental test data: 
A 200 % bund capacity with R/H = 1.0 & h/H = 0.4. 
Using the Overtopping Equation 6.1: 
Qf = Ae-'('1H) 
Qf = 0.4814e--- 
1866(0.4) 
Qf = 0.20 or 20 % 
Comparing overtopping: The empirical equation for overtopping based on axisymmetrical 
results under-estimates the magnitude of the experimental value obtained with a difference 
of -16.7 % expressed in terms of the Greenspan and Young (1978) data. The fact that the 
experimental results are based on channel releases will influence the magnitudes of any 
overtopping data sets obtained due to the enclosed channel sides preventing the spread of 
the fluid flow after release. The ensuing flow will therefore be at a greater, more uniform 
depth across the width of the bore prior to the impact and subsequent overtopping of the 
bund, thus exaggerating the magnitude of the overall result. The differences found 
between the channel and small-scale cylinder results were reported to be minimal (< 5 %) 
and a combination of the increased height of bore along with the increased wetted 
perimeter, allowing ftiction to reduce the celerity of the bore, may sufficiently account for 
this. 
160 
Using a bund capacity of half the previous example by halving the bund height and 
maintaining the parameter L/R: 
Example 2 
Tank wall width = 228.6 mm 
cr 
Bund Tank 11 = 203.2 mm 
rl*..... 
ý 
h= 40.6 mm t 
L= 914.4 mm :R= 228.6 mm 
Figure 7.3 Greenspan and Young (1978) channel model with reduced bund height 
From the data given, assuming h/H = 0.2 & L/R = 4.0 the chart for flow over a 
containment dyke, Fig. 10 from Greenspan and Young (1978) gives an overtopping 
fraction, Q=0.49 or 49 %. 
Considering bund geometry: 
h=0.2xH 
h=0.2 x 203.2 
h= 40.6 mm 
Hence, 
R= 228.6 
= 1.125 H 203.2 
Volume released: 
Vr,,, = 0.2286 x 0.2286 x 0.2032 
V 
rýj = 
0.01 062M3 
Bund capacity: 
V, 
w = 
0.2286 x (0.9144 + 0.2286) x 0.0406 
V, =0.01061m3 , ap 
V,,, 
p = 
0.01061 
= 0.10or 100% 
V, 
ý, 
0.01062 
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Using experimental test data: 
AI 10 % bund capacity with R/H = 1.0 & h/H = 0.2. 
Using the overtopping Equation 6.1: 
Qf =A 
-B(hlH) 
Qf = 0.7588e 
-2.3529(0.2) 
Qf = 0.47 or 47 % 
Comparing overtopping: The magnitude of the empirical result again under-estimates the 
overtopping by -4.1 % based on the experimental value. This is consistent with the 
previous findings, however the difference is reduced. The fact that the bund height has 
been halved; the increase in overtopping is to be expected due to a reduced capacity with 
the bund presenting a much smaller obstacle to the flow. The other consideration is that 
the empirical formulae is based on a slightly larger bund capacity than that of the 
experimental configuration, this will reduce the calculated overtopping fraction and will 
partially account for the reduced difference in magnitude. 
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7.8 Comparison with Greenspan and Johansson (1981) experimental cylinder 
models for axisymmetric releases. 
Example 1 
Tank wall 
I 
Bund Tank H= 254.0 mm 
rT h= 50.8 mm. ; 11 
L= 133.4 mm :R= 95.2 rmn 
i 
Figure 7.4 The Greenspan and Johansson (198 1) axisymmetric cylinder model 
From the data given, assuming h/H = 0.2, r= 228.6 mm &h= 50.8 mm, the chart for flow 
over a containment dyke, Fig. 2a from Greenspan and Johansson (1981) gives an 
overtopping fraction, Q=0.43 or 43 %. 
Considering bund geometry: 
h=0.2 
H 
h 50.8 H= 
0.2 0.2 
H= 254 mm 
Hence, 
R= 95.2 
= 0.38 H 254 
Volume released: 
V 
"'I 
= 7CR2 H 
V,., 
el =ax0.0952 
2x0.254 
V,.,, = 0.00723 m' 
Bund capacity: 
V,. 
P = 7cr 
2h 
VI-P = 7c x 0.22862 X 0.0508 
V,. 
P = 
0.00834 M3 
Lý,, 
p = 
0.00834 
= 1.153or 115.3% V,,,, 0.00723 
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Using experimental test data: 
A 120 % bund capacity with R/H = 0.5 & h/H = 0.2. 
Using the overtopping Equation 6.1: 
Qf = ACB(hIH) 
Qf = 0.8942e -3.4692(0.2) 
Qf = 0.45 or 45 % 
Comparing overtopping: In the case of the cylindrical model, the empirical formula gives 
a slightly higher result than the experimental value quoted by Greenspan and Johansson 
(1981) with a difference of 4.6 %. The empirical result is based on a slightly larger bund 
capacity, with larger tank radius to tank height ratio, in which case it would be expected 
that the calculated overtopping fraction would be less than the experimental value. One 
possible consideration is the scale of the two physical models with the Greenspan and 
Johansson (1981) model being of a much smaller size it is more susceptible to frictional 
effects due to surface roughness. It has long been established in hydraulic modelling that 
small-scale models must have extremely smooth surfaces to avoid issues with experimental 
error in flow analogies being induced due to excessive friction between the fluid/solid 
interfaces (Francis, 1975). 
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Using a tank height of half the previous example and changing r and h/11: 
Example 2 
Bund 
I Tank wall 
h= 63.5 mm 
L= 82.6 mm 
Tank 
R= 95.2 mm 
i 11 = 127.0 mm 
Figure 7.5 The Greenspan and Johansson (198 1) axisymmetric cylinder model 
with reduced tank height 
From the data given, assuming h/H = 0.5, r= 177.8 mm &h= 63.5 mm, the chart for flow 
over a containment dyke, Fig. 2a from Greenspan and Johansson (1981) gives an 
overtopping fraction, Q=0.22 or 22 %. 
Considering bund geometry: 
h=0.5 
H 
Hh 63.5 
0.5 0.5 
H= 127.0 mm 
Hence, 
R= 95.2 
= 0.75 H 127.0 
Volume released: 
V 'ýýj = 7CR2 
H 
V,,, = 7r x 0.0952 
2 
xO. 127 
Vr,,, = 0.00362 m3 
Bund capacity 
vCaP = iEr 
2h 
V, 
ap = 7c x 
0.17782 x 0.0635 
V,,, 
p = 
0.00631 m3 
V,,,, 
p = 
0.00631 
= 1.743 or V,,,, 0.00362 
174.3% 
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Using experimental test data: 
A 150 % bund capacity with R/H = 1.0 & h/H = 0.5. 
Using the overtopping Equation 6.1: 
Qf = Ae-"(h1H) 
Qf = 0.63592e 
-2.4431(0.3) 
Qf = 0.19 or 19 % 
Comparing overtopping: In this example, the empirical formula under-estimates the 
overtopping by -13.6 % based on the result form the experimental model. When 
considering the smaller bund capacity on which the empirical result is based, it would be 
anticipated that the overtopping fraction should be higher. On closer inspection, the ratio 
of tank radius to tank height, R/H is smaller for the experimental test rig indicating a taller 
tank. A relatively taller tank would have more potential energy and hence more kinetic 
energy on release, assuming conservation of energy principles are applied. This would 
result in an increased level of overtopping due to greater velocity and increased dynamic 
pressure. 
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7.9 Comparison with Greenspan and Johansson (1981) experimental cylinder 
models for asymmetric releases. 
Example 1 
Bund 
Tank wall 
h= 83.8 mm s= 25.4 mm 
L= 133.4 mm 
Tank 
R= 95.2 mm 
i 
t 
i 11 = 279.4 mm Tank 
Figure 7.6 The Greenspan and Johansson (198 1) asymmetric cylinder model 
From the data given for a vertical bund, assuming h/H = 0.3, r= 228.6 mm for a slot height 
of 25.4 mm, Table I from Greenspan and Johansson (1981) for flow over a containment 
dyke gives an overtopping fraction, Q=0.13 or 13 %. 
Considering bund geometry: 
h=0.3 
H 
h=0.3xH 
h=0.3 x 279.4 
h= 83.8 mm 
R 95.2 
= 0.34 H 279.4 
Volume released: 
V rýj = 7rR2 
H 
= 7E x 0.0952 2x0.2794 
V,.,,, = 0.00796 m3 
Bundcapacity: 
VI. 
Ul = 7rr 
2h 
vmp = 7c x 0.2286 
2x0.0838 
V,. 
p = 
0.01376 m3 
V,, 
p = 
0.01376 
= 1.729 or 172.9 % V,., 0.00796 
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For a slot height, s= 25.4 mm over a 30' sector: 
Release area : 
Ar', = 
30 
x 2nRs 360 
Ar', = 
30 
x2xnx 95.2 x 25.4 360 
A,, j = 1266 10 MM2 
Total area: 
A10, = 2nW 
Atot =2x ic x 95.2 x 279.4 
Alor = 167125.69 mm 2 
Percentage ares of release: 
A% = 
A 
x 100 Atot 
Ay, = 
1266.10 
x]00 167125.69 
A% = 0.76 % 
Using experimental test data: 
A 110 % bund capacity with R/H = 0.5 & h/H = 0.3 for a 0.5% area of release. 
Using the overtopping Equation 6.1: 
Qf Ae -B(hlH) 
Qf 0.4260e -3.6389(0.3) 
Qf 0.14 or 14 % 
Comparing overtopping: In the case of an asymmetric release, the empirical formula 
agrees very well with the Greenspan and Johansson (1981) model with a difference of 
7.7% based on the experimental value. It is to be expected that the empirical overtopping 
fraction would be greater due to the smaller bund capacity (110 %) on which the equation 
is based, however this is partially offset by the relatively larger release area (0.76 %) and 
the relatively taller tank (R/H =0.34) used in the case of the physical model. 
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Now using a larger area of release with no change in other parameters. 
Example 2 Tank wall 
Bund 
83.8 mm s= 76.2 mm 
L= 133.4 mm 
I 
Tank 
R= 95.2 mm 
I 
11 = 279.4 mm 
Figure 7.7 The Greenspan and Johansson (198 1) asymmetric cylinder model 
with enlarged slot release 
From the data given for a vertical bund, assuming h/H = 0.3, r= 228.6 mm for a slot height 
of 76.2 mm, Table I from Greenspan and Johansson (1981) for flow over a containment 
dyke gives an overtopping fraction, Q=0.18 or 18 %. 
Considering bund geometry: 
For a slot height, s= 76.2 mm over a 30' sector. 
Release area : 
A,, = 
30 
x 2nRs 
360 
A,, = 
30 
x2x Tc x 95.2 x 76.2 360 
Arýj = 3798.31 rnM2 
Total area: 
A,,,, = 2nRH 
Atot =2x Tc x 95.2 x2 79.4 
Atot = 167125.69 mm2 
Percentage ares of release: 
As = 
Arel 
X 100 
A10, 
As = 
3798.31 
x 100 
167125.69 
AV = 2.27 % 
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Using experimental test data: 
A 110 % bund capacity with R/H = 0.5 & h/H = 0.3 for a 2.5% area of release. 
Using the overtopping Equation 6.1: 
Qf = Ae 
-B(h1H) 
Qf = 0.6554e 
-3.3391(0.3) 
Qf = 0.24 or 24 % 
Comparing overtopping: In this case the size of the aperture has been increased and as 
such the experimental overtopping fraction is greater. This is reflected in the empirical 
result with a difference of 33.3 % between the two values based on the experimental 
model. On inspection of the parameters used, there is a clear difference in the relative 
release areas with the empirical result based on a larger aperture (2.5 %). It must also be 
considered that the empirical expression is based on a smaller bund capacity (I 10 %) rather 
than the much larger Greenspan and Johansson (1981) bund capacity of 172.9 %. With 
these issues considered, it is not surprising that there is a notable difference in the two 
overtopping results and illustrates the limitations of the empirical data with only the 110% 
bund capacity investigated for asymmetric releases. 
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7.10 Case history -Ashland Oil, Floreffe, Pennsylvania, USA, 2"d January 1988. 
Based on upper and lower estimates and approximate calculations by Wilkinson (1991), 
the following comparisons have been made considering upper and lower bounded 
solutions. The information contained in the report gives the following data: 
Tank wall 
Dyke angle Tank height 30' 11 = 12.6 m 14.6 m Tank 
h=3.05 m 
R= 18.3m 
Figure 7.8 Wilkinson (1991) model for overtopping in the Ashland Oil spill (1988) 
Volume released was estimated as 3.5 million US gallons or Vrel ý 13249 m3 (1 US gallon 
= 3.7854 x 10-3 M3 ). 
Estimated volume retained by the secondary containment was determined to be between I 
and 2 million gallons with the dyke slope estimated at 30'. 
Min Vbund = 3785 m3 and max Vbund = 7571 m3. 
Using tank and bund geometry: 
j7 = nR2 rel H 
VII, 
H 
nR2 
13249 
H = 12.6 2 
nx 18.3 
h 3.05 
- 0.24 H 72.6 
R 18.3 
H 12.6 
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Estimated range of overtopping: 
Minimum overtopping: 
(13249-7571) 
13249 
Q=0.43 or 43 % 
Maximum overtopping 
Q= 
(13249 
- 3785) 
13249 
Q=0.71 or 71% 
Using experimental test data: 
For a vertical bund with a 150 % bund capacity (based on a bund capacity of 172.9 % for 
the nearest Greenspan and Johansson (1981) configuration) with R/H = 1.0 & h/11 = 0.24. 
Using the overtopping Equation 6.1: 
Qf = Ae 
-B(h1H) 
Qf = 0.6359e 
-2.4451(0.24) 
Qf = 0.35 or 35 % 
Due the fact that a vertical bund has been used for the comparison an engineering 
judgement approach using data from the Greenspan and Johansson (1981) is applied to 
modify the overtopping result. 
0= 30' 
h 
=0.234 Q=0.67 H 
0=900 h=0.250 Q=0.35 
H 
Conversion factor from 90"to, 30': 
K=0.67 = 1.9143 0.35 
Modiji'ed overtopping, Q. for LJMU result: 
Q. = 1.9143 x 0.35 
Q. = 0.67 or 67 % 
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Comparing overtopping: Due to the nature of the dyke profile in the case study (30" 
slope), it is not possible to calculate an overtopping fraction directly from the cmpirical 
formula and a modification has to be made for comparison purposes. This modirication 
seems to be justifiable as the difference between the overtopping fractions is minimal 
giving an under-estimate of -5.6 % based on the upper bounded result cstimatcd by 
Wilkinson (1991). On inspection of the data used for the modification, it can be sccn that 
the Greenspan and Johansson (1981) data yields the exactly the same result (0.35) as tile 
empirical formula for the overtopping fraction when considering a vertical bund. 
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7.11 Comparison with Trbojevic and Slater (1989) finite difference model 
Tank wall 
Dyke slope 
51" Tank 11 = 10.5 m 
F\ h= 1.5 m 
L= 23.3 m1 R=15. Om 
Figure 7.9 The Trbojevic and Slater (1989) finite difference model 
Given the time from release to prior to impact as 2 seconds, a velocity of 14.6 ms" is 
quoted as being reached using the finite difference model. 
Using Newton's equations of motion: 
vu +at 
u0 
v= at 
Also: 
12 
s =ut+ -at 2 
u0 
sIa2 2 
2s 
a=T (7.2) 
Combining (7.1) & (7.2): 
2s 
V=Tt 
2s 
V=- (7.3) 
t 
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Using the time at impact of 2.5027 seconds and applying Equation 7.3: 
v =. 
2 x 23.3 
= 8.62ms-1 2.5027 
From Michels et al (1988) using Equation 4.5, theoretically: 
2g 112 H112 
2x9.81'12 x 10.5 112 
u= 20.30 ms-' 
Experimentally, using Equation 4.6: 
1.4g 112 H 112 
1.4 x 9.81 
112 
x 10.5 
112 
u= 14.21 ms-1 
From Fig. 4 in Trbojevic and Slater (1989), the dynamic pressure maxima near the base of 
the bund = 0.36 Bar. 
Tank and Bund geometry: 
R 15.0 
= = 1.43 H 10.5 
h 1.5 
= = 0.14 H 10.5 
Volumereleased: 
V =, XR2 rel H 
V rel =aX 
15.02 x 10.5 
V,,, = 7422.0 M3 
Bund capacity 
Kap= Tcr'h 
Vcqp= 7r x (23.3 + 15.0)2 X 1.5 
V= 6912.6 M3 cap 
V,,, 
p = 
6912.6 
= 0.93 or 93 % V,.,, 7422.0 
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Using experimental test data: 
AI 10 % bund capacity with R/H = 1.0 & h/H = 0.1 
i. e. Configuration identity El (h30): 
Impact velocity, u=3.55 ms-1 
Separation distance, L= 695 mm 
Using dimensional analysis, Equation 6.5 (Francis, 1975): 
Where, u. = velocity in model & up = velocity in prototype 
1. = model length & Ip = length in prototype 
112 
ip 
up ý- m 
l'n j112 
p 
up 
3.55 20.55 ms-' 
695 )112 
23300 
Using the dynamic pressure Equation 6.2-. 
DYnIStat 
base =Ce 
-D(hlH) 
DynlStat 9.4121 e-4.5112(0.14) 
DynlStat 4.96 
Based on the hydrostatic head for the model bund 
Dynamic pressure = 4.96pgh 
Dynamic pressure = 4.96 x 850 x 9.81 x 1.5 = 62038 Pa 
Dynamic pressure = 62.038 kPa or 0.62 Bar 
Comparing velocities: The quoted velocity of 14.6 ms" after 2 seconds has been 
determined before impact with the bund and the use of Newton's equations of motion 
applied to the position of the bore at the exact time of impact indicates that the celerity of 
the wave was higher and therefore still accelerating. Using the theoretical and 
experimental equations from Michels et al (1988), the range of upper and lower velocity 
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values determined encompass the magnitude of the value calculated using Newton's 
equations of motion. Comparison with the value estimated using tile dimensional analysis 
from the model results indicates reasonable correlation both with the theoretical equation 
from Michels et al (1988) and with the value determined from Newton's equations or 
motion. The difference between the Newtonian value derived from tile Trbojcvic and 
Slater (1989) data and the value given by the dimensional analysis is 10.4 %. 
Comparing dynamic pressures: The dynamic pressure maxima near the base of the bund 
(0.36 Bar) is quoted as being approximately 3.5 times the static pressure based on the 
density of Diesel fuel. Applying the empirical formula gives a DynlStat b., ratio of 4.96, 
which equates to a dynamic pressure of 0.62 Bar. The difference in magnitude between 
theses two pressures is 72.2 % based on the reported value, which is very significant. The 
parameters R/H and h/H are suitably similar, however the major factor in the significantly 
larger dynamic stress in the case of the empirical solution is that the equation is based on 
vertical bund modelling data. The dynamic pressure on the sloping dyke would be very 
different from that on a vertical bund and a reduced order of magnitude is to be expected 
given the that the momentum will carry the flow more easily over the inclined dyke and 
present less of an obstacle. 
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7.12 Comparison with Kleefsman et al (2004) dam break experiment 
By using the scale diagram and the data provide by Kleefsman et at (2004) the dimcnsions 
shown in fig. 7.1 were elicited. The following calculations were made to determine the 
velocity of the wave with the charts used to evaluate the dynamic pressures at the front 
impact face: 
Removable wall width = 1.0 m 
Model container 
(not full width) 
Head of water fl = 0.55 
h= 0.15 
1.15 R=1.22 
Figure 7.10 The Kleefsman et al (2004) dam-break model 
Given the time from release to just prior to impact as 0.40 seconds and the time from 
release to the wave front surging up the wall as 0.56 seconds it is deduced that the time at 
impact is approximately 0.42 seconds. 
Using equation (7.3): 
2x1.15 
= 5.48 ms 0.42 
From the pressure charts, the dynamic pressure near the base of the front face: 
Instantaneous peak value = 11400 Pa 
Post peak value = 4000 Pa 
Dynamic pressure at the upper third of the front face: 
Instantaneous peak value = 6500 Pa 
Post peak value = 3900 Pa 
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From Michels et al. (1988) using Equation 4.5, theoretically: 
2g'12HI12 
2x9.81 112 x 0.55 112 
u=4.64 ms -' 
Experimentally, using Equation 4.6: 
u=1.4g 
112 H 112 
u=1.4x 9.81112 X 0.. 55112 
u=3.25 ms-' 
Comparing to circular tank and bund geometry: 
R 1.22 
= = 2.22 H 0.55 
h 0.150 
= = 0.27 H 0.55 
Volume released: 
V =I. Oxl. 22xO. 55 rel 
V =0.67lOm3 rel 
'Bund capacity': 
Vcap 
= 1.0 x (1.22 + 1.15) x 0.15 
V,,, 
p = 
1.3035 m' 
1.3035 
= 1.94 or 194 0.6710 
Using experimental test data: 
For a 200 % bund capacity with R/If = 2.5 & h/H = 0.3 
i. e. Configuration identity C4 (h36) 
Impact velocity, u=2.62 ms" 
Separation distance, L= 475 mm 
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Using dimensional analysis, Equation 6.5 (Francis, 1975): 
Where, u.. velocity in model & up = velocity in prototype 
1. model length & Ip = length in prototype 
j12 
um 
=1m 
up( ip 
uu p (IM)1/2 
IP 
up 
2.62 
112 = 4.08ms-1 
475 (1150) 
Using the dynamic pressure Equation 6.2: 
LynlStat base= Ce -D(h 
/ H) 
LynlStat bae= 5.4911 e -3.0111(0,27) 
LynlStat base= 2.44 
Based on the hydrostatic head for the model container 
Dynamic pressure = 2.44pgh 
Dynamic pressure = 2.44 x 1000 x 9.81 x 0.15 = 3590 Pa 
Comparing velocities: The velocity determined from the dam-break experiment is based 
on an estimate made from the bore position with respect to time. Using the Michels (1988) 
theoretical and experimental formulae gives a reduced estimate for the impact velocity in 
both cases with the dimensional analysis approach producing a magnitude between these 
two values. The dimensional analysis produces an under-estimatc of -25.5 % based on the 
experimental result and is possibly related to the manner of the fluid release. The door in 
the channel is quoted as being opened by a falling weight, which is unable to accelerate the 
door sufficiently fast enough to allow a standing head of liquid to fall under gravity. This 
means that on initial opening of the door, the fluid escaping through the gap would be 
forced out at higher pressure with the rest of the fluid following behind as tile gap 
increased. 
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Comparing dynamic pressures: Considering the recorded dynamic pressures near tile base 
of the model container, the instantaneous peak value is in excess of three times tile post 
impact value. This can be attributed to the momentum of the fluid being distributed 
around the model container, as unlike the bund scenario, the fluid as able to pass tile 
container on either side mainly undisturbed (Fig. 7.11). This addition momentum, which 
suffers no change in direction, will contribute to sudden increased pressure prior to tile 
normal build up of fluid behind the model container. A more suitable comparison for tile 
dynamic pressures would therefore be made with the post peak impact value. TIlc 
measured post peak value of 4000 Pa compares more favourably with the empirical 
solution of 3590 Pa, giving an under-estimate of -10.2 %. 
Figure 7.11 Plan view of model container with flow pattern 
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7.13 Comparison with CFD results supplied by Logistique France - Rlsques 
Industriels (2007) derived from information from Total France. 
Table 7.3 contains results derived from a series of CFD models created for the 
investigation of dynamic pressures on bund walls as a result of simulated catastrophic 
failures of the primary containment based on actual site data (Louise, 2007). For 
comparison purposes the CFD predicted ratios of dynamic pressure to static pressurc, 
DynlStat ba,, are indicted along with those predicted by the new empirical equations with 
the percentage differences calculated. Where the same configurations have bcen run a 
number of times using different modelling techniques and meshes, a mean value has been 
calculated. 
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Comparison of dynamic pressures: The individual scenarios for the various tank and bund 
configurations modelled using CFD techniques indicate a large degree of variation when 
compared to the empirical results derived from the experimental data. This can be 
attributed to a number of various modelling techniques being employed with various mcsh 
densities and VOF algorithms in an attempt to identify a satisfactory simulation of a bulk 
storage tank failure and the magnitude of the dynamic/static pressure ratio. Where a 
number of simulations for the same scenario have been recorded, the mean values of 
DynlStat bam have been calculated and re-compared the empirical solutions. On inspection 
this method gives a more favourable comparison between the values of -1.29 to 5.96 %. 
These results are indicative of the range of values that can be obtained using CFD 
modelling, particularly with problems involving free surface flow. 
7.14 Summary 
In general terms, the performance of the empirical equations justifies their use in the 
prediction of both the overtopping fractions and dynamic pressures obtained for the range 
of configurations for which they were developed. The orders of magnitude for the results 
are similar in the vast majority of cases, which provides a sufficient degree of confidence 
to allow reasonable predictions to be made for the purposes of risk assessment and spill 
management. 
The overriding issues that are evident from the orders of magnitude obtained for both 
overtopping and dynamic pressures have severe implications for designers, operators and 
managers of large-scale bulk storage facilities. The discussion of the results and 
implications for stakeholders regarding the design and construction of secondary 
containment further emphasises the need for greater understanding and vigilance when 
evaluating risk and preparing safety reports. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Discussion of Results and Implications for Stakeholders 
8.1 Reasons for bunding 
Barnes (1990) states that the object of bunding is to retain any spilled liquid from tile 
primary storage tank/tanks in order that it may be dealt with in a controlled manner by 
evaporation in specially designed catchments, by foam blanketing or other suitable 
measures. There are two major reasons for providing bunding around a bulk storage 
vessel, firstly for reasons of safety and secondly for economic reasons, due to the high cost 
of the material being stored. With regard to safety, the risks associated with the stored 
material upon release may relate to flammability, toxicity along with possible corrosive 
and reactive properties. 
In general, most of the arguments covered relate to atmospheric storage vessels sited in 
chemical plants, where relatively weak thin-shelled tanks are provided with full bunding. 
In the case of pressure vessels containing liquefied flammable gas, bunds tend not to be 
utilised, as they would contribute to the problem of any leak by trapping large volumes of 
vapour. 
8.1.1 Construction of bunds 
In most failure scenarios the escaping fluid normally contacts the floor of the bunded area, 
except possibly in the case of a spigot/jetting failure, where the fluid may completely clear 
the bund. The floor of the bunded area therefore needs careful consideration in terms of 
permeability to resist possible losses due to seepage as well as moisture content with 
respect to boiling rates for refrigerated liquid gases. The bund walls and floors need to 
withstand the possibility of then-nal shock in the case of cryogenic liquids being stored and 
correct material selection is of great importance. 
The main materials used in the construction of floors and bunds are earth and concrctc, 
however variations include steel bunds and crushed rock. In most cases, even with a 
concrete bund the floor area will be constructed from levelled and compacted earth/clay 
with coefficients of permeability mostly not known or even considered. 
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For reactive/corrosive materials the floor and internal face of the bund may require special 
surface preparation/finishes to prevent damage in the event of a spill and spccialised 
concrete mixes have been developed to withstand exposure to acids. 
8.1.2 Bund capacity 
The recommendations for the capacity of bunded areas vary greatly and nominal bund 
capacities range from 50 to 150 % based on actual measurements taken from operational 
facilities. With capacities greater than 100 %, there is no guarantee of total containment, 
as evidenced by sudden catastrophic tank failures accompanied by large bund overtopping 
fractions. Failures involving spigot flow/jetting may make the volume of the bundcd area 
irrelevant if the tank to bund separation distance is inadequate. 
8.1.3 Bund height and profile 
Changes in the Codes of Practice have gone from restrictions on bund height of about 2m 
to no restrictions in order to allow for high collar bunds, while in the USA, a minimum 
height of 1.5 m is usually stipulated. There are a number of views taken as to the required 
height of a bund; a possible catastrophic failure of a bulk storage tank would merit the use 
of a high collar bund to restrict overtopping. Others argue that such forms of construction 
would restrict access for fire fighting, requiring specialist equipment. 
For bunds with sloping sides or dykes, there is a possibility of increased losses due to the 
angle of construction presenting a reduced barrier to fluid flow with low distant bunds 
allowing greater overtopping than taller closer installations. Hence, the volume of 
containment is less important than the ratio of the bund height to that of tile fluid height 
contained in the tank. 
8.2 Overtopping for axisymmetric releases 
The magnitude of the overtopping results clearly indicate a problem with the current 
guidelines for the design of secondary containment as substantial levels of overtopping are 
obtained in most of the cases studied with the exception of high collar bunds, Apart from 
the initial impact and the resulting surge over the bund, the shock waves generated at the 
bund are reflected back only to return causing additional overtopping. 
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The results from the experimental overtopping measurements are consistcnt for cach tcst 
configuration and indicate a serious problem if full secondary containment is to be relied 
upon in the event of a catastrophic tank failure. This is in direct agreement with similar 
results found by other researchers, where large overtopping fractions have bccn found both 
experimentally and by computational methods. 
A conclusion from earlier work, supported by the new work, is that the fraction that 
escapes the confines of the bund is mainly a function of h/H and generally increases if h/11 
is reduced and the bund moved further away from the tank to maintain the same bund 
volume. However, a feature seen in the new work is that beyond a certain point the 
overtopping fraction begins to decrease. This is because surface friction begins to affect 
the results at larger spreading distances, where the velocities tend to be reduced. 
With regard to the height of the overtopping wave, the level to which the main body of 
fluid reaches is in some cases higher than the original tank level prior to release. A main 
feature of the breaking wave is the separation layer that develops giving rise to the flight of 
droplets from the leading edge or crest of the wave as indicated in the video capture 
photograph in section 4. The height these droplets can attain generally reaches a level at 
least three times the original tank level, with the smallest droplets travelling even higher, 
especially in the case of the high collar bunds. The vertical nature of the bund face 
contributes greatly to this effect, as the forward horizontal momentum of the fluid is 
violently interrupted and a sudden change in the direction of the fluid takes place as it 
rapidly accumulates behind the bund, eventually surging upwards and forwards over tile 
bund. 
Reflected waves contribute to the final overtopping fraction, however this has been shown 
to be minor with impacts after the first one accounting for only 5 to 6% of the total, as in 
the case of the initial trials configuration (Table 5.4). Greenspan and Young (1978) also 
found that 5% of the total overtopping was from sloshing after the initial impact. T'he 
action of these 'sloshings' becomes more significant when (r - R) is small and h is large as 
in the case of high collar bunds, however the total overtopping is minimal in these cases. 
Comparison between the smaller scale Greenspan and Johansson (1981) test data and tcst 
data obtained in this investigation for overtopping suggests a good level of agreement, with 
slightly more scatter associated with the squat tank results, particularly at grcater 
separation distances, An improved level of agreement for overtopping is observed in the 
187 
case of both middle and tall tank releases, again with some scatter occurring at larger 
separation distances in the case of the middle tank results. It therefore seems that thc 
effects of scale are not overly apparent in terms of the overtopping results, which is 
interesting as the effects of friction at smaller scales should lead to slightly smaller 
overtopping fractions. 
The 'square' and 'rectangular' bunds investigated had overtopping fractions vcry similar to 
those of 'circular' bunds with the same area and height, slightly greater (52-55% versus 
49%) for a squat tank, slightly smaller (47-50% versus 52%) for a middle tank, and in good 
agreement (48-50% versus 49%) for a tall tank (Table 5.10). 
8.3 Overtopping for asymmetric releases 
Comparisons made between orifice and slot releases of the same area of release indicate 
that for squat tanks, the orifice release gives a greater magnitude in overtopping for smaller 
separation distances and taller bunds. This situation changes as the separation distance 
increases and the bund wall height is reduced, when the slot release gives greatcr 
overtopping. The same is true for all ranges of R/H, middle and tall tank configurations 
included as illustrated in Table 5.24 and Chart 5.23 with full results in Appendix 6. 
The size of the aperture is also of importance with regard to overtopping with larger 
apertures giving greater overtopping fractions. This is true for both orifice and slot 
releases with the time of emptying being an obvious factor (Tables 5.25 to 5.26 and Charts 
5.24 to 5.25 with full results in Appendix 7). The trends obtained for overtopping in 
relation to asymmetric releases compare well to the results for slot releases published by 
Greenspan and Johansson (1981). 
The resulting overtopping for the asymmetric releases is less than that obtained for the 
axisymmetric releases in all cases. This can be explained by a combination of factors 
depending on the size and shape of the aperture, the height of fill in the tank, the emptying 
time and the separation distance, L between the tank and the bund. In the majority of cases 
the separation distance is sufficient to allow the spigot/jet to impact the bund floor 
resulting in a spreading out of the flow, thus reducing the energy prior to impact with the 
bund. This leads to the localised build up of fluid behind the bund, which then ultimatcly 
surmounts the bund resulting in overtopping. There are exceptions to this type of 
behaviour and in certain cases the fluid fails to build to a height capable of overtopping the 
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bund and builds in depth in the bunded area with the formation of eddy currents between 
the bund and the sides of the spill table. These eddy currents eventually grow in 
magnitude and converge on the still emerging flow from the tank suddenly leading to an 
upward surge in the jet, which subsequently causes overtopping of thebund(Fig. 8.1). 
F 
Figure 8.1 Plan view of spill table with eddy currents 
There are a couple of configurations vulnerable to this type of phenomenon at certain 
values of h/H for all values of R/H, particularly in the case of the orifice releases. It was 
theorised that the geometrical configuration of the test rig was influencing the overtopping 
result and therefore it was decided to model two particular cases using full 360" geometries 
(Tables 7.1 and 7.2). This was achieved using a simple plastic barrel and concentric bund 
arrangement incorporating a rubber bung, which was pulled free from the orifice allowing 
the water to escape. 
The results obtained confirmed the initial observations and the overtopping fraction was 
reduced with the surging fluid spreading around the bund area, rather than forming eddy 
currents and meeting at a position diametrically opposed to the release point prior to 
overtopping the bund. Comparison with the original results found that in the case of the 30 
mm diameter orifice the overtopping fraction was reduced by approximately 64 % with the 
90 mm diameter orifice; the reduction was approximately 38 %. This meant that the 
results recorded in the original quadrant test rig for the affected configurations were 
anomalous and that the observed localised increases in overtopping were Sencrated as a 
direct result of the eddy currents. This is reflected in the quality of the fit for some of tile 
orifice results in the empirical equations derived for asymmetric overtopping. 
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8.4 Avoiding overtopping 
The amount of fluid overtopping the bund in the event of a significant release can vary 
greatly depending on the design of the secondary containment. The inclined faces of dykes 
may be easily vaulted or fluid may rapidly pile-up against the face of a vertical bund, 
subsequently flowing over the top. The resulting strong shock waves rctum to the original 
position of the tank causing further losses due to reflected waves in a so-called 'Sloshing' 
action. 
The dependence of overtopping on h/H rather than volume of containment seems clear and 
as h increases for the same value of H, the overtopping fraction reduces. I'llis leads to the 
conclusion that high collar bunds would be the most effective way of prcvcnting 
overtopping in the event of a catastrophic tank failure. A major problem with this, is the 
asymmetric dynamic loading, which has been determined to be up to 6 times the normal 
static loading condition. This obviously has implications for the design strength of high 
collar bunds, with many existing facilities having been designed based on static loading 
only. Suggestions for the possible mitigation of existing facilities include the construction 
of earthen berms to add support and increasing the thickness of the walls with the use of 
additional reinforced concrete (Barnes, 1990). 
8.5 Dynamic pressures for axisymmetric releases 
It is clear from the results in this report and from work carried out by previous rcscarchcrs 
that the current design for bunds is in question with respect to containment of spillage from 
a sudden catastrophic failure of the primary storage. The problem of overtopping is not the 
only issue and the actual mechanical integrity of the bund is also in question when tile 
magnitudes of the dynamic pressures are considered. The dynamic pressure profiles 
obtained in the experimental results (Charts 5.1,5.3 and Appendix 2) are very different 
than those used in the normal hydrostatic design, being of generally greater magnitude but 
shorter duration. Structural response calculations would be needed to determine the 
significance, but there is a primafacie possibility of the collapse of the bund leading to a 
total failure of the secondary containment to retain any of the fluid released. 
The results from the dynamic pressure transducers take a little interpretation in tcnns of 
identifying true signals and those generated by the impact of the overtopping waves 
striking the sensor bodies and cables. Comparison with video footage using frame-by. 
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frame analysis (Plate set 5.2) was used to confirm the timings of the wave impacts and 
identify the time periods to be used for sampling. Data logger gains were sclectcd to 
ensure that sensible signals were within the ranges selected, thus avoiding any signal 
truncation due to excessive voltages. The largest dynamic/static pressure factors are found 
in the case of the smaller bund heights h, at the larger bund radii r, for each of the nominal 
bund capacities of 110 %, 120 %, 150 % and 200 %. These configurations also give rise to 
the largest overtopping fractions indicating the obvious relationship between tile 
overtopping fraction and the associated dynamic pressures exerted on the bund. Upon 
examination of the local dynamic pressure maxima and static pressure profiles (Charts 5.2, 
5.4 and Appendix 2) it can be seen that when the plot of dynamic pressure values falls 
below that of the static values, then overtopping fraction is reduced, the larger the 
difference the smaller the volume of fluid escaping the bund. Conversely, with dynamic 
values falling above the static pressure plot, the level of the overtopping fraction is 
increased, with large deviations leading to significant fluid loss over the bund. At tile point 
where the difference in the envelope of bund pressure maxima is at a minimum i. e. the 
dynamic pressure profile is close to that of the static profile, then the overtopping fraction 
is at a minimum for non-high collar bunds. This corresponds to h= 48 nini for squat tank 
releases, h= 120 mm for middle tank releases and finally h= 240 mm for tall tank 
releases. This may be as expected in terms of overtopping, however a direct link between 
the overtopping fraction and the dynamic pressures is now clearly established. In the case 
of high collar bunds, the dynamic/static ratios are all less than I and hence have the 
smallest overtopping fractions, as would be expected. 
The 'rectangular' bunds (Appendix 3) gave mixed results in terms of the dynamic 
pressures calculated at the base. In the case of the triangular configuration, the dynamic 
pressure was lower than that calculated for the circular equivalent for squat tanks but larger 
for middle and tall tank releases. The square configuration again gave a lower result than 
the circular for the squat tanks, but higher results for middle and tall tanks. Finally, the 
rectangular bund gave a lower result for the squat tank releases, but higher for middle and 
tall tanks when compared to their circular equivalents. 
8.6 Dynamic pressures for asymmetric releases 
Comparison of orifice and slot apertures with the same release area (0.5 %) Table 5.24 and 
Chart 5.23 indicate variations in dynamic pressures at the base with the orifice creating 
larger pressures in the majority of cases. This variation is related to the length of the 
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perimeter of the aperture, the contraction and the relative discharge coefficients together 
with the fill level of the tank. It should be noted that large dynamic pressures at the base 
do not necessarily correlate to high overtopping fractions, with overtopping being directly 
related to the difference between the static and dynamic pressure profiles. In cases where 
there is a larger difference between local static and dynamic near the top of the bund, the 
overtopping fraction is substantially increased. Local dynamic pressure maxima occur at 
various positions along the bund height as a result of the bore profile on impact and the 
way in which the fluid builds and is propelled up the face of the bund. In a number of 
cases there are negative pressures produced on the bund as a large amount of fluid impacts 
at the base of the bund and suddenly changes direction to run along the inner face before 
overtopping. This effect is due to the relative motion between the solid surface of the wall 
and the surrounding fluid and the accompanying drag forces. 
The magnitudes of the dynamic pressures vary greatly across the range of configurations 
considered, however factors as high as 10.27 times the static pressure have been 
determined. In most cases the dynamic pressure is substantially above the normal static 
design pressure with values in excess of 2 times the static pressure being common. 
8.7 Wave heights for axisymmetric releases 
The wave monitoring probes have inherent problems with respect to establishing constant 
datum positions and hence were calibrated against initial tank fill levels for each test using 
Excel. These datum variations were due to temperature changes and the build up of 
contamination on the stainless steel probes. Other problems were experienced with the 
high collar bunds, as the reading from the probe located at the bunds tended to give wave 
heights in excess of the probe length. This was due to the large amounts of spray formed 
and the electrical connections at the probe being compromised. The results from the 
probes are useful in terms of determining the time between fluid release and initial impact 
with the bund, as the probe separation distance corresponds to the bund radius, r, this 
enables the average velocity of the wave to be estimated. In the case of this investigation 
these velocities have been calculated in terms of impact velocities with the distance 
travelled calculated from the tank wall directly to a point at the bund. The probes were 
also useful in allowing the investigation of the point of intersection, where the failing tank 
contents level is equal to that accumulated at the inner face of the bund. An estimate of the 
maximum wave height at the bund was also possible giving a comparison with the 
dynamic pressure at the base of the bund. 
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Assuming the dynamic pressure consists of an instantaneous hydrostatic head and an 
associated velocity head an estimate can be made of the maximum instantaneous 
hydrostatic bead using the maximum wave height at the bund. A number of areas of 
interest were highlighted by the results from the wave monitoring probes including the 
apparent relationship between the position of the point of intersection for equal tank and 
bund wave heights and the position of the maximum dynamic pressures with respect to 
time. This relationship is particularly true in the case of the non-high collar bunds, where 
the positions of the maximum wave heights at the bunds lag the positions of the maximum 
dynamic l5ressures. 
Examination of the video footage on a frame-by-frame basis (25 frames per see) and 
comparison with the measured data, led to the observation that the hydrostatic element of 
the maximum dynamic pressure due to the instantaneous height of fluid occurred due to a 
mass of fluid building at the bund. This occurred prior to the formation of the separation 
layer as the surge moved upwards and forwards overtopping the bund. Hence the 
maximum wave height consists of an element of fluid, which has upwards and forwards 
momentum eventually forming the separation layer, leading to the expulsion of elongated 
fingers of fluid and finally the ejection of droplets. As is the case with the 'crown' of 
liquid formed by a single droplet splashing onto a surface or into a liquid pool. 
The nature of the wave impact means that the full height of the wave does not contribute to 
the instantaneous hydrostatic element of the maximum dynamic pressure, as only part of 
the height has a gravitational component at that instant in time. The part of the wave with 
the gravitational component corresponds to the point of intersection of the fluid height in 
the tank and the developing wave at the bund, where both levels are equal. This means 
that the potential energy due to the level in the tank is equal to that of the wave building at 
the bund just prior to the formation of the observed separation layer. 
With respect to high collar bunds, this is not always the case and for the larger bund 
heights, the intersections occur after the positions of maximum dynamic pressures. 
Conversely, in the case of the smaller bunds at the larger radii, the points of intersection 
occur before the positions of the maximum dynamic pressures. This illustrates the 
interplay of the hydrostatic and velocity heads, which form the dynamic pressures, with the 
smaller bund heights unable to oppose the full heights of the approaching surge proriles, 
thus significant dynamic pressures and overtopping result, even with reduced instantaneous 
wave heights. This situation changes for the largest bund radii considered due to friction 
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with the base of the spill table, where velocities are reduced enough to actually cause a 
slight reduction in the overtopping fraction. 
When considering the 'rectangular' bunds, in the case of squat and middle tanks, all the 
configurations gave intercept and maximum wave heights lower than those found for the 
equivalent circular configuration. The tall tank releases gave mixed results with the 
triangular configuration having a greater intercept height and smaller maximum height. 
The square configuration gave a smaller intercept height and a greater maximum height 
and finally, the rectangular configuration having lower intercept and maximum heights. 
8.8 Wave heights for asymmetric releases 
The wave monitor was not utilised for the asymmetric releases due to the nature of the 
directional flow and the possible physical interference of the probe with the fluid jet. 
Video recordings were used to verify impact times and in cases where the dynamic 
pressure sensors failed to pick up a meaningful signal, the frame rate and number of frames 
to collision with the bund were used to establish impact velocities, 
8.9 Bund effectiveness 
Davies et al (1996) published findings on bund effectiveness in preventing escalation of 
tank farm fires and examined a number of case studies. There are a large number of 
incidents recorded on the Major Hazard Incident Database (MHIDAS), where bund 
overtopping was known be a contributory factor in the escalation of the incident. The 
database gives the following reasons for failure of the bund to contain losses from the 
storage vessel: 
0 Overtopping due to the fluid surge. 
0 Structural failure of the bund due to dynamic loading from stored liquid. 
0 Structural failure due to impact form pieces of the original storage vessel. 
0 Overfilling due to fire fighting operations. 
0 Open drain valves. 
0 Holes in the bund due to the passage of pipe work etc. 
0 Multiple tank failures within a single bunded area. 
0 'Rocketing' of tanks containing flammables. 
194 
No incidents of 'spigot' flow over the bund were recorded on the MHIDAS database, 
although cases have been reported in the past. 
From the analysis of vessels involving flammable releases both with and without bunds, 
314 out of 376 or 84 % of releases ignited with the proportion failing to 31 out of 51 or 61 
% in the case of bunded tanks. Hence, in cases specifically relating to the presence of 
bunds, there was a probability of 0.61 that the bund was ineffective. For cases involving 
the fire spreading to include other tanks, bunded vessels yielded a figure of 20 out of 51 or 
39 %, with unbunded vessels quoted as 4 out of 5 or 80 %. 
On further analysis, the probability of a bund failing to contain the release was 12 out of 15 
or 0.80 for tanks in a shared bund and 7 out of 17 or 0.41 for singly bunded tanks. Tanks 
within common bunds spread the incident to a significantly greater extent than those in 
single bunds. 
8.10 Emergency spill management 
There are a number of possible routes for spills to enter rivers eventually leading to the sea 
with the immediate response of authorities concerning the adverse effects on human health. 
The type of chemical and quantities involved will determine the type of response with the 
longer-term efforts concentrated on avoidance of environmental impact on a wider-scale, 
particularly relating to species in the human food chain. 
The toxicity, bioaccummulability and degradability of a particular compound, must be 
considered along with physical and chemical data in order to predict the outcome on the 
environment. The spreading at sea will take various forms depending on the time from the 
original spill migrating from the surface through various depths of suspension before 
finally reaching the seabed as degradation takes place. 
The sensitivity of various regions can be mapped and areas particularly at risk can be 
identified e. g. fish spawning fields. As data is collected and resources mapped a process of 
mathematical modelling can be employed to determine pre and post spill situations. Such 
tools are valuable in terms of training and can assist in the decision making process in the 
event of a real spill. 
In post spill situations there is a great need to evaluate the environmental hazard both 
during and after the spill and an environmental impact assessment is an essential 
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requirement to predict the possible outcomes of a major release. Part of the process 
considers possible transport routes and the potential fate of the chemicals released before 
they finally degrade to inorganic compounds deposited in sediment or they are combated 
by some other means. The chemical, physical and biological properties of various 
compounds involved in the spill and the actual conditions of the spill area will have to be 
processed before the necessary course of action can be determined. A diagrammatic 
representation of the process can be seen in Fig. 8.2. 
In the case of a compound that is a fast precipitator and a danger to humans, then 
evacuation of areas that could be affected should be considered. For chemicals that 
dissolve in the water column or float on the surface, then efforts will have to be made to 
determine the effects on pelagic and bottom feeding organisms in both the short and long- 
term. The short-term effects on food sources for human consumption will be the initial 
focus of efforts with the log-term effects on the total ecosystem being a secondary 
consideration. 
The very nature of a spill at sea can make any response difficult and in some cases a 
meaningful solution can be severely limited if not impossible. Efforts should be made to 
minimise the effects of such spills and avoid unnecessary environmental damage with 
suitably prepared guidance and advice given to those facing possible exposure as stated by 
Bender in Bockholts and Heidebrink (1988). 
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8.10.1 Case study - Ashland Oil spill (1988) 
The Ashland Oil spill on 2 nd January 1988 was one of the largest releases of oil in to the 
environment ever recorded in the USA with the total response time being in excess of a 
month. The response required the combined efforts of government, industry and the 
public. Nearly 4 million US gallons of Diesel fuel was released after the catastrophic 
failure of the bulk storage tank at the Ashland Oil Company terminal in Floreffe, 
Pennsylvania. The oil and tar tank farm was located approximately 200 yards (183 m) 
from the Monongahela River and the surge of escaping oil, which passed easily over the 
bunds of the facility entered into a near-by storm sewer. The spill in turn led to 
approximately 750,000 US gallons entering the Monongahela River with drastic 
consequences. 
Estimates place most of the oil entering the river within two hours of the initial failure of 
the tank with difficulties encountered in shutting off the drainage access and outfall points. 
There were a number of factors that conspired to make an accurate assessment difficult, 
firstly the spill took place during the hours of darkness, secondly all electrical and 
communications equipment at the oil storage facility had been cut off as a safety 
precaution and the emergency evacuation of near-by residents collectively added to cause 
overall confusion. This made effective initial response to the spill mostly ineffective with 
access to the site limited and information confused and conflicted. 
The speed of flow for the river was estimated at 3.2 kmh", however the actual rate was 
1.76kmh" with the flow rate decreasing as the temperatures fell over the next few days. 
The predictions of plume movement were difficult to access with the variable flow rate and 
emulsified oil was mixed and distributed throughout the water column. The emulsifled oil 
made the containment booms of limited use and cleanup crews were unable to effectively 
deploy the booms in an effort to collect oil downstream of the spill. The extreme cold 
period hampered all efforts to contain and cleanup the spill with conditions on the river 
increasing the risk of hypothermia to the exposed crews, which meant that ultimately all 
crews were withdrawn from the river on day four. The formation of ice on the river acted 
to contain patches of the spill and interfered with the installation of additional booms and 
sorbent materials in other areas, which also further complicated the assessment of plume 
development. It was also theorised that the cold temperatures may have stabilised the oil 
emulsion increasing the threat of subsurface contamination, threatening the water utility 
intake pipes used to service populations adjacent to the river. 
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Employees of the oil company had provided prompt and efficient notification of the spill to 
the National Response Center (NRC) and local emergency response agencies. The NRC 
then informed the US Coast Guard, who ultimately notified the USEPA of the spill. The 
local authorities acted to reroute traffic and attempted to block off the storm drains as a 
direct means of the spill entering the river. 
In terms of federal response, the US Coast Guard acted to close the river to commercial 
traffic and mobilised their National Strike Force, trained to deal with environmental 
emergencies and waterways. The USEPA arrived on site at first light and provided 
directions to the Technical Assistance Team, who provided engineering and scientific 
advice on the spill. 
The Monongahela River drains into the Allegheny River with their confluence creating the 
Ohio River and details provided by emergency response agencies allowed treatment 
procedures tO'be put in place and storage facilities to be utilised before the contamination 
reached intake pipes. Using a combination of water conservation measures and bottled 
water, vital supplies were maintained in a number of areas, however commercial premises 
were affected. 
The process of river monitoring involved three elements, definition of the mass of the spill 
and tracking of its progress, determination of the effects on wildlife and testing of water 
samples at the intakes. Attempts at tracking the plume combined information from fly-bys, 
testing at treatment plants and reports from lock and dam employees. Sampling at surface 
water and ground water intakes took place at regular intervals with analysis for volatile 
organics, total organic carbon and fuel oil. 
The numerous cleanup operations covered approximately 30 miles of river with specialist 
equipment and alternative oil recovery systems employed from all around the world. A 
number of processes were proposed and trials were initiated in a few instances to assess 
suitability and effectiveness of the technology. Teams were established to collected oil- 
soaked waterfowl, however it was estimated that 2,000 to 4,000 birds had been killed as a 
result of the spill. The spill affected a number of other water borne species including flsh 
and mussels and multiple studies were initiated to determine the long-term adverse effects 
of test subjects placed in cages down stream from the discharge (Laskowski and Voltaggio 
in Bockholts and Heidebrink, 1988). 
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8.11 Implications for stakeholders 
The problems facing stakeholders in the event of a major spill are clearly on an enormous 
scale and if such events can be prevented or minimised, then this will bring obvious 
advantages. There will be less material escaping and therefore a reduced commercial loss 
of product, with a much more limited release to the surrounding environment, which will 
in turn lead to reduced environmental damage and lower costs in terms of any clean up. 
There is a need for better communication of developments in the field of bulk storage and 
probably a requirement for greater application of such developments through possible 
legislation. This is necessary in both terms of improved methods of risk assessment and in 
terms of providing adequate secondary containment to account for the possibility of 
catastrophic failures of the primary storage. Only by a unified effort to respond to such 
issues will the necessary improvements be made and the lessons properly learned from the 
past. Dissemination of the findings from this research and of the empirical equations is to 
be carried out through peer reviewed journal publication in the months following the 
completion of this thesis. It is envisaged that this will have a subsequent impact within the 
industry and possibly lead to better regulation and design in an effort to reduce the 
possibility of major spills and devastating effects on the environment. 
The importance of this research is clear in so far as it not only confirms the issues 
identified in the literature with regard to potential overtopping and the possible effects of 
the dynamic pressures generated, but also quantifies the magnitude of the problems over a 
wide range of configurations in common use. The equations proposed by Clark (200 1) and 
Hirst in Thyer et al (2002) are suitable in terms of representing axisymmetric overtopping 
over the limited scale and range of configurations investigated (Tables 5.12 to 5.17, Chart 
7.2 and Appendix 8). These equations, were, however never intended to represent 
asymmetric overtopping and are therefore restricted in their range of application. 
The new empirical equations derived in this investigation were based on data elicited at a 
much larger scale, over an extended range of configurations with consideration of both 
axisymmetric and asymmetric modes of failure. The innovative approach of this work in 
the evaluation of the dynamic pressures generated by such failures has made it possible to 
derive similar empirical equations for the purposes of prediction. This gives a powerful, 
yet simple method of assessing not only the possible losses due to overtopping, but also the 
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physical integrity of existing secondary containment, when exposed to the sudden impact 
of the escaping fluid. 
For operators and statutory bodies alike, this provides relatively simple methods of 
assessing the potential risks at existing facilities and will aid in the development of 
mitigation methods for sites found at risk. For issues of land use planning, this work 
allows identification of possible areas at risk in terms of major spill events if existing 
regulations and recommendations are adhered to in the development of future installations. 
8.12 Summary 
The existing design and construction of bund walls is clearly in question with regard to 
providing satisfactory levels of containment in the event of a failure of the primary 
containment vessel. This is not the only issue and in many cases the inherent factors of 
safety against the pressures experienced in such an event leave many bunds failing 
woefully short of expectation and in severe danger of complete structural failure. 
Mitigation of overtopping alone may not adequate in the majority of cases and 
reinforcement techniques will have to be employed to strengthen existing bunds if they are 
to be relied upon in the unlikely, yet distinctly possible event of a catastrophic failure. A 
number of recommendations are proposed to for both further investigation and 
modifications to existing tank and bund designs with the aim of providing adequate 
protection across the range of foreseeable accident scenarios. 
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CHAPTER9 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
9.1 Summation 
This project investigated the catastrophic and partial failure of bulk storage vessels in the 
process industries by designing and constructing a suitable test facility. The investigation 
included conducting many hundreds of tests on various tank and bund configurations under 
differing modes of failure to determine the major parameters involved in the quantification 
of bund wall overtopping and dynamic pressures along with the associated wave velocities. 
The main results from this research indicate that, although rare, the possibility exists that a 
bulk storage tank may fail and that considerable stored material can overtop the secondary 
containment. The volume of fluid lost over the bund/dyke depends on a number of 
variables, however the principal parameter in the determination of the magnitude of the 
overtopping is the ratio h/H. 
The vast amount of data collected has made it possible to derive empirical formulae to 
predict the magnitude of both the overtopping and dynamic pressures likely to be 
experienced under a wide range of scenarios. These empirical equations have been 
checked to ensure they reasonably represent the experimental results from which they were 
derived and validated against previous research data including a suitable case study. 
For overtopping, Equation 6.1: 
A exp[- B( 
h )] 
H 
With A and B taking values as recommended in Chapter 6 
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For dynamic pressures, Equation 6.2: 
DynlStat C exp[- D( 
h 
With C and D taking values as recommended in Chapter 6 
It is the large number of configurations, the detail of the recorded results and the 
determination of the dynamic pressures that make this research novel in its approach to this 
long-standing problem. The development of the predictive equations give a simplified 
method of assessing the risks posed by existing facilities and allows a more accurate 
method of determining the performance of modified/new structures. 
The major impact of this work is the quantification of the potential losses given the various 
types of tank failure identified and the extent to which such losses can quickly escalate to 
create a major incident that can have long-lasting implications. I'liere is clear evidence 
that the measures currently employed are inadequate to provide complete containment 
given the types of failures possible, as supported by the findings in this research and the 
number of recorded incidents on a worldwide basis. This has serious implications for 
operators, regulators and planning authorities and suggests that an urgent review of major 
facilities should be undertaken with the express consideration of catastrophic tank failures 
along with other forms of major breaches. 
The aim and objectives of this research have therefore been realised and problems 
identified in the literature have been addressed. There is now a valid method of assessing 
the problem of bulk storage tank failure, which has been evaluated against work by 
previous researchers and case studies. Comparison with the seminal works of Greenspan 
and Young (1978) and Greenspan and Johansson (1981) has proven the empirical 
equations derived to be suitable in their application for the prediction of overtopping. This 
was further reinforced by the satisfactory performance of the equations when applied to the 
case history of the Ashland Oil incident, Floreffe, Pennsylvania, USA, 2 nd January 1988, 
where the equation suitably predicted the overtopping within the reported range of actual 
losses once adapted for an inclined dyke. 
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The performance of the equation for dynamic pressure was also suitably validated against 
the work of Henderson (1966) and Featherstone (1988) using the dam-break analogy. This 
was further underpinned by comparison with the work of Trbojevic and Slater (1989) using 
their finite difference model results and taking the slope of the dyke used in to account. 
Perhaps, one of the most unlikelY analogies was that made with the work of Kleefsman et 
al (2004), where wave impacts were investigated on containers placed on the deck of a 
ship. Although the comparison gave rise to differing Dow patterns, there were surprising 
similarities in the results obtained. 
Comparisons with results from the CFD analysis carried out by Louise (2007) on bulk 
storage tanks operated by Total France, gave rise to varied results in term of the expected 
dynamic pressures. This was attributed to the different methods of analysis employed on 
each of the test configurations using the CFD package and once the mean values were 
calculated, a satisfactory comparison was made. The work of Ivings and Webber (2007) 
stands as further testament to the quality of the data collected in this research, with their 
application of the findings of Atherton (2005) in the development of their novel CFD 
package 'SPLOT'. 
9.2 Overtopping 
It has been established from the literature that even though the probability of a catastrophic 
tank failure is extremely low, the possibility of major loss of costly materials, 
infrastructure and life along with long-lasting damage to the environment, make this 
research of vital importance to stakeholders. 
The overtopping fractions possible in the event of a catastrophic (axisymmetric) failure of 
the primary containment have been established and their magnitudes give cause for 
concern to any operators who are relying on the bunds to provide full secondary 
containment in such circumstances. For high-collar bunds the overtopping fraction is only 
a few % but for non high-collar bunds the overtopping fractions vary from 14 to 24 % at 
best, depending upon the initial tank fill levels and considering the larger height bunds at 
the closer bund radii, at the various bund capacities. For bunds of I 10 % nominal capacity 
overtopping fractions up to 70 % were obtained (Table 5.10). This represents a 
considerable loss of fluid over the secondary containment with the possibility of 
formidable environmental impact on the area surrounding the bund, and human impact if 
that area is populated. 
204 
Where spigot (asymmetric) failures are concerned, using a 110 % bund capacity, the 
overtopping fraction varies from 0 to 2% at best for orifice releases and from I to 31 % for 
slot releases. In the case of tall tanks, the overtopping fraction can be as high as 50 % for 
slot releases (Table 5.11). 
It has thus been demonstrated that the present bund design criteria produce structures that 
are unable to contain the spills resulting from catastrophic tank failures, the amount of 
spillage depending upon the individual configurations used, even if those structures are not 
damaged by the impact. 
9.2.1 Alternative design approach 
CIRIA, C598 by Cassie and Seale (2003) states that while the 110 % design criterion 
provides a good starting point, operators need to assess their own particular circumstances 
in terms of the characteristics of their installation and surrounding land use. Once this has 
been carried out, decisions should be made as to the extent of additional measures that 
need to be taken, whether to increase bund capacities or provide containment measures as 
is considered reasonably practicable. It is reasonable to assume that a review of such 
measures is particularly important in the event of retrofitting and/or refurbishment and 
should be the result of a rigorous risk assessment. 
CIRIA Report R164 (1997) is recommended as an alternative method for estimation of 
bund capacity and takes into account a number of factors in an effort to improve the overall 
performance of the secondary containment: 
o The total storage capacity of the tank/tanks in the bunded area. 
o The amount of rain fall that could possibly collect in a 24-hour period prior to a 
failure and for a period of 8 hours post failure, based on a 10 year period. 
o An allowance for fire fighting requiring the bund. to be of an adequate size, 
incorporating a recommended freeboard of 100 mm for foam. 
o An allowance for surges in the event of a catastrophic tank failure, nominally a 
freeboard of 250 mm should be allowed, however this is not based on any 
particular detailed analysis and in the case of earthen dykes should be increased to 
750 mm. 
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The bund capacity calculations allow for the volume of fluid retained within the tank, up to 
the height of the bund with allowances made for pipes, equipment and other permanent 
items within the bunded area. Physical or practical limitations to the size of a bund may 
reduce the capacity available to a value below that required. Various options are available 
to overcome the problem including reducing the storage tank capacity or constructing a 
containment system incorporating dedicated containment drainage and/or 
underground/remote storage. The most important factor is that the level of containment 
should be in direct response to the risk associated with the materials being stored. This 
will depend mostly on the risk assessment using both environmental and heath and safety 
factors. Environmental issues are decided on the best practical environmental option with 
health and safety problems rendered as low as reasonably practicable. 
Even though the recommendations made above go some way to addressing the existing 
problems, they do not give a method of assessing the level of risk and make suggestions 
that are not based on any suitably detailed analysis. The suggestion of increasing the bund 
capacity has only a minor effect on reducing the overtopping, as has been shown in this 
research, where bund capacities of 200 % still give rise to significant overtopping fractions 
(Table 5.1). The dynamic pressures on the bund from the accompanying surge are implied, 
but not quantified and yet again, no recommendations are made as to a method of 
undertaking a 'rigorous risk assessment. 
9.3 Dynamic pressures 
The dynamic pressures on the bunds have also been established. They have been linked to 
the overtopping fractions and in some cases are of significant magnitudes when compared 
to the hydrostatic pressures at the base of the bunds. For axisymmetric releases, the 
pressures on the bunds can be much greater than those normally employed for design 
purposes and were found to be mostly in excess of 6 times the hydrostatic pressure at the 
base (Table 5.10). Normally, bund design only considers the hydrostatic pressures, 
however the dynamic pressure distributions are very different to the hydrostatic pressure 
profiles, with variations of local dynamic pressure maxima. In the case of the smaller 
bunds, large variations in the dynamic/static pressure ratios were calculated, in one case 
the ratio was indicated to be as high as 16.45. However, such values are subject to 
interpretation due to the method of extrapolation and the positions of the sensors used to 
compute the dynamic pressures at the base. 
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When considering asymmetric releases, dynamic/static pressure ratios in excess of 3 are 
common for orifice type apertures with the maximum value calculated as 10.27. For slot 
type apertures, values in excess of 3 are again common with a maximum value of 8.59 
recorded (Table 5.11). 
The mechanical integrity of current bund design has to be questioned if the bunds are 
relied upon to provide secondary containment in the event of a sudden catastrophic failure 
of the primary containment. A catastrophic breach in the secondary containment due to the 
impact of a surge would be disastrous in terms of the total loss of any containment leading 
to a major incident of possible overwhelming environmental and human proportions. 
9.4 Wave heights 
The waves generated by a catastrophic tank failure can be considerable in terms of their 
height, and may reach heights greater than that of the original level of tank fill, with the 
potential to cause damage to adjoining tanks and equipment. The resulting tsunami can be 
far reaching with the separation layer and eventual droplet formation throwing fluid over 
vast distances. Details of recorded maximum wave heights can be found in the tables for 
the worst-case dynamic pressures and the charts for dynamic pressures and wave heights 
(Tables 5.3 and 5.6 and Charts 5.1 and 5.3 with full results in Appendices 2 and 3). 
9.5 Bund structural design and integrity 
To allow for maximum containment of hazardous liquids and protection of the 
environment, the inner faces of bunds should be impermeable. This can be achieved by 
careful consideration of the construction materials and the methods employed for 
connection of the structural elements to provide a continuous seal capable of preventing 
leaks. The most common materials used in the construction process are concrete, 
brickwork and block-work. In the case of concrete, which is reasonably impermeable, 
lining may be required depending on the reactivity of the liquid being retained. Brickwork 
and block-work are not normally considered as impermeable, although the use of 
considered bonding techniques can reduce porosity, lining are nearly always required. 
The type of lining will again depend on the reactivity of the materials, however chemical 
resistant resins, bituminous coatings or sheet linings are common. Maintenance of linings 
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is essential and the durability of the materials used together with the level of environmental 
exposure should be used to prevent degradation. 
The design of any bund should carefully consider the possibility of adverse loading 
conditions to ensure the necessary structural integrity throughout its life. The normal 
design criteria of withstanding the maximum volume they contain is no longer adequate as 
confirmed by a number of mathematical and experimental studies have shown. This will 
pose a particular problem with bund walls constructed from brick and block, which are 
normally structurally inferior to reinforced concrete bunds and will probably not survive 
the impact of a surging wave resulting from a catastrophic tank failure (Cassie and Seale, 
2003). 
9.6 Recommendations for reducing overtopping including modification of the 
bund 
The effect of ground conditions will obviously cause variations in the speed of the wave 
approaching the bund, especially with porous ground materials, where the volume released 
will decrease as fluid is absorbed. Further work could be undertaken: 
o To evaluate the overtopping fractions based on porous/roughened ground 
conditions again using similar test configurations used in this investigation. 
o To investigate the use of remedial works to modify existing bunding 
arrangements using inward facing deflectors or profiles to redirect the vertical 
and forward motion of the wave backwards and reduce the overtopping 
fraction. 
9.7 Recommendations for dynamic pressures 
Any directional release of fluid under the jetting scenario would lead to the likelihood of 
some form of mechanical failure of the bund itself due to the localised high impact. All 
bunds are susceptible to dynamic loading under primary storage catastrophic failure 
conditions, with higher dynamic/static pressure ratios occurring for smaller height bunds at 
larger radii. 
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Further work could be undertaken: 
o To further investigate the dynamic pressures experienced by low-level bunds at 
larger radii, with careful consideration given to more accurate determination of 
the dynamic pressures at the base of the bunds, given the limitations of scale 
and the physical size of any sensors used. 
9.8 Recommendations for wave heights 
The importance of the action of the resulting wave of fluid striking the bund has been 
established to some degree in this research, the nature of the overtopping wave in relation 
to the dynamic pressures being observed in some detail. Further work could be 
undertaken: 
o To reproduce the experimental work undertaken with emphasis on more 
detailed measurements on the actions of the overtopping waves in direct 
relation to the dynamic pressures generated on the bunds. 
9.9 Recommendations for modification of the storage vessel 
It is important to consider the function of the storage vessel in providing primary 
containment and any possible improvements in design that may reduce the damaged 
caused in the event of a catastrophic failure. A research programme has recently been 
approved by LJMU to investigate the feasibility of possible mitigation measures using a 
number of design options. It is planned to compare the performance of any feasible 
designs to the newly obtained test data. Further work could be undertaken: 
o To investigate the possibility of modifications to the primary containment in 
order to substantially reduce the overtopping fraction and dynamic pressures 
without the need to modify existing bunding arrangements. 
9.10 Site-specific modelling 
The work undertaken has been limited to considering a single tank surrounded by a single 
bund wall. Further work could be undertaken, for example: 
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o To study the effect on the overtopping fraction of having other tanks within the 
same bund. The positions of adjacent tanks can act to reduce the overtopping 
fraction by providing a physical obstacle to the escaping wave of fluid. 
Previous incidents have shown that there is a possibility of close proximity 
tanks sustaining impact damage and further adding to the quantity of escaping 
fluid. 
o To study the effects of buildings or natural features of the terrain outside the 
bund in diverting the overtopped fluid. The ground levels and other features of 
the site can act to concentrate or divert the flow of overtopped fluid with 
directed flow having sufficient energy to cause considerable damage to 
structures or plant in areas surrounding the bund. 
o To study retention in an adjacent bund or bunds following a catastrophic 
failure. Considerable quantities of fluid can be collected by neighbouring 
bunds in the event of significant overtopping of the bund containing the original 
source of failure. 
o To study the optimum design of an additional 'tertiary' bund or flow diverter. 
An additional bund surrounding the secondary containment area can limit the 
quantity of fluid escaping to the site in the event of overtopping of the main 
bund. The size and position of an additional bund could be identified using 
existing tank and bund parameters. The possible use of diverters to control the 
direction of any spills could be investigated, particularly where damage to items 
of important plant needs to be considered. 
9.11 Progress on recommendations 
A number of researchers including Greenspan and Johansson (1981) have proposed 
varying modifications to the profile of the secondary containment as a means of reducing 
losses in the event of a tank failure. Recent work undertaken at LJMU in 2007 has 
investigated a range of possible improvements, both to the primary and secondary 
containment, the full details of which are to be published over the next two years. This 
work has concentrated on retaining the bund capacity of I 10 %, as it has already been 
shown, counter to some arguments, that simply increasing the capacity of the secondary 
containment does not prevent substantial losses occurring in the event of a tank failure 
(Atherton 2005). The most productive in terms of loss reduction have been termed MOTIF 
(Mitigation Of Tank Instantaneous Failure) and COAST (Catastrophic Overtopping 
Alleviation of Storage Tanks), both of which are the subject of a current patent application. 
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MOTIF is a modification to the design of the storage vessel; it involves the installation of a 
low level internal baffle, the dimensions of which are governed by the type of tank to 
which the modification is made. The purpose of the baffle is to reduce the velocity of any 
escaping liquid that would be released in the event of a catastrophic tank failure. COAST 
incorporates a specially designed deflector fitted to the top of the bund wall capable of 
withstanding any wave impact. If added to an existing bund this would marginally 
increase the overall capacity of the secondary containment. If however, the modification is 
incorporated into the design of a new secondary containment system, then 110 % capacity 
remains more than adequate. It is the shape of the additional deflector, which is of 
significance in preventing overtopping rather than the overall dimensions of the structure. 
The findings of this research and the evolution of MOTIF and COAST are to be modelled 
using advanced CFD software as part of an investigation of the possibility of developing a 
decision support tool for the process industry and regulators. It is envisaged that such a 
tool will be based on an Excel spreadsheet enabling a relatively quick method of carrying 
out a site-specific risk assessment and evaluating a suitable method of mitigation if 
required. 
9.12 Summary 
The range and weight of evidence provided in terms of the performance of secondary 
containment under all foreseeable modes of failure is difficult to refute, yet facilities 
continue to be constructed without due consideration of all the facts. The statistical 
approach to the probability of a tank failure has its place in the assessment of risk, yet 
given the magnitude of losses and the extensive short and long-term environmental impact 
of such failures, assessment criteria must merit the consideration of a more deterministic 
approach. 
The development of effective and practicable mitigation is only one consideration in the 
reduction of losses and a range of hazards will always be present, given the nature of the 
process industry and the complexity of the systems employed. Careful land use planning 
and the correct selection of future sites in terms of locally sensitive areas must also be a 
major factor together with geographical, topographical and geological considerations. 
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